Omar Washington v. Daniel Martuscello Jr., et al.

Background

Omar Washington, who was incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, filed a self-represented lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued Daniel Martuscello Jr., identified in the caption as a defendant, in his official capacity; Officer Washington in her individual capacity; and Sergeant Riley in his individual capacity. The opinion’s body refers to Martuscello as Daniel Martuscello III, while the caption identifies him as Daniel Martuscello Jr.

Washington alleged that he is a member of the Nation of Islam and participates in Jumah, a religious service. He claimed that on December 29, 2023, Officer Washington failed to prepare the list used to identify incarcerated people scheduled for religious programming. When Washington asked about the chapel trip, she told him that no call had yet been received. After the chaplain called later, Officer Washington began preparing paperwork, but Sergeant Riley arrived and determined that it was too late for the trip. Washington alleged that people in other housing areas were allowed to attend religious services while people in his housing block were not.

Washington asserted claims under the First Amendment’s protection for religious exercise, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection guarantee, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The opinion notes that his complaint also referred to the Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but the court did not address those theories because Washington did not provide supporting factual allegations and was not challenging a law that substantially burdened his religious exercise.

Rule 12(b)(6) standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to support a plausible legal claim. Because Washington was representing himself, the court interpreted his filings liberally and considered factual allegations in his opposition papers when they were consistent with the complaint.

Claims against Martuscello

The court dismissed all claims against Martuscello without prejudice. Under § 1983, a government official generally cannot be held liable solely because the official supervises employees. A plaintiff must allege the official’s own involvement in the alleged violation. For an official-capacity claim based on a government policy or practice, the plaintiff must also allege facts showing that an official policy, widespread practice, or deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise caused the violation.

The court found that Washington did not identify a policy or custom, specific actions by Martuscello, or facts showing inadequate training or supervision. Washington’s assertion that Martuscello failed to stop known violations was conclusory. The court also found that Washington did not adequately allege that Martuscello personally participated in the events. It rejected Washington’s request for a declaration about past violations because that relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and it found no facts showing an imminent risk of continuing violations that could support prospective relief.

First Amendment religious-exercise claim

The court dismissed Washington’s First Amendment claim without prejudice. It applied Second Circuit law holding that negligence is not enough to support a § 1983 claim for denial of religious exercise. The complaint alleged, at most, an isolated negligent act or administrative oversight. It did not allege that Officer Washington or Sergeant Riley intentionally denied Washington access to religious services or acted with deliberate indifference, meaning a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.

The court noted that Officer Washington attempted to arrange the chapel trip after receiving the chaplain’s call, and that Sergeant Riley later decided it was too late to send the group. The court also stated that Washington provided no details about the two additional missed services mentioned in his opposition, including whether the defendants were personally involved in those events.

Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim

The court dismissed the equal-protection claim without prejudice. To state this type of claim, Washington needed to allege that he was intentionally treated differently from similarly situated people because of membership in an identifiable or protected group. The court found that his statements that the defendants acted intentionally and discriminatorily were conclusory.

The court also found that the fact that people in other housing blocks were allowed to attend religious services did not establish an equal-protection violation. Housing blocks are not a protected class, and Washington did not identify the religious backgrounds of the people who were permitted to attend. The court observed that some of them may have been Muslims attending the same type of service, which undermined an allegation that Washington was treated differently because of his religion.

RLUIPA claim

The court dismissed Washington’s RLUIPA claim without prejudice. RLUIPA protects a confined person from a substantial burden on religious exercise unless the government proves that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. The court found that missing one, or even three, religious services did not establish a substantial burden on Washington’s religious practice. It also concluded that the alleged negligent conduct was insufficient to support a RLUIPA claim.

The court separately held that RLUIPA did not authorize the damages Washington sought against state officers in either their official or individual capacities. The opinion states that Washington sought $100,000 from Officer Washington and Sergeant Riley.

Disposition and opportunity to amend

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed all claims against all defendants without prejudice. It granted Washington leave to file an amended complaint by December 1, 2025. If he did not file one by that date, his claims would be dismissed with prejudice. If he filed an amended complaint on time, the defendants would have 21 days to answer or otherwise respond.