F.P.D. v. Brott

Background

Petitioner Fernando F.P.D. is an Ecuadorian citizen who entered the United States without inspection on November 26, 2019, and has lived here without authorization since then. At the time of the court's ruling, he was charged with disorderly conduct under Minnesota Statutes § 609.72.1(1). On November 22, 2025, ICE arrested him in St. Anthony, Minnesota, serving him that same day with a Warrant for Arrest of Alien and a Notice to Appear in immigration court. The warrant cited authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1357 (INA §§ 236 and 287). However, ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations officers separately determined that Fernando was subject to detention as an "applicant for admission" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(1) and (b)(2) — a classification that triggers mandatory detention with no bond hearing. Fernando was transferred to Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota.

The Legal Framework at Issue

Two different statutory regimes govern immigration detention:

- 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens "seeking admission" (i.e., arriving aliens or those treated as arriving aliens). Detention under this provision is mandatory — the detainee has no right to a bond hearing. - 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to noncitizens already present in the United States. Detention under this provision is generally discretionary, meaning an immigration judge must hold a bond hearing to determine whether the person should be released pending removal proceedings. (A subsection, § 1226(c), mandates detention for certain individuals who have committed specified crimes, but the government did not argue Fernando fell into that category.)

Fernando filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 — the federal statute authorizing courts to order release of a person being held unlawfully — arguing he was misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) instead of § 1226, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706.

Respondents' Arguments

The government raised two primary defenses:

1. Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Respondents argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) strip federal district courts of jurisdiction. Section 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) channel review of removal orders exclusively to courts of appeals. Section 1252(g) strips jurisdiction over the government's decisions "to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." Respondents also argued Fernando failed to exhaust his administrative remedies — i.e., he had not yet litigated the classification issue before an immigration judge — before seeking federal court review.

2. Merits. Respondents argued that the § 1225(b)(2) classification was correct as a matter of statutory interpretation.

The Court's Analysis

Jurisdiction

The court rejected the jurisdiction arguments, consistent with a series of prior rulings in the District of Minnesota (citing Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, Avila v. Bondi, Andres R.E. v. Bondi, Santos M.C. v. Olson, and Roberto M.F. v. Olson, among others). The court reasoned that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252 address challenges to removal orders and to DHS decisions about commencing or executing removal proceedings — not the "narrow question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under § 1226 or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)." Fernando's detention classification challenge does not fall within those categories. The court further held, relying on Eliseo A.A., that Fernando was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing in federal court.

Merits: Correct Classification

The court held that Fernando had been misclassified. Section 1225(b)(2) applies to aliens "seeking admission," while § 1226 applies to aliens already in the country. Fernando has lived in the United States for approximately six years; his Notice to Appear checked the box for "alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled" and did not check the "arriving alien" box. The court cited Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), and multiple District of Minnesota decisions, as well as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 25-3050 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025), which reached the same conclusion. The court noted that as of December 17, 2025, the Seventh Circuit was the only federal court of appeals to have ruled on the question.

Relief Granted and Denied

The court granted the habeas petition in part:

- Granted: A declaration that § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention does not apply to Fernando, and that he is subject instead to discretionary detention under § 1226. - Granted: An injunction ordering Respondents to provide Fernando with a bond hearing under § 1226(a)(2)(A) and prohibiting them from denying such a hearing on § 1225(b)(2) grounds. - Not granted: Immediate release — the court declined to order Fernando freed outright. - Not granted: Fernando's request to prevent Respondents from filing a Form EOIR-43 (a government form that can stay a bond order) — the court declined because the parties had not briefed the issue. - Not reached: The APA arguments, which the court found unnecessary to address.

Judge Tostrud directed that judgment be entered accordingly.