Gonzalez v. United States of America
- Laura Provinzino
- 0:25-cv-03938
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 4
In Gonzalez v. United States, Judge Provinzino denied a federal prisoner's petition for early-release time credits because a final removal order made him ineligible under federal law.
Federal prisoners who are subject to final orders of removal and who have earned — or hope to earn — First Step Act time credits toward early release. This ruling, consistent with decisions from the Second and Seventh Circuits, confirms that such prisoners, including former lawful permanent residents whose status terminated upon issuance of a final removal order, are statutorily ineligible to apply those credits.
What happened
In Gonzalez v. United States (Case No. 25-cv-3938), federal prisoner Camilo E. Gonzalez filed a petition seeking a ruling that he was entitled to earned time credits under the First Step Act — a federal law allowing prisoners to reduce their sentences by completing certain programs. Gonzalez, a Cuban national who had been a lawful permanent resident, is serving a sentence for a drug conspiracy conviction and became subject to a final order of removal from the United States while imprisoned. He argued that a federal law barring prisoners under final removal orders from using these time credits violated his constitutional right to equal treatment under the law.
Gonzalez acknowledged that the law explicitly bars prisoners under final orders of removal from applying earned time credits toward early release. However, he argued that because he was a lawful permanent resident — not an undocumented immigrant — the removal order had no legal effect on his rights and that denying him these credits treated him unequally compared to U.S. citizens. The court rejected this argument, citing federal regulations and case law establishing that lawful permanent resident status ends automatically when a final order of removal is entered, and noting that multiple courts of appeals have found the time-credit restriction does not violate equal protection.
Judge Laura M. Provinzino adopted the earlier recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko and denied Gonzalez's petition. The court found that the statute plainly makes prisoners under final removal orders ineligible for these time credits and that this rule does not violate Gonzalez's constitutional equal protection rights, since his lawful permanent resident status had already been terminated by the removal order itself.
The detailed version
- Gonzalez v. United States of America · No. 0:25-cv-03938
- Laura M. Provinzino
- Dec. 19, 2025
Background
Petitioner Camilo E. Gonzalez, a federal prisoner and Cuban national, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (a court order challenging the lawfulness of a person's imprisonment or detention conditions) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 14, 2025. Gonzalez is serving a sentence for conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He sought a ruling affirming his eligibility for First Step Act Earned Time Credits ("FTCs") — a program under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) that allows federal prisoners to reduce their time in custody by completing approved rehabilitative programming.
While imprisoned, Gonzalez — who had previously held lawful permanent resident (LPR) status in the United States — became subject to a final administrative order of removal under federal immigration law.
Procedural History
On November 25, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the petition be denied on the ground that Gonzalez is statutorily ineligible for FTCs. Gonzalez filed objections to the R&R; the United States urged its adoption. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the district judge must conduct a de novo (fresh, independent) review of portions of an R&R to which a party has objected.
Legal Framework
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) generally requires that FTCs earned by prisoners be applied toward prerelease custody or supervised release. However, § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) creates an explicit exception: a prisoner who is "subject of a final order of removal under any provision of the immigration laws" is ineligible to apply those time credits. Gonzalez did not dispute the underlying facts or his removal order; he challenged the statute's constitutionality as applied to him.
Gonzalez's Equal Protection Argument
Gonzalez argued that § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment (which prohibits the federal government from denying equal protection of the laws) because it denies him, as a lawful permanent resident, the same benefits available to U.S. citizens. He further contended that a removal order has "no legal effect" on lawful permanent residents and does not deprive them of the right to remain in the United States.
The Court's Analysis
The court rejected Gonzalez's equal protection challenge on two independent grounds.
Controlling and Persuasive Authority on Equal Protection
The court cited two appellate decisions holding that § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i) does not violate equal protection by denying FTCs to non-citizens subject to final removal orders: Cheng v. United States, 132 F.4th 655, 658 (2d Cir. 2025), and Lopez v. Emmerich, No. 24-3195, 2025 WL 3172841, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025).
Loss of LPR Status Upon Final Removal Order
The court also addressed Gonzalez's claim that his LPR status distinguished him from other non-citizens. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p), lawful permanent resident status "terminates upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion, deportation, removal, or rescission." The court cited Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2010), which confirmed that LPR status continues only until a final removal order is entered. Because Gonzalez's removal order became final, his LPR status was rescinded, and the distinction he sought to draw — between lawful permanent residents and undocumented individuals — did not apply to him. The court also cited Nycklass v. Healy, No. 4:23-cv-2166, 2024 WL 1054408 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2024), which applied the same reasoning to a former LPR in the same procedural posture.
Disposition
Judge Provinzino overruled Gonzalez's objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge's R&R in full, and denied Gonzalez's petition. Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly. The order does not address whether Gonzalez retains the right to appeal or any certificate of appealability (a procedural requirement for habeas petitioners to pursue an appeal).
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.