P. v. Samuel J. Olson
Victor Hugo D. P. v. Samuel J. Olson, Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, St. Paul Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as acting director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Pam Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; Joel Brott, Sherburne County Sheriff
- Laura Provinzino
- 0:25-cv-04593
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 9
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate and have been consolidated across spelling variants.
In Victor Hugo D. P. v. Olson, Judge Provinzino granted a habeas petition ordering the government to give an immigration detainee a bond hearing within 7 days.
Noncitizens who have been living inside the United States without lawful status and are detained by ICE pending removal proceedings, particularly those who have been denied bond hearings on the theory that they are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) rather than the bond-hearing provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals applying Matter of Yajure Hurtado are also directly affected by this ruling.
What happened
In Victor Hugo D. P. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4593, Victor Hugo D. P., a Mexican citizen who has lived in the United States without legal status for nearly twenty years, was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in November 2025 and detained pending removal proceedings. An immigration judge denied his request for a bond hearing, ruling that he was subject to mandatory detention under a federal immigration law (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)) and relying on a recent Board of Immigration Appeals decision called Matter of Yajure Hurtado. Victor Hugo D. P. then filed a petition in federal district court asking to be released or, at minimum, given a bond hearing.
The central legal dispute was which immigration detention law applied to Victor Hugo D. P. The government argued he was an 'applicant for admission' subject to mandatory detention — meaning he had no right to a bond hearing at all — partly because he stated he intended to remain in the United States if released on bond. Victor Hugo D. P. argued that the mandatory detention provision applies only to people physically seeking to enter the country at a port of entry or border, not to someone already living inside the United States for nearly two decades. The court agreed with Victor Hugo D. P., finding that 'admission' under the relevant statute means the physical act of entering the country, not an expression of a desire to stay. Because he was arrested inside the country — not at a border crossing or port of entry — he was not 'seeking admission' and was therefore entitled to a bond hearing under a different provision (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).
Judge Laura M. Provinzino granted the habeas petition and ordered the government to provide Victor Hugo D. P. with a bond hearing within 7 days. The court declined to order his immediate release, finding that his detention was not unlawful by itself — only the denial of a bond hearing was. The court added that if the government fails to hold the bond hearing within 7 days, Victor Hugo D. P. must be immediately released from detention. The motion for a temporary restraining order was denied as moot because the habeas petition was granted.
The detailed version
- P. v. Samuel J. Olson · No. 0:25-cv-04593
- Laura M. Provinzino
- Dec. 19, 2025
Background
Victor Hugo D. P. is a native and citizen of Mexico who has resided in the United States without lawful immigration status for approximately twenty years. He has no criminal history and lives with his partner, a lawful permanent resident, and his stepson, a United States citizen. He had no prior contact with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) before November 2025.
On November 18, 2025, ICE arrested Victor Hugo D. P. and placed him in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security pending removal proceedings. He moved before an immigration judge for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which generally governs the arrest and detention of noncitizens already present in the United States and allows for bond hearings. The immigration judge denied the motion, concluding that Victor Hugo D. P. was instead subject to mandatory detention — meaning detention with no right to a bond hearing — under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which governs noncitizens arriving at the border and seeking admission. The immigration judge relied on a recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025), which held that immigration judges lack authority to grant bond to noncitizens who are unlawfully present in the United States because such individuals are subject to mandatory detention.
On December 11, 2025, Victor Hugo D. P. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — a court order challenging the lawfulness of his detention — along with a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). He asserted statutory claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), constitutional claims, and claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). He sought either immediate release or an order directing the government to provide a bond hearing.
Prior Precedent and Court's Pre-Briefing Order
The court noted that it had already ruled on the identical legal question in Roberto M. F. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4456, 2025 WL 3524455 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2025), and that nearly every federal court to consider the issue had rejected Yajure Hurtado's reasoning and ordered the government to provide bond hearings under § 1226(a). The court ordered the government to respond within three days and limited its response to a good-faith argument for why this case was factually or legally distinguishable from Roberto M. F., stating it would not reconsider its prior holding absent such a showing.
Government's Arguments and the Court's Rejection
Argument 1: Reconsideration of Roberto M. F. The government asked the court to reconsider its holding in Roberto M. F. and adopt Yajure Hurtado's reasoning. The court declined.
Argument 2: Factual Distinctions
Distinction A — No prior contact with immigration authorities
The government argued that unlike Roberto M. F., who had taken affirmative steps to adjust his immigration status, Victor Hugo D. P. had never had any contact with immigration authorities. The court found this distinction legally irrelevant because the government offered no explanation for why it would matter to the legal question at issue.
Distinction B — Intent to remain in the United States
The government argued that Victor Hugo D. P.'s stated intention to remain in Minnesota if released on bond made him an 'applicant for admission' subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). The government cited Melgar v. Bondi, No. 8:25-cv-555 (D. Neb. 2025), a minority decision that adopted this reasoning.
The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it noted factually that prior cases in the District of Minnesota — including Roberto M. F. itself — had already involved noncitizens who wanted to remain in the United States, so the claimed distinction was not novel. Second, and more substantively, the court disagreed with Melgar's legal conclusion.
Statutory Analysis: § 1225(b)(2) vs. § 1226(a)
The court's holding rests on the meaning of 'seeking admission' as used in § 1225(b)(2). To be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), a noncitizen must have been 'seeking admission' at the time of arrest.
The INA defines 'admission' as 'the lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.' 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). The court further cited longstanding Supreme Court precedent holding that 'entry' in the immigration context means the physical act of 'coming from outside' into the United States. United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929). Therefore, to be 'seeking admission,' a noncitizen must be presently seeking physical entry — coming from outside the country.
The court also examined the statutory definition of 'application for admission,' which the INA defines as referring to 'the application for admission into the United States and not to the application for the issuance of an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa.' 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4). This confirmed that 'admission' means physical entry, not an expression of a desire to stay or obtain legal status.
Applying these definitions, the court concluded that because Victor Hugo D. P. was arrested inside the United States — not at a border crossing or port of entry while seeking to enter — he was not 'seeking admission' within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2). Accordingly, § 1225(b)(2)'s mandatory detention provisions did not apply to him.
The court also rejected the broader implication of the government's argument: that any noncitizen who expresses a desire to remain in the country pending or after immigration proceedings would be deemed 'seeking admission,' effectively eliminating bond hearings for virtually all detained noncitizens. The court noted this would render § 1226(a) meaningless, violating the canon requiring courts to give full effect to every part of a statute. See Owner-Operator Ind. Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., 651 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2011).
Relief Granted
The court granted the habeas petition and ordered the government to provide Victor Hugo D. P. with a bond hearing before an immigration judge in accordance with § 1226(a) within 7 days. The court declined to order his immediate release, consistent with its ruling in Roberto M. F., because his detention was not unlawful per se — only the denial of a bond hearing was unlawful. However, the court ordered that if the government fails to hold the bond hearing within 7 days, Victor Hugo D. P. must be immediately released. The government was also ordered to file a status update within 8 days reporting the results of any bond hearing or, if none was held, advising the court of his release.
The TRO motion (ECF No. 2) was denied as moot because the habeas petition was granted.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.