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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Dec. 19, 2025

Boose v. Musk

Judge
Martinez-Olguin
Docket
3:25-cv-03366
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
8
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissPro SeContract
In one sentence

In Boose v. Musk, Judge Martinez-Olguin screened and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, denied appointed counsel, and terminated remaining motions as moot.

Who this affects

Elliot Casray Boose and the defendants named in his complaint, including Elon Musk and X Corp.; Boose’s complaint was dismissed, with permission to amend only the fraud and breach-of-contract claims.

What happened

In Elliot Casray Boose v. Elon Musk, et al., Boose, representing himself, sued over X Corp.’s handling of his advertisement for an e-book. He asserted fraud, breach of contract, and sex discrimination claims.

The court granted Boose permission to proceed without paying the filing fee and screened his complaint. It found that the fraud and contract claims lacked sufficient factual support, and that the sex-discrimination claim failed because California law governed and the complaint did not allege discrimination occurring in California.

Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin dismissed the complaint, allowing Boose to amend the fraud and contract claims but not the sex-discrimination claim. The judge denied Boose’s request for appointed counsel and terminated the remaining motions as moot; an amended complaint was due January 16, 2026.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Boose v. Musk · No. 3:25-cv-03366
Judge
Martinez-Olguin
Date
Dec. 19, 2025

Background

Elliot Casray Boose represented himself. He alleged that X Corp. operates the social-networking service X, formerly known as Twitter, and that he paid for X advertisements to promote an e-book. He alleged that his account was later “shadow banned,” that his advertisement was paused, and that X support identified concerns with the advertisement and invited him to make adjustments. The opinion says he did not allege that he made the requested adjustments.

Boose asserted claims for fraud, breach of contract, and “Sex Discrimination.” The sex-discrimination claim relied on a law identified in the complaint as the Republic of Georgia’s law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination. The court applied California law because of the choice-of-law provision in the applicable Terms of Service.

Screening standard

Because the court granted Boose’s renewed application to proceed without paying the filing fee, it screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. That statute requires dismissal of an action filed under that process if the complaint is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. The court explained that the failure-to-state-a-claim standard is the same as the standard used for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court also applied the heightened pleading requirement for fraud under Rule 9(b), which requires specific details about the alleged misconduct.

Fraud claim

The court dismissed the fraud claim because Boose alleged only generally that X Corp. gave fraudulent reasons for its concerns about his advertisement. He did not identify the allegedly fraudulent reasons, plausibly allege that they were false when made, allege facts showing an intent to defraud, or show that he relied on a false statement and changed his position because of it. He also did not plausibly allege resulting damages. The court noted that he did not allege when he received the message, which X Corp. employee sent it, how he was misled, or that the defendants gained anything.

Breach-of-contract claim

The court held that Boose did not plausibly plead breach of contract. In particular, the Terms of Service included in the complaint contradicted his contention that X Corp. breached the contract by not allowing him to buy advertisements to promote his e-book. The court concluded that he could not state a breach-of-contract claim based on those Terms.

Sex-discrimination claim

The court held that the claim under the Republic of Georgia’s law failed as a matter of law because California law governed the dispute. The court also considered whether Boose could state a claim under California’s civil-rights protections, including the Unruh Civil Rights Act. It concluded that the complaint did not identify discrimination occurring within California’s borders and instead focused on alleged discrimination in Georgia. The court therefore dismissed the sex-discrimination claim.

Leave to amend and other motions

The court granted Boose leave to amend the fraud and breach-of-contract claims because it was not clear that amendment of those claims would be futile. It did not allow him to raise the sex-discrimination claim again in an amended complaint, concluding that amendment of that claim would be futile.

The court denied Boose’s motion to appoint counsel. It found no exceptional circumstances, stating that Boose had not shown a likelihood of success, that the issues were not complex, and that his pleading problems resulted from legal deficiencies rather than an inability to present his claims without counsel.

Disposition

The court granted Boose’s application to proceed without paying the filing fee, dismissed the complaint under Section 1915 with leave to amend as described above, denied the motion to appoint counsel, and terminated all remaining motions as moot. The court set January 16, 2026, as the deadline for Boose’s first amended complaint and stated that no additional parties or claims could be added without court permission or the defendants’ agreement.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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