Kesireddy v. Scott

Background

Mahender Reddy Kesireddy sued to compel federal officials to act on an immigration petition that was pending with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The opinion states that he filed the petition on May 26, 2023, and had received no meaningful status updates. He alleged that he was a victim of domestic violence by his former wife and was seeking immigration status through a petition created under the Violence Against Women Act.

The opinion states that USCIS processes these petitions under a first-in, first-out system, subject to limited exceptions. It also states that the estimated processing time for Violence Against Women Act self-petitions was 42.5 months, and that Kesireddy’s application remained well within that estimate when the defendants moved for summary judgment.

Jurisdiction

Kesireddy sought relief under both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Mandamus Act. The court elected to analyze the Administrative Procedure Act claim because the two claims sought identical relief. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that it lacked jurisdiction because USCIS had no deadline to decide the petition. It held that the agency had a mandatory duty to adjudicate the petition within a reasonable time, even without a specific deadline.

Unreasonable Delay

The court applied the six-factor test from Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. Federal Communications Commission, commonly called the TRAC test, to determine whether the delay was unreasonable.

The first factor asks whether the agency’s timing follows a reasonable rule, and the second considers any congressional timetable or indication of expected speed. The court found that USCIS’s first-in, first-out system satisfied the first factor. It found that Congress’s stated 180-day benchmark for processing immigration-benefit applications slightly favored Kesireddy under the second factor.

The third and fifth factors address the effect of delay on human welfare and the interests harmed by the delay. The court acknowledged Kesireddy’s allegations of emotional, financial, and physical abuse, as well as his inability to find permanent employment and reliance on financial support from his elderly parents. It nevertheless found that these factors only slightly favored him because the alleged harms were primarily economic and the record suggested he was in a safe and stable living situation.

The fourth factor considers the effect of expedited relief on the agency’s competing priorities. The court found that this factor favored the defendants because moving Kesireddy ahead in a first-in, first-out system could place other applicants farther back in the queue. The sixth factor asks whether agency impropriety is involved. Because the parties agreed there was no bad faith or impropriety, the court treated this factor as neutral.

Ruling

Judge Jon S. Tigar concluded that the first and fourth factors outweighed the second, third, and fifth factors, while the sixth factor was neutral. The court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment based on the undisputed facts and that Kesireddy had not shown a material factual dispute requiring a trial.

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It directed the clerk to enter judgment and close the file.