Cooper v. NYPD Detective Brengie Vasquez

Background

Kaazim Cooper proceeded without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee. He brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of constitutional rights by state or local actors. He alleged that Detective Brengie Vasquez and unidentified New York Police Department officers searched his residence under a warrant and seized, among other things, a cell phone during an assault investigation. A state-court jury later convicted Cooper of the assault, and the state trial court denied his challenge to the warrant.

In an earlier order, the court dismissed claims against two state judges and a prosecutor based on immunity, dismissed claims against the City of New York for failing to plead facts supporting municipal liability, and dismissed other claims for failure to state a claim. The court allowed Cooper to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint named Detective Vasquez, John Doe New York Police Department officers, and the City.

Motions concerning the judge

Cooper sought recusal, reassignment, or a change of venue. He based the request on the court’s handling of his case and its prior rulings. Judge Swain concluded that Cooper did not show personal bias, conduct outside the court proceedings, or the kind of extreme favoritism or hostility that would make a fair decision impossible. The court therefore denied the motion for recusal, reassignment, or a change of venue.

Claims concerning the search warrant

Cooper repeated his assertion that the warrant materials did not adequately connect his electronic devices to the assault and that grand-jury testimony did not make that connection. The court dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim, relying on its earlier order and its analysis in this order.

Cooper newly alleged that Detective Vasquez knowingly or recklessly made false statements or omissions in the warrant affidavit. The court explained that a claim based on a fraudulently obtained warrant requires facts plausibly showing that the officer deliberately or recklessly made false statements or material omissions that were necessary to the probable-cause finding. The court found that the affidavit said there was reasonable cause to believe evidence might be found on Cooper’s devices; it did not say that such evidence would definitely be found. The amended complaint and its attachments did not plausibly show deliberate or reckless falsehoods or material omissions. The court dismissed this claim for failure to state a claim.

Cooper also alleged that the judge never signed the warrant. The court found that this allegation conflicted with Cooper’s other allegations and the materials he submitted, which indicated that the judge had approved the warrant. The court further held that, even if the warrant lacked a signature, the absence of a signature alone would not invalidate it if the judge reviewed the supporting materials, found probable cause, and authorized the search. The court concluded that Cooper had not stated a viable constitutional claim based on an allegedly unauthorized warrant and dismissed this claim for failure to state a claim.

Claims concerning Cooper’s mother

Cooper alleged that the search violated the privacy rights of other people living in the apartment, including his mother. Because Cooper did not indicate that he was a lawyer, the court held that he could not represent his mother or assert claims on her behalf. The court dismissed without prejudice any claims Cooper was asserting on his mother’s behalf.

Claim against the City

Cooper alleged that the City failed to train officers about the need for a signed warrant. The court explained that a municipality is not liable under Section 1983 merely because one of its employees allegedly violated someone’s rights. A plaintiff must allege a city policy, custom, or practice that caused an underlying constitutional violation. The court found that Cooper had not shown an underlying constitutional violation and had not alleged facts showing that a City policy, custom, or practice caused his injury. It dismissed the municipal-liability claim for failure to state a claim.

State-law claims and amendment

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, over any state-law claims Cooper might be asserting. The court also denied further leave to amend because it concluded that another amendment could not cure the complaint’s defects.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the complaint under the federal filing-fee statute’s screening provision. The court denied any pending motions, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment, and denied Cooper permission to proceed without paying the filing fee on appeal after certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.