Ahmad v. The City of New York
- Paul Engelmayer
- 1:25-cv-04166
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 2
In Rasheed Ahmad v. The City of New York, Magistrate Judge Figueredo ruled that IFP status does not prevent defendants from filing a motion to dismiss.
Rasheed Ahmad may respond to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the defendants may file that motion despite the court’s earlier grant of IFP status.
What happened
Rasheed Ahmad v. The City of New York concerns whether defendants may seek dismissal after the court granted Ahmad permission to proceed without paying filing fees. Ahmad opposed the defendants’ request for a schedule to brief their dismissal motion.
Ahmad argued that the court’s earlier review of his complaint was equivalent to deciding that it could survive a motion to dismiss. The court rejected that argument, explaining that fee-waiver screening and a defendant’s motion to dismiss are separate procedures.
Magistrate Judge Valerie Figueredo held that the defendants may file their motion to dismiss and that Ahmad will have an opportunity to respond. The clerk was directed to mail the order to Ahmad.
The detailed version
- Ahmad v. The City of New York · No. 1:25-cv-04166
- Paul Engelmayer
- Nov. 5, 2025
Issue
The issue was whether the defendants could request a briefing schedule and file a motion to dismiss after the court granted Rasheed Ahmad in forma pauperis (IFP) status, meaning permission to proceed under the federal fee-waiver process.
Ahmad’s Argument
Ahmad did not consent to the defendants’ request for a briefing schedule. He argued that the action had already survived a review equivalent to a motion to dismiss because the court had granted him IFP status.
Court’s Reasoning
The court rejected that argument. It explained that the court decides whether to grant IFP status, while a defendant decides whether to bring a motion to dismiss. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must screen an IFP complaint for issues such as an untrue poverty allegation, frivolousness, failure to state a claim, or a request for money damages from an immune defendant. The court may dismiss a complaint on its own during that screening, but the opinion explained that early dismissal of a self-represented plaintiff’s complaint is strongly disfavored when the complaint presents a legally supportable claim and the defendants have not yet submitted their papers.
The court therefore stated that IFP screening does not bar a defendant from filing a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), including a motion arguing that the complaint fails to state a claim. Ahmad will have an opportunity to oppose that motion.
Disposition
Magistrate Judge Valerie Figueredo rejected Ahmad’s argument and stated that the defendants are entitled to file their motion to dismiss. The clerk was directed to mail the order to Ahmad at the address listed on the docket. The opinion did not decide whether the complaint ultimately states a claim or whether the defendants’ motion should be granted.
Procedural Classification
This is a procedural order. It addresses the relationship between IFP screening and a later motion to dismiss, without deciding the merits of Ahmad’s claims.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.