Sequen v. Albarran

Background

The plaintiffs challenged 2025 policies issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). The policies concerned civil immigration arrests at or near immigration courthouses, detention in ICE short-term hold rooms for more than 12 hours, and conditions at ICE’s San Francisco field office at 630 Sansome Street.

The plaintiffs asserted claims on behalf of two provisionally certified classes. The courthouse-arrest class challenged ICE’s and EOIR’s 2025 arrest policies under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permits courts to review certain federal agency actions. The detention class challenged ICE’s waiver of its prior 12-hour hold-room limit under the APA and alleged that conditions at 630 Sansome violated the First and Fifth Amendments and federal immigration law.

The government moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state APA claims. The Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the motion did not challenge the conditions-of-confinement claims.

Jurisdiction and Mr. Hernandez Torres

The court rejected the government’s arguments concerning standing, ripeness, mootness, and the plaintiffs’ ability to challenge detention conditions in this action. The court also concluded that the amended complaint supported a reasonable inference that the named plaintiffs were affected by restrictions on attorney-client communications at 630 Sansome.

The court separately addressed Martin Hernandez Torres’s claims. ICE had arrested him after a reasonable-fear interview connected to his removal proceedings, and the government later removed him to Mexico. The court had previously concluded that the potential class claims were inherently temporary and therefore would not necessarily become moot when a class representative’s individual claim expired. But the court declined to certify Mr. Hernandez Torres as a representative of the provisional detention class because he could not adequately represent the class’s interests. As a result, the exception no longer applied, his claims were moot, and the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss as to him. The clerk was directed to terminate him as a party.

APA claims

The court held that the remaining plaintiffs stated viable APA claims challenging ICE’s and EOIR’s courthouse-arrest policies and ICE’s 12-hour-detention waiver. The court concluded that the policies were reviewable under the APA. It rejected the government’s argument that the Immigration and Nationality Act made the courthouse-arrest policies unreviewable and concluded that the government had not identified another adequate court remedy for the challenge to the detention waiver.

The court also concluded that the amended complaint plausibly alleged that each challenged policy was arbitrary and capricious. Regarding the courthouse-arrest policies, the court relied on its earlier determination that the policies were insufficiently reasoned on their face, including because they did not adequately address concerns previously identified by the agencies about chilling access to courts, safety risks, and effects on hearing attendance.

Regarding the 12-hour-detention waiver, the court identified allegations that ICE failed to consider alternatives for addressing detention-capacity problems and failed to reconcile the waiver with existing policies. The waiver allowed detention in hold rooms for up to 72 hours, or longer in exceptional circumstances, while other policies continued to prohibit confining detainees in hold rooms for more than 12 hours and prohibited sleeping equipment in those rooms. The court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged that this conflict was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.

Disposition

The court denied the government’s motion to dismiss as to Carmen Aracely Pablo Sequen, Yulisa Alvarado Ambrocio, and Ligia Garcia. The court granted the motion as to Martin Hernandez Torres and directed the clerk to terminate him as a party. The opinion did not enter a final ruling on the ultimate merits of the surviving claims; it allowed those claims to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage.