Doe v. Kristi L. Noem

Background

Plaintiff John Doe is a U.S. citizen originally from Afghanistan who was granted asylum in 2017, lawful permanent residence in 2022, and full citizenship in 2023. He filed this action under a pseudonym. His family members remaining in Afghanistan and Pakistan face ongoing persecution by the Taliban, including physical violence, ransacking of their homes, and bounties on their heads, in part because of their connections to U.S. forces and Afghan government institutions.

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the government announced Operation Allies Welcome, a humanitarian parole program under which Afghan nationals could be paroled into the United States on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian reasons. The governing statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to parole individuals into the United States 'only on a case-by-case basis' for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. USCIS internal policies similarly require officers to evaluate applications individually, considering totality of the circumstances, and to issue Requests for Evidence (RFEs) rather than outright denials when additional evidence could demonstrate eligibility.

Plaintiff submitted humanitarian parole applications for all 27 of his family members. USCIS denied them in 2022 with identical form letters. The parties then jointly agreed to stay the litigation to explore an administrative resolution. During that stay, USCIS reopened the applications and issued RFEs for 26 of the 27 family members. After Plaintiff submitted the requested evidence, USCIS again denied all 27 applications with identical boilerplate denial letters stating only that 'we carefully reviewed your application in accordance with the law[,] regulation, and USCIS policy and determined that parole is not warranted.' No individualized findings or explanations were provided.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his original complaint in December 2022. After the stays, he filed an Amended Complaint asserting an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim (Count I) and a Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim (Count II). Defendants—then including the Secretary of State—moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On March 11, 2025, the court granted in part and denied in part those motions: it dismissed the Secretary of State for lack of standing (Plaintiff failed to allege causation), dismissed the APA and constitutional claims based on the first round of denials as moot, but allowed the case to proceed as to the second round of denials by the USCIS Director and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Before Defendants filed the instant motion, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the due process claim (Count II), leaving only the APA claim. Defendants then moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which is evaluated under the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)—accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor.

Issues Presented and Holdings

1. Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability

The doctrine of consular nonreviewability generally shields a consular or immigration officer's denial of a visa or parole from judicial review, reflecting the principle that admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign function. Defendants argued this doctrine bars Plaintiff's APA claim.

The court held the doctrine does not apply here. In its earlier March 2025 order, the court had found two reasons the doctrine was inapplicable: (1) Plaintiff's constitutional claim triggered the exception for constitutional rights of U.S. citizens, and (2) the court was not reviewing the ultimate merits of the parole denials but only the predicate, nondiscretionary legal question of whether USCIS conducted a case-by-case review. Because Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed his constitutional claim, the first rationale no longer applies. However, the court reaffirmed the second rationale: reviewing whether USCIS followed the statutory requirement of case-by-case review is a nondiscretionary legal question not shielded by consular nonreviewability. The court noted that its prior ruling on this point was not a 'final judgment,' so the law of the case doctrine did not independently compel that conclusion, but the reasoning remained sound.

2. Whether the Amended Complaint States a Valid APA Claim

Under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (C), a court may set aside agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law, or that exceeds statutory authority. To survive a judgment-on-the-pleadings motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim.

The court held Plaintiff has stated a plausible APA claim. The key factual allegations are: (1) USCIS issued RFEs for 26 of 27 family members, indicating it engaged with the applications at some level; (2) after Plaintiff responded with evidence, USCIS issued identical boilerplate denials for all 27 applications, including the one for which no RFE had been issued (his mother); (3) the denial letters made no specific findings and provided no individualized explanations; and (4) Afghan parole applicants have been granted parole at much lower rates than applicants from other countries such as Ukraine. The court acknowledged that boilerplate language alone does not conclusively establish a failure to conduct case-by-case review, and that the issuance of RFEs supports an inference that some individualized review occurred. But at the pleading stage, facts must be construed in Plaintiff's favor, and the allegations are sufficient to survive. The court noted that further discovery may clarify whether Defendants in fact complied with the statutory mandate. The court also referenced the Accardi doctrine—derived from United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)—which requires administrative agencies to follow their own rules and guidelines, as an additional legal basis for the APA claim.

3. Whether Plaintiff Has Standing and a Private Cause of Action Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)

The Laken Riley Act, enacted in January 2025, added § 1182(d)(5)(C), expressly granting state attorneys general standing to sue the Secretary of Homeland Security for violations of the case-by-case basis requirement if such violations harm the state or its residents. Defendants argued this provision implicitly displaces any private individual cause of action: because Congress expressly created standing for states but not individuals, it must have intended to foreclose individual suits.

The court rejected this argument. It found nothing in the text of § 1182(d)(5)(C) suggesting that suits by state attorneys general are the exclusive mechanism for challenging violations of the case-by-case requirement. The provision affirmatively authorizes states to sue; it does not prohibit individual suits. The legislative history cited by the court—including floor statements by Representatives McClintock and Scott—confirms that the Laken Riley Act was intended to empower states to hold federal officials accountable for failure to enforce immigration statutes but does not address individual private causes of action. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff has standing and a private cause of action to enforce § 1182(d)(5)(A)'s case-by-case basis requirement.

Disposition

The court denied Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in its entirety. The case will proceed on the APA claim (Count I) as to the second round of USCIS parole denials. The remaining defendants are the USCIS Director and the Secretary of Homeland Security.