Richard M. v. Bisignano
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:19-cv-00827
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 3
In Richard M. v. Bisignano, Judge Menendez granted plaintiff's lawyer $19,846.75 in Social Security attorney's fees under federal law.
Attorneys who represent Social Security disability claimants in federal court on a contingency-fee basis, and claimants who have won past-due benefits and whose attorneys are seeking court approval of their fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
What happened
In Richard M. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, a disability benefits claimant won his case after it was sent back to the Social Security Administration and received $116,187 in past-due benefits. His attorney then asked the court to approve a fee of $19,846.75, representing 25 percent of those past-due benefits, as allowed under a federal law (42 U.S.C. § 406(b)) that governs attorney's fees in Social Security cases argued in federal court.
The court reviewed whether the requested fee was reasonable. It found that the representation was successful, that the fee matched the contingency fee agreement the client had signed (meaning the lawyer would only be paid if the client won), and that the resulting hourly rate of $689.12 was reasonable given the risk that the attorney might receive nothing if the case had been lost. The defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security, did not object to the fee award.
Judge Katherine Menendez granted the motion and ordered the government to pay $19,846.75 directly to the plaintiff's counsel within 30 days. Because the attorney had previously received a smaller fee award of $2,990.29 under a different law called the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) for the same work, the court also ordered the attorney to refund that smaller amount to the plaintiff upon receiving the new, larger fee award.
The detailed version
- Richard M. v. Bisignano · No. 0:19-cv-00827
- Katherine Menendez
- Dec. 30, 2025
Background
This Social Security disability case was previously remanded (sent back) to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for further proceedings. Following remand, the plaintiff received a past-due benefits award totaling $116,187. The plaintiff's attorney had already obtained a $9,200 fee for work performed before the agency under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), which governs fees for representation at the administrative level. The court had also previously awarded $2,990.29 in attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), a separate law that allows fee awards against the federal government in certain cases where the government's position was not substantially justified.
The Motion
Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which authorizes a court to award a "reasonable fee" to a successful claimant's attorney for work performed before the court, capped at 25 percent of the claimant's past-due benefits. Counsel sought $19,846.75 — exactly 25 percent of the past-due benefits minus the previously obtained § 406(a) fee of $9,200. Combined, the two fee awards equal $29,046.75, or 25 percent of the $116,187 in past-due benefits. The court noted that under the Supreme Court's decision in Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53 (2019), the 25-percent cap applies separately to court fees and agency fees, so counsel was actually seeking less than what they could have requested under § 406(b) alone. The Commissioner did not object and took no position on reasonableness.
Legal Standard
Under § 406(b), the court has an independent obligation to assess whether the requested fee is reasonable, regardless of whether the parties agree. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002). Courts examine: (1) whether the representation was successful; (2) whether the fee aligns with the contingency agreement; and (3) whether the fee is disproportionately large relative to the time counsel spent on the case.
Court's Analysis
Success
The court found that the representation was successful because it resulted in an award of past-due disability benefits, satisfying the statutory requirement of "a judgment favorable to the claimant" under § 406(b)(1)(A).
Contingency agreement
The requested fees matched the 25-percent contingency agreement between the plaintiff and counsel. The court noted that such agreements are the most common fee arrangement in Social Security cases.
Proportionality
The court found that the fee was not so large in comparison to the hours worked as to require a reduction. Based on counsel's reported hours, the award translated to an hourly rate of $689.12, which the court deemed reasonable given the contingent nature of the representation — meaning counsel risked receiving nothing if the case was lost.
EAJA Offset Requirement
When an attorney receives fee awards under both the EAJA and § 406(b) for the same work, the attorney must refund the smaller of the two fees to the client. Here, the $2,990.29 EAJA award is smaller than the $19,846.75 § 406(b) award, so the court ordered counsel to refund the EAJA amount to the plaintiff upon receiving the § 406(b) payment.
Disposition
The court granted the motion. It ordered: (1) an award of $19,846.75 under § 406(b), to be paid by the government directly to plaintiff's counsel within 30 days; and (2) upon receipt of that payment, counsel must refund the previously awarded EAJA fee of $2,990.29 to the plaintiff.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.