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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Substantive rulingFiled Dec. 30, 2025

Richard M. v. Bisignano

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:19-cv-00827
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
3
Social SecurityFee Petition
In one sentence

In Richard M. v. Bisignano, Judge Menendez granted plaintiff's attorney $19,846.75 in Social Security attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).

Who this affects

Attorneys who represent Social Security disability claimants on a contingency fee basis and seek court-awarded fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) after a successful remand; Social Security claimants who have contingency fee agreements with their lawyers and whose attorneys also received fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

What happened

In Richard M. v. Bisignano (No. 19-cv-827), a Social Security disability case in the District of Minnesota, plaintiff's attorney asked the court to award fees totaling $19,846.75 after the plaintiff won past-due disability benefits following a remand to the Social Security Administration. The requested amount equals 25 percent of the plaintiff's past-due benefits that were handled at the court level, consistent with a contingency fee agreement the plaintiff had signed with his attorney. The government did not object to the fee request.

Federal law (42 U.S.C. § 406(b)) allows a court to award a 'reasonable fee' to a winning claimant's attorney in a Social Security case, capped at 25 percent of the past-due benefits. Courts must independently assess whether the fee is reasonable regardless of whether anyone objects. The court looked at whether the representation was successful, whether the fee matched the contingency agreement, and whether the hourly rate produced by the fee — about $689 per hour — was reasonable given the risk that the attorney might have received nothing if the case had been lost.

Judge Katherine Menendez granted the motion and awarded $19,846.75 in attorney's fees under § 406(b), to be paid by the government directly to plaintiff's counsel within 30 days. Because the attorney had previously also received $2,990.29 under a separate fee law called the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) for the same work, the court ordered the attorney to refund that smaller EAJA amount to the plaintiff upon receiving the larger § 406(b) award — a requirement that prevents double recovery at the client's expense.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Richard M. v. Bisignano · No. 0:19-cv-00827
Judge
Katherine Menendez
Date
Dec. 30, 2025

Background

This Social Security disability case was previously remanded to the Social Security Administration, and the plaintiff ultimately obtained an award of past-due disability benefits totaling $116,187. Plaintiff's counsel had already received a $9,200 fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) for work performed before the agency, and a $2,990.29 fee award under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) for work performed before the court. Counsel then moved under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) for an additional fee award of $19,846.75 — representing 25 percent of the past-due benefits attributable to work before the court — based on a contingency fee agreement with the plaintiff. The defendant did not object and took no position on the reasonableness of the amount.

Legal Standard

Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), a court may award a 'reasonable fee' to a successful claimant's attorney for work performed before the court, capped at 25 percent of the claimant's total past-due benefits. The Supreme Court's decision in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002), requires that counsel demonstrate the fee is reasonable for the services rendered, and that the court independently assess reasonableness even when no party objects. A separate Supreme Court ruling, Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53 (2019), clarifies that the 25-percent cap applies separately to fees for work before the court and fees for work before the agency — not as a combined aggregate cap.

Analysis

The court conducted the three-part reasonableness inquiry prescribed by Gisbrecht:

Success of representation

The court found that counsel's representation was successful because it resulted in an award of past-due disability benefits, satisfying the 'favorable judgment' requirement of § 406(b)(1)(A).

Consistency with the contingency agreement

The requested fee matched the 25-percent contingency arrangement the plaintiff had signed with his attorney. The court noted that such contingency agreements are the most common fee arrangement between attorneys and Social Security claimants.

Reasonableness of the hourly rate

Based on the number of hours counsel devoted to the case, the contingency award produced an effective hourly rate of $689.12. The court found this reasonable in light of the risk that counsel might have received no compensation at all if the case had been unsuccessful.

EAJA Offset Requirement

Where an attorney receives fee awards for the same work under both the EAJA and § 406(b), the attorney must refund the smaller award to the claimant to prevent double recovery at the client's expense. Because the previously awarded EAJA fee of $2,990.29 is smaller than the § 406(b) award of $19,846.75, the court ordered counsel to refund the EAJA amount to the plaintiff upon receipt of the § 406(b) payment.

Disposition

The court granted the motion (ECF No. 67) and awarded $19,846.75 in attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The government was ordered to pay that amount directly to plaintiff's counsel within 30 days. Plaintiff's counsel was ordered to refund the $2,990.29 previously awarded EAJA fee to the plaintiff upon receiving the § 406(b) award.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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