Rojas v. Shelter Corporation and Kyle Didier

Background

Plaintiff Marcos Isaac Rojas, proceeding pro se (without a lawyer), lives in an apartment complex managed by Defendant Shelter Corporation. Defendant Kyle Didier is the president of Shelter Corporation. Rojas originally filed suit in Minnesota District Court, Washington County, alleging that between at least 2020 and 2024, other tenants harassed him based on his race, ethnicity, color, and language — including calling him "that Mexican," accusing him of stealing gas and damaging laundry machines, and one incident in which a neighbor's car allegedly attempted to hit his vehicle. Rojas alleged that Shelter Corporation responded to his complaints with skepticism and that Didier "has shown no interest" in addressing his discrimination complaints. Rojas also alleged that after he filed a prior lawsuit against Defendants, Didier retaliated by installing a security camera aimed exclusively at his parking spot.

Rojas's complaint contained four counts: - Count 1: Minnesota Human Rights Act (Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.09 et seq.) - Count 2: Federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 — disparate-impact theory - Count 3: Minn. Stat. §§ 181.960–181.965 — employees' access to personnel records - Count 4: Federal Fair Housing Act — retaliation theory

Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction over the FHA claims and supplemental jurisdiction (the court's power to hear related state claims alongside federal ones) over the state claims. Defendants then moved to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) — the rule allowing dismissal when a complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief.

Rojas subsequently filed an Amended Complaint and a Second Amended Complaint, which the court found to be verbatim restatements of the original. The court therefore treated the original complaint and initial motion to dismiss as the operative filings.

Legal Standards

The court applied the standard from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: a complaint must allege facts sufficient to make a claim "plausible on its face" — more than mere labels or legal conclusions. The court must accept all factual allegations as true and construe them in the plaintiff's favor, but need not accept legal conclusions dressed up as facts. Because Rojas is pro se, the court applied a more lenient reading standard, though pro se litigants must still comply with substantive law.

Analysis of Federal Claims (FHA)

Count 2 — Disparate Impact

A disparate-impact claim under the FHA does not require proof of intentional discrimination. Instead, the plaintiff must show that a defendant's policies or practices had a disproportionately adverse effect on a protected group without a legitimate justification. The court, citing Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2017), explained that even at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish a prima facie (legally sufficient on its face) case of disparate impact.

The court found that Rojas's allegations — while describing incidents of harassment by other tenants — did not sufficiently allege that Defendants were aware of those incidents and failed to act, or that any such inaction constituted a policy or practice that disproportionately harmed a protected minority group. The claim therefore failed to state a plausible disparate-impact cause of action.

Count 4 — Retaliation

The FHA prohibits retaliation against any person for exercising rights protected by the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617; Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010). Rojas alleged that after he filed a prior lawsuit against Defendants, Didier installed a camera aimed at his parking spot in retaliation. The court found this single, vague allegation insufficient to plausibly support a retaliation claim under the FHA.

Statute of Limitations

As a threshold matter, the court noted that the FHA requires a plaintiff to file suit within two years of an alleged discriminatory housing practice. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). Because Rojas filed in April 2025, only incidents occurring after April 2023 would be timely. Of all the documented incidents, only the June 2024 letter fell within that window. However, the court evaluated all of Rojas's allegations regardless, and still found both FHA claims insufficiently pleaded.

Disposition of FHA Claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss as to Counts 2 and 4, dismissing both without prejudice.

Analysis of State-Law Claims (Counts 1 and 3)

With both federal claims dismissed, the FHA claims were the only basis for the court's original (federal question) jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a federal court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when all claims supporting original federal jurisdiction have been dismissed. The court exercised that discretion and declined to reach the merits of Counts 1 (Minnesota Human Rights Act) and 3 (Minnesota personnel records statute). Instead, the court remanded — returned — those claims to Minnesota state court, Washington County. The court denied as moot the motion to dismiss as it pertained to Counts 1 and 3, meaning those counts were not decided on the merits in federal court.

Order