Orlando Sanchez de Tagle v. County of Santa Clara, et al.

Background

Self-represented plaintiff Orlando Sanchez de Tagle brought one claim for unlawful arrest against the County of Santa Clara and “Deputy Thong 1985,” identified as Deputy Vibol Thong. The claim arose from an interaction with Thong on a VTA train platform. Sanchez de Tagle alleged that Thong detained and arrested him for using his bicycle on a VTA station platform in violation of posted rules, even though he was walking the bicycle and no signs indicated that he could not do so.

After the court granted Sanchez de Tagle’s application to proceed without paying the filing fee, the Clerk requested addresses for service. Sanchez de Tagle provided 55 W. Younger Ave. as Thong’s address, and that address appeared on the summons issued for Thong. The executed summons, however, stated that the U.S. Marshals Service served the summons on Dina Garcia at 70 W. Hedding St. Sanchez de Tagle then obtained an entry of default against Thong and filed proof that the entry had been served on the County Sheriff’s Department and Transit Sheriff.

Thong moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) to set aside the entry of default. Sanchez de Tagle opposed the motion.

Legal standard

Rule 55(c) permits a court to set aside an entry of default for good cause. The court considered whether Thong engaged in culpable conduct that caused the default, whether he had a potentially meritorious defense, and whether setting aside the default would prejudice Sanchez de Tagle. The court explained that its discretion is especially broad when, as here, the request concerns an entry of default rather than a default judgment, and that cases should generally be resolved on their merits when possible.

Analysis

The court found that all three factors supported setting aside the default.

First, the court found that Thong did not engage in culpable conduct. Thong stated that his work address was 55 W. Younger Ave., that he was never personally served, and that he first learned of the lawsuit on October 3, 2025, when the entry of default arrived by mail at his work address. He filed the motion one week later. Because service occurred at a different address, the court was not persuaded that Thong received or knew about the lawsuit before October 3. The court also found that, even if Garcia had been authorized to accept service for Thong, there was no indication that Thong’s failure to answer was in bad faith. His prompt motion after learning of the default further supported that conclusion.

Second, the court found that Thong raised a meritorious defense. Thong argued that the complaint left open whether he merely had a consensual conversation with Sanchez de Tagle while performing patrol duties. He also argued that any temporary seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to determine whether Sanchez de Tagle was violating VTA bicycle policies. The court held that these arguments presented legally cognizable defenses and factual questions concerning the merits that should not be resolved on a motion to set aside default.

Third, the court found that Sanchez de Tagle would not be prejudiced. Sanchez de Tagle did not argue that setting aside the default would prejudice him. The County had not appeared, and no answers or motions had been filed. The court found no reason to believe that the delay would cause tangible harm, such as lost evidence, more difficult discovery, or a greater opportunity for fraud or collusion.

Disposition

The court granted Thong’s motion to set aside the entry of default and directed the Clerk to set aside the default against him. The order also states that Thong must file a response to the first amended complaint, but the provided opinion text ends before stating any deadline or additional instruction. The court did not decide the merits of the unlawful-arrest claim.