Choi v. Yeoung Soo Kim
- John Koeltl
- 1:24-cv-06526
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 10
In Ji Hye Choi v. Yeoung Soo Kim, Judge Koeltl denied reconsideration of email service and denied Choi’s motion to strike.
The ruling affects Ji Hye Choi’s attempt to serve Yeoung Soo Kim by email and Kim’s challenge to that service; it does not decide whether service was completed or whether the court has personal jurisdiction.
What happened
In Ji Hye Choi v. Yeoung Soo Kim, the defendant asked the court to reconsider its earlier decision allowing the plaintiff to serve him by email. The defendant argued that a document supposedly showing his consent to electronic service had been fraudulently filed. The plaintiff opposed reconsideration and asked the court to remove the fraud statements from the defendant’s motion.
The court rejected the defendant’s arguments. It found that the document showed the plaintiff—not the defendant—had consented to electronic service. The court also maintained that email service was not barred by the international service agreement at issue, that court-approved alternative service did not require earlier failure of traditional methods, and that the defendant’s consent was not required. The court emphasized that authorizing email service did not decide whether service had been completed or whether the defendant was subject to the court’s authority.
Judge Koeltl denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and denied the plaintiff’s motion to strike. He ruled that the fraud statements were relevant to the reconsideration motion, did not prejudice the plaintiff’s case, and did not justify using the court’s authority to remove them from the record.
The detailed version
- Choi v. Yeoung Soo Kim · No. 1:24-cv-06526
- John Koeltl
- Nov. 11, 2025
Background
Ji Hye Choi sued Yeoung Soo Kim for trademark infringement. The opinion states that both parties reside in Korea. The plaintiff’s initial attempt to serve the defendant was found deficient because the summons was not served with the complaint and the mailing did not comply with the international agreement governing service of court documents abroad.
The court later authorized alternative service by email under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). It found that email service was necessary to avoid lengthy and burdensome procedures under the international agreement, was not prohibited by that agreement, and was reasonably calculated to notify the defendant. The order authorizing email service did not determine that service had already been completed or that the defendant was subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.
Motion for Reconsideration
The defendant moved for reconsideration of the order authorizing email service. Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy generally available only when the moving party identifies an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error or manifest injustice that could change the earlier result.
The defendant’s principal argument concerned a document filed as ECF No. 2 that allegedly showed the defendant’s consent to electronic service. The court examined the document and found that it showed only the plaintiff’s consent, in the plaintiff’s own name. The court therefore concluded that the fraud allegation provided no basis for reconsideration.
The court also rejected the defendant’s arguments concerning the international service agreement, Rule 4(f)(3), and consent. It explained that the agreement’s objection to service “by postal channels” did not prohibit email service. It further held, consistent with the majority of courts in that district, that Rule 4(f)(3) is one available method for serving an international defendant and is not limited to situations in which traditional methods have already failed. A defendant also need not consent to a service method imposed by court order under that rule.
The court stated that emails sent to the address the defendant provided in his motion to dismiss were likely to notify him of the case and give him an opportunity to object. The defendant did not identify overlooked controlling decisions or data that could reasonably be expected to change the earlier ruling. The defendant’s motion for reconsideration was therefore denied.
Motion to Strike
The plaintiff moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike the defendant’s fraud allegations as irrelevant, baseless, prejudicial, and potentially misleading. The court explained that Rule 12(f) concerns pleadings, such as complaints and answers, rather than motion papers.
The court considered whether it could instead use its inherent authority to strike an abusive or improper filed paper. It declined to do so. The statements were relevant to the reconsideration motion, did not prejudice the plaintiff’s case on the merits, and posed no risk of influencing prospective jurors because the allegations were confined to motion papers and had been disproven. The court found that the defendant’s accusation was ill-advised but did not meet the standard for striking the material under the court’s inherent authority. The plaintiff’s motion to strike was denied.
Disposition
Judge John G. Koeltl denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and denied the plaintiff’s motion to strike. The clerk was directed to email the order to the pro se defendant and close the docket entry for the reconsideration motion.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.