Samuels v. City of New York

Background

Simone Samuels, a former New York City Department of Transportation construction worker, alleged that a workplace hip injury on March 25, 2021, caused significant physical restrictions. She claimed that the City delayed providing reasonable workplace accommodations, first directing her to complete accommodation paperwork on August 4, 2021, providing an insufficient accommodation on January 28, 2022, and assigning her to 100% desk duty on February 22, 2022. She brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

The motion concerned Dr. Louis Rose, one of Samuels’s treating physicians. Samuels disclosed that Dr. Rose would testify about his treatment of her, accommodations he requested, when she received those accommodations, and whether the delay aggravated her injury, caused additional pain and injury, and affected her ability to stand for long periods. The disclosure was a one-page notice accompanied by a one-page letter from Dr. Rose.

Expert-disclosure ruling

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C) requires a non-retained expert disclosure to identify the subject matter of the testimony and summarize the facts and opinions the witness will provide. Judge Moses concluded that Samuels’s disclosure identified the general topics and opinions but did not provide enough supporting facts. It did not describe Dr. Rose’s examination findings, Samuels’s symptoms, the diagnostic-imaging results, her diagnosis, the nature of her disability, the number of examinations, or the facts supporting his opinions about aggravation and reduced ability to stand.

Because the disclosure was inadequate, Dr. Rose could not testify as an expert witness. The court did not decide that Dr. Rose was unqualified or that all medical opinions were barred. Instead, it limited the permissible testimony based on the distinction between expert testimony and testimony by a treating physician about matters personally observed during treatment.

Permitted fact testimony

Dr. Rose could testify as a fact witness about his personal interactions with Samuels during the period he examined or treated her. He could also testify about accommodations he requested on her behalf, including when, how, and why he requested them. He could offer opinions about Samuels’s condition, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, and causation only if those opinions were based on his own observations during treatment and were formed in the course of that treatment.

Dr. Rose could not rely directly or indirectly on information supplied by Dr. Steven Zelicof, other medical providers, or Samuels’s counsel. He could not testify about Samuels’s medical condition, symptoms, or prognosis after he stopped treating her. He also could not testify about whether or when Samuels received “reasonable” accommodations, because that determination was for the fact-finder and involved the central legal issue in the case.

Required production of records

Before Dr. Rose could offer opinion testimony, Samuels had to produce all remaining medical records from January 1, 2016, through the present, including records concerning her hip replacement and postsurgical rehabilitation. She also had to produce correspondence between herself or her attorney and Dr. Rose, and her deposition testimony and other specified nonpublic litigation documents from the related malpractice action against Dr. Zelicof. Publicly available pleadings from that action did not have to be produced.

The court ordered Samuels to produce documents within her possession, custody, or control within 21 days of the order. If medical records were not within that possession, custody, or control, she had to provide valid health-information releases within seven days. The parties also had to submit a joint status letter by December 12, 2025, addressing the remaining expert-discovery schedule and summary judgment.

Disposition

Judge Moses granted the City’s motion to strike and preclude in part. Dr. Rose was barred from testifying as an expert but could testify as a fact witness within the stated limits. The court also required the specified disclosures and releases before he could provide opinion testimony.