Carbone v. The City of New York

Background

Charles Carbone alleged that the City of New York and various unknown entities and individuals violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). He alleged that he was a practicing Catholic whose religious beliefs prevented him from receiving COVID-19 vaccines that he believed were manufactured using aborted fetal cell lines.

Carbone sought a religious exemption from New York City’s requirement that municipal employees receive a COVID-19 vaccine. The Department of Transportation denied his request and his appeal. After Carbone did not provide proof of vaccination, he was terminated on February 11, 2022. He alleged that an examiner questioned and ridiculed his religious beliefs during a brief telephone call and that the exemption process improperly weighed his religious beliefs against other considerations.

Carbone asserted four claims remaining at issue in the opinion: a First Amendment Free Exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a NYCHRL failure-to-accommodate claim, a NYSHRL failure-to-accommodate claim, and a NYCHRL claim for failure to engage in a cooperative dialogue about an accommodation. The defendants moved to dismiss all four claims for failure to state a claim. The opinion notes that Carbone had previously voluntarily dismissed his claims against the Department of Transportation and that the parties had agreed to dismiss two New York State constitutional claims with prejudice.

First Amendment claim

The court treated Carbone’s federal Free Exercise claim as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal law that permits claims against state or local officials and entities for violations of federal rights. The court explained that the vaccine requirement itself did not have to provide religious exemptions. But because the City offered an exemption process, it had to administer that process without discriminating against religious beliefs.

The court held that Carbone plausibly alleged that the process, as applied to him, was neither religiously neutral nor generally applicable. His allegations that the examiner questioned his religious beliefs in a hostile or ridiculing manner raised factual questions that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court also found that the denial letter’s statement that his objections were based on “personal views and false facts” plausibly alleged that the examiner improperly evaluated the validity or weight of his religious beliefs rather than simply assessing whether they were sincerely held.

Because Carbone plausibly alleged that the exemption process was not neutral or generally applicable, the court applied strict scrutiny at this stage. The court recognized that preventing the spread of COVID-19 was a compelling government interest, but concluded that denying an accommodation because an examiner weighed the applicant’s religious beliefs against nonreligious considerations was not narrowly tailored to that interest. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss the Free Exercise claim.

NYSHRL and NYCHRL accommodation claims

The court held that Carbone plausibly alleged the elements of religious-accommodation claims under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. He alleged that he had a sincere religious belief conflicting with the vaccination requirement, informed the employer of that belief, and was disciplined when he did not comply with the requirement. The court accepted those allegations as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.

The court rejected the argument that Carbone was not disciplined because vaccination was merely a condition of employment. Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, imposing a condition of retaining employment that requires an employee to abandon a sincerely held religious practice can itself support a discrimination claim. Carbone’s allegation that he was terminated after his exemption request was denied therefore satisfied the third part of his initial showing.

The defendants also argued that exempting Carbone would have imposed an undue burden because he could have exposed other employees and members of the public to COVID-19. The court concluded that this issue could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss because Carbone alleged that he would comply with weekly testing and masking requirements and primarily worked alone in his vehicles. The court denied the motion to dismiss both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL failure-to-accommodate claims.

NYCHRL cooperative-dialogue claim

The NYCHRL separately requires an employer to engage within a reasonable time in a good-faith written or oral discussion about an employee’s accommodation needs, possible accommodations, and the difficulties those accommodations might create for the employer. Carbone alleged that there had been no meaningful interactive process.

The court found that allegation conclusory and inconsistent with the other allegations in the complaint. Carbone alleged that the Department of Transportation provided information about the accommodation process, that he spoke with an examiner, received a written denial explaining the decision, and pursued an appeal. Relying on New York decisions involving similar accommodation procedures, the court concluded that these allegations did not state a claim for failure to engage in a cooperative dialogue.

The court dismissed Count III, the NYCHRL cooperative-dialogue claim, without prejudice. That disposition permits the claim to be brought again, subject to applicable requirements.

Disposition

Judge John G. Koeltl granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Count III without prejudice. It denied the motion to dismiss Count I, the NYCHRL failure-to-accommodate claim; Count II, the NYSHRL failure-to-accommodate claim; and Count VI, the First Amendment Free Exercise claim. The final paragraph of the opinion appears to label the federal count “VE,” but the opinion consistently identifies that count as Count VI.