Zayas v. Aviles-Ramos

Background

Rosa Zayas and Edwin Zayas brought the case for themselves and on behalf of their child, R.Z. They sought enforcement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s stay-put provision, which generally requires a child to remain in the current educational placement during specified administrative or judicial proceedings. Their request concerned R.Z.’s enrollment at the International Institute for the Brain, or iBRAIN, during the 2024–25 extended school year, along with transportation and individual nursing services.

The parents sent the New York City Department of Education a “Ten Day Notice” on June 14, 2024, rejecting the proposed educational program and stating their intent to enroll R.Z. at iBRAIN. They filed a due process complaint on December 16, 2024, alleging, among other things, that the Department had not offered R.Z. a free appropriate public education. On January 9, 2025, an impartial hearing officer issued a pendency order requiring direct payment of iBRAIN tuition, transportation, and nursing services. The order referred to pendency beginning October 9, 2024.

The Department paid the pendency costs from the filing of the due process complaint through the end of the school year, but did not pay costs incurred from October 9 through December 16, 2024. The underlying administrative matter remained under review by a state review officer, including a challenge to the pendency start date.

Issue and arguments

The remaining issue was whether the Department had to pay tuition, transportation, and nursing costs incurred before the parents filed the due process complaint. The parents argued that the pendency order required payment from October 9, 2024. They also argued that the Ten Day Notice itself began the due process proceedings and therefore triggered stay-put protections.

The Department argued that its payment obligation began only when the due process complaint was filed. The court also noted that the parties agreed the Department had otherwise satisfied its pendency obligations for the 2024–25 school year.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the ordinary summary-judgment standard because the case sought enforcement of the pendency order rather than review of the underlying educational decision. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

The court relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Doe v. E. Lyme Board of Education, which held that stay-put obligations begin when a parent files a due process complaint and the related administrative proceeding begins. The court concluded that the parents filed their complaint on December 16, 2024, so the Department was not responsible under the stay-put provision for costs incurred before that date.

The court rejected the parents’ reliance on the pendency order and claim-preclusion principles. It explained that the administrative proceeding was not a separate prior case with preclusive effect, and that the impartial hearing officer’s decision was not final because appeals to the state review officer were pending. The court also noted uncertainty about whether the pendency order actually decided that the Department’s obligations began on October 9, 2024. In any event, the court said the order was not binding while under appeal.

The court separately rejected the argument that the Ten Day Notice initiated the due process proceeding. The cited federal regulation treats that notice as relevant to reimbursement for a unilateral private-school placement, which is distinct from stay-put funding. The court held that the due process complaint, rather than the Ten Day Notice, initiated the proceeding and triggered the stay-put obligation.

Ruling and disposition

The court held that the Department was not responsible for stay-put funding during the disputed period and had fully satisfied its obligations under the stay-put provision. Judge Jeannette A. Vargas denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment, terminate outstanding motions, and close the case.