Greenwood v. American Kennel Club
- Gregory Woods
- 1:23-cv-10516
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 28
In Elaine Greenwood v. American Kennel Club, Judge Woods granted AKC’s motion to dismiss, barring some claims and dismissing others without prejudice.
Elaine Greenwood’s claims against the American Kennel Club were affected. Several claims were barred under the law-of-the-case doctrine, and three remaining state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice, with limited permission to amend. The court said the North Carolina-based claims could be pursued in the Middle District of North Carolina.
What happened
In Elaine Greenwood v. American Kennel Club, Elaine Greenwood sued the American Kennel Club over alleged sexual assaults by Stephen Daniel Gladstone and Jay Phinizy, and alleged conduct by AKC. She argued that New York’s Adult Survivors Act revived her older state-law claims.
The court ruled that claims based on conduct in North Carolina were barred here by an earlier venue ruling. It also held that the Adult Survivors Act revived Greenwood’s remaining state-law claims based on the alleged New York assaults, but that she had not adequately connected AKC to those assaults. The court granted AKC’s motion to dismiss.
Judge Woods dismissed the remaining New York claims for aiding and abetting, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence or gross negligence without prejudice, allowing Greenwood to amend with new facts within 30 days. Other claims were barred under the earlier ruling, though the court said they could be pursued in North Carolina.
The detailed version
- Greenwood v. American Kennel Club · No. 1:23-cv-10516
- Gregory Woods
- Nov. 20, 2025
Background
Elaine Greenwood, representing herself, sued the American Kennel Club (AKC) over alleged sexual assaults by Stephen Daniel Gladstone in 1995 and by Jay Phinizy in 1996, as well as alleged later conduct involving sexual trafficking, threats, and AKC’s treatment of Greenwood and her dogs. She did not name Gladstone or his estate as defendants. Her fourth amended complaint asserted 13 claims, including aiding and abetting violations of New York’s Penal Law, aiding and abetting sex trafficking under federal law, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and gross negligence, fraud, conspiracy, battery, defamation, extortion, obstruction of justice, theft, and alleged violations of 7 U.S.C. § 2303.
An earlier order transferred Greenwood’s initial case to the Middle District of North Carolina because venue was improper in the Southern District of New York for claims arising from North Carolina conduct. That earlier order gave Greenwood limited permission to amend concerning conduct in New York. The court found that her amended complaint reasserted many of the same North Carolina-based claims without new facts or an extraordinary reason to revisit the earlier ruling.
Issues and analysis
The court first applied the law-of-the-case doctrine, which generally prevents parties from relitigating an issue already decided in the same case. The court held that Counts V through XIII were barred in their entirety because they arose only from North Carolina conduct, including alleged abuse at the Carthage property, the 2015 AKC inspection, and later AKC conduct. Count II, the federal sex-trafficking claim, was also barred. Portions of Counts I and III through IV based on North Carolina conduct were likewise barred. The court stated that Greenwood could pursue those North Carolina claims in the pending case in the Middle District of North Carolina.
The court next considered New York’s Adult Survivors Act (ASA), a state law that temporarily revived certain otherwise time-barred civil claims arising from conduct that would constitute a sexual offense under New York law. The court held that Greenwood filed her claims within the ASA’s revival period and that the alleged 1995 and 1996 rapes and attempted rape qualified as predicate sexual offenses. The court further held that the ASA could revive state-law claims against AKC even though the alleged sexual offenses were committed by other people. The court did not hold that AKC was liable; it treated revival and the elements of the underlying claims as separate questions.
For the remaining New York-based claims, the court held that Greenwood had not plausibly pleaded that AKC aided and abetted the alleged assaults. Under New York law, that claim required an underlying assault, AKC’s actual knowledge of it, and substantial assistance directed toward the assault. Greenwood did not allege facts showing that AKC knew about Gladstone’s conduct when it occurred, and she did not allege that she reported Phinizy’s alleged assault to anyone. The court also held that promoting Gladstone, hosting events, allegedly ratifying misconduct, or canceling Greenwood’s dog registrations was not substantial assistance directed at the assaults themselves.
The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because Greenwood did not plausibly allege that AKC’s own conduct was extreme and outrageous or that AKC intended to cause her emotional distress. The court evaluated AKC’s alleged conduct rather than the alleged assaults by Gladstone and Phinizy, because Greenwood sued AKC and not the alleged assailants.
The court construed Greenwood’s negligence and gross-negligence allegations as including negligent supervision or retention. It held that the claim against AKC concerning Gladstone failed because he was not formally affiliated with or employed by AKC when the 1995 assaults occurred. Even assuming Phinizy was an AKC employee, Greenwood did not allege that AKC knew or should have known of a propensity for sexual assault. The court also noted that the alleged assaults occurred at hotels or Madison Square Garden, not on AKC premises.
Disposition
The court granted AKC’s motion to dismiss. Claims for aiding and abetting federal sex trafficking, fraud, coercion and witness intimidation, conspiracy, battery, defamation, extortion, obstruction of justice, theft, and alleged violations of 7 U.S.C. § 2303 were barred under the law-of-the-case doctrine. The court dismissed without prejudice the remaining claims for aiding and abetting violations of New York’s Penal Law Chapter 130, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence and gross negligence. Greenwood was granted leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days, limited to adding new facts addressing the deficiencies in those three claims; she could not add new claims without prior court permission. The court also denied payment of filing fees for an appeal because it certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
Read the full 28-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.