Betts v. Sixty Lower East Side

Background

Margaret Betts was a hotel guest from October 19 to October 21, 2018. After she requested an in-room massage, Hotel staff contacted a massage therapist through an existing referral arrangement. The therapist, Iouri Astakhov, went to Betts’s room, where Betts testified that he sexually assaulted her during the massage.

Astakhov had obtained a massage-therapy license in 2008 but had not re-registered after 2013. New York law required registration to continue practicing. The Hotel did not verify whether Astakhov was properly authorized before sending him to Betts’s room. Betts sued the defendants for negligence.

In August 2023, the court granted summary judgment to Betts on liability. It held that the Hotel violated New York Education Law § 7802 and was negligent per se, meaning that the statutory violation established the required breach of duty. The court also held that the Hotel’s failure to verify Astakhov’s authorization was a proximate cause of Betts’s injuries.

At trial in July 2025, the jury awarded Betts $1 million for past pain and suffering and $375,000 for future pain and suffering. The jury assigned 50 percent of the fault to the Hotel and 50 percent to Astakhov, a non-party. Before interest, the Hotel defendants’ effective liability was therefore $1,375,000. The judgment also included $237,677.81 in prejudgment interest.

Hotel’s challenge to the liability ruling

The Hotel moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the earlier summary judgment ruling, or under Rule 59(a) for a new trial on liability. The court explained that these remedies are extraordinary and generally require a change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error or manifest injustice. The Hotel presented no intervening controlling law or new liability facts and largely repeated arguments previously rejected.

The court again rejected the Hotel’s argument that § 7802 did not apply because Astakhov was an independent professional and because he had once obtained a license. The statute required a person practicing massage therapy to be licensed or authorized, and other provisions required licensed therapists to register every three years before practicing. The court held that allowing an unregistered therapist to practice would defeat the statutory scheme.

The court also reaffirmed that the statute was intended to protect people receiving massage therapy from harmful or sexual contact and therefore supplied a specific standard of care. The Hotel’s violation constituted negligence per se. The court further held that proximate cause could be decided as a matter of law because the undisputed facts permitted only one conclusion: if the Hotel had checked Astakhov’s registration, it would have learned that he could not lawfully perform the massage, and the assault would not have occurred. The motion to vacate the summary judgment ruling or obtain a new trial on liability was denied.

Challenge to the fault allocation and damages

The Hotel separately moved under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the jury’s verdict, or under Rule 59(a) for a new trial on damages. It argued that the jury should have assigned it only 5 percent of the fault rather than 50 percent. The court rejected that argument. The Hotel had selected, advertised, and sent Astakhov to Betts’s room without verifying his registration. The court held that the equal allocation of fault was a fair interpretation of the trial evidence and would not be set aside.

The court also rejected the argument that the damages award was excessive. Applying New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5501(c), the court compared the award with evidence presented at trial and with damages awards in other New York cases. It concluded that $1 million for past suffering and $375,000 for future suffering was reasonable in light of Betts’s testimony, the evidence of trauma-related symptoms, and the duration of her past and anticipated suffering.

Trial conduct and evidentiary rulings

The court found no basis for a new trial based on statements by Betts’s lawyer during closing argument. The court had sustained defense objections and issued curative instructions concerning comments about fault allocation, a suggestion that jurors conduct internet research, and other challenged remarks. The court concluded that these measures eliminated any potential prejudice. It also held that questioning the Hotel’s expert about compensation was permissible and that the lawyer’s request for a non-specific large award did not warrant a new trial.

The court upheld its decision not to admit portions of the deposition of Dr. Steven Fayer, a non-testifying expert retained by Betts. The court held that Dr. Fayer was not Betts’s agent or an authorized representative for purposes of the rule concerning statements by an opposing party, so his testimony did not qualify under that rule.

The court also upheld its refusal to give a missing-witness instruction concerning Dr. Robert Reff, a treating psychiatrist who was not listed as a trial witness. The Hotel was allowed to argue that the jury could draw an inference from Dr. Reff’s absence, and Dr. Reff’s medical records were admitted. The court therefore found no prejudice and no need for an additional jury instruction.

Disposition

Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald denied in its entirety the defendants’ motion to vacate the summary judgment decision, alter or amend the jury’s verdict, or obtain a new trial on liability or damages. The court also denied Betts’s waived motion for additur, to the extent it could be considered a motion. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 217 and 222.