Mairs v. Eischen

Background

Spencer Curtis Mairs filed what he titled a "Motion to Award First Step Act Credits." The court construed this filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 — a federal statute allowing a prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence. The petition was reviewed preliminarily under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which permits courts to dismiss a petition without requiring a response if it plainly does not entitle the petitioner to relief.

Underlying Criminal Conviction

In 2021, Mairs was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota on one count of distributing a substance containing heroin and fentanyl where the use of that substance resulted in serious bodily injury, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which he admitted: (1) he knowingly and intentionally distributed the substance; (2) its use resulted in serious bodily injury; and (3) he was subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum because of the serious-bodily-injury outcome. He was ultimately sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Judgment was entered in the North Dakota criminal case on July 19, 2022.

Legal Framework: First Step Act Credits

The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), allows most federal prisoners to earn time credits by completing recidivism-reduction programming. However, the FSA expressly lists 68 categories of offenses whose convicts are ineligible for these credits. Relevant here is 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(lviii), which bars prisoners convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A), (B), or (C) "for which death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of such substance" from earning FSA credits. The BOP determined Mairs fell within this exclusion.

Mairs's Three Arguments and the Court's Responses

Argument 1: No Toxicology Report

Mairs argued the serious-bodily-injury enhancement was never properly established because no toxicology report was provided proving the injury was truly "serious." The court rejected this, holding that by entering a guilty plea Mairs voluntarily admitted serious bodily injury resulted from his offense, waiving his right to require the government to prove that fact at trial. The plea agreement also included a waiver of his right to argue that admitted conduct falls outside the scope of the charged statutes. The court also noted in a footnote that a § 2241 habeas petition is not the proper vehicle for challenging the factual basis of a conviction in any event; that challenge would need to be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Argument 2: BOP Should Not Second-Guess the Court

Mairs argued the BOP improperly made its own factual determination that his offense resulted in serious bodily injury, exceeding its authority. He cited Lallave v. Martinez, 635 F. Supp. 3d 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2022), and Valladares v. Ray, 130 F.4th 74 (4th Cir. 2025), in which courts found the BOP had improperly gone beyond the charging documents to find prisoners ineligible when those prisoners had not actually been convicted of a disqualifying offense. The court distinguished Mairs's situation: unlike in Lallave and Valladares, where the BOP reached beyond the charging documents to find ineligibility, here the indictment, plea agreement, and sentencing judgment all clearly reflect a conviction for the disqualifying offense. The court also addressed Mairs's reference to a companion case — Stevenson v. Eischen, Case No. 25-cv-1308 — noting that the documents in Stevenson's underlying criminal case did not show a disqualifying conviction, distinguishing his situation from Mairs's.

Argument 3: Sentence Below the Mandatory Minimum

Mairs argued that because § 841(b)(1)(C) carries a 20-year mandatory minimum for the serious-bodily-injury enhancement but he received only a 10-year sentence, the enhancement must not have applied. The court rejected this, explaining that mandatory minimums are frequently subject to statutory exceptions permitting below-minimum sentences — citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and 18 U.S.C. § 994(n) as examples. The court confirmed from the records of the underlying criminal case that such an exception was applied at sentencing, and that the serious-bodily-injury enhancement nonetheless governed the conviction.

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Mairs also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 7). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), district courts may appoint counsel to prisoners seeking habeas relief if the "interests of justice so require." The court found that because Mairs's claims lacked merit, appointment of counsel was not warranted. The court also applied the factors from Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994) — legal complexity, factual complexity, and the petitioner's ability to investigate and present claims — all of which weighed against appointment. Mairs filed an 18-page petition citing relevant caselaw and statutes and including BOP attachments, demonstrating an ability to present his claims. The Motion to Appoint Counsel was denied.

Disposition

Magistrate Judge Bullard recommends that the habeas petition (Dkt. No. 1) be denied and that the matter be dismissed. The Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 7) is denied by order. Because the merits ruling is a Report and Recommendation rather than a final district court order, Mairs may file written objections within 14 days of service of the report under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), and any responding party has 14 days thereafter to respond. The Report and Recommendation is not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.