Davis v. Aviles-Ramos
Brianna Davis, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of O.D., Candida Diaz, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of N.D., Keisha Archibald, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of N.A. v. Melissa Aviles-Ramos, in her capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, and New York City Department of Education
- Katherine Failla
- 1:25-cv-07555
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 5
In Davis v. Aviles-Ramos, Judge Failla denied all three preliminary-injunction motions, finding later requests moot or denying requests for immediate payment.
The ruling affected Brianna Davis, Candida Diaz, and Keisha Archibald, who sought funding and related orders for their children’s educational services, and Melissa Aviles-Ramos and the New York City Department of Education, which opposed the motions.
What happened
In Davis v. Aviles-Ramos, the plaintiffs filed three motions asking the court to require faster action and to fund tuition, transportation, and nursing services for the 2025–2026 school year. The court denied the first motion during oral argument. The other two motions sought orders recognizing the students’ educational placement and requiring payments, including immediate payments.
After the hearing, the defendants reported that pendency orders had been issued for all three students and that payments were being made or would be made in the ordinary course. The plaintiffs did not dispute that update. The court therefore denied as moot the requests for new pendency orders and denied the separate request for immediate payment. The court did not decide whether irreparable harm was required or shown.
Judge Katherine Polk Failla denied the second and third preliminary-injunction motions and ended the need for a planned telephone conference. The defendants were given until December 29, 2025, to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the complaint.
The detailed version
- Davis v. Aviles-Ramos · No. 1:25-cv-07555
- Katherine Failla
- Nov. 21, 2025
Background
The plaintiffs filed the case on September 11, 2025, and then filed three motions for a preliminary injunction, which is a court order intended to provide temporary relief while a case continues. The first motion sought expedited deadlines for the plaintiffs’ requests and a ruling that failure to meet those deadlines would automatically deny a free and appropriate public education. The court denied that motion during oral argument.
The second motion asked the court to require the New York City Department of Education and Melissa Aviles-Ramos to fully fund tuition, transportation, and nursing services for the 2025–2026 school year. The requested relief would have included pendency orders recognizing iBRAIN as the plaintiffs’ unilateral placement. The third motion sought immediate payment of outstanding tuition, transportation, and nursing expenses and largely requested the same relief as the second motion.
Rulings on the Second and Third Motions
At oral argument, the defendants stated that a pendency order had already been issued for one of the three student plaintiffs. In post-hearing letters, the defendants stated that pendency orders had been issued for all three plaintiffs, that partial payments had been made for one plaintiff, and that payments for the other plaintiffs were forthcoming in the ordinary course. The plaintiffs disputed the defendants’ approach to funding but did not dispute that each plaintiff had received a pendency order. The court treated the defendants’ statement as unopposed.
Because pendency orders had already been issued, the court denied as moot the plaintiffs’ requests for issuance of pendency orders. The court separately denied the request for immediate payment. It concluded that the cited authorities did not require the Department of Education to fast-track pendency payments and instead supported payment in the ordinary course.
Irreparable Harm
The court noted differing views among judges in the district about whether a plaintiff seeking pendency payment must show irreparable harm, meaning harm that cannot adequately be repaired later with money or another ordinary remedy. The court also questioned whether the plaintiffs could make that showing because, according to the defendants, delayed payments had not caused an iBRAIN student to lose a placement or face threatened disenrollment. The court did not resolve those questions because the motions were moot.
Disposition and Further Proceedings
Judge Katherine Polk Failla denied the plaintiffs’ second and third motions for a preliminary injunction. The order stated that no telephone conference was necessary. It also stated that the defendants had until December 29, 2025, to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the complaint. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motions at docket entries 6 and 11.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.