Maria D. v. Easterwood
Maria D. v. David Easterwood, in his official capacity as Field Office Director, St. Paul Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:26-cv-01269
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 7
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
In Maria D. v. Easterwood, Judge Tostrud ruled Maria was misclassified for immigration detention and ordered her release.
Maria D. and the federal immigration authorities named as respondents, including the officials and agencies responsible for her detention.
What happened
Maria D. v. David Easterwood concerned Maria D.’s challenge to her immigration detention. She argued that officials wrongly treated her as subject to mandatory detention and detained her without a warrant.
Maria argued that, because she had been in the United States for more than a year, the government could detain her only under a provision allowing discretionary detention and a bond hearing. The government did not dispute the petition’s facts, produce a warrant, or present a specific argument against releasing her.
Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted Maria’s petition. He ruled that she was not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), was instead subject to discretionary detention under § 1226, and had to be released within 48 hours if still in Minnesota or returned to Minnesota and released within 72 hours if moved elsewhere.
The detailed version
- Maria D. v. Easterwood · No. 0:26-cv-01269
- Eric Tostrud
- Feb. 12, 2026
Background
Maria D., identified in the opinion as an Ecuadorian citizen, entered the United States on or about May 19, 2024. She presented herself to an immigration official at the border, was briefly detained, and was then released on her own recognizance with a notice to appear for ordinary removal proceedings. She applied for asylum within one year of entering the country and did not have a final order of removal.
Maria was later arrested in St. Paul, Minnesota, on an unspecified date. Her petition alleged, based on information and belief, that the respondents did not have or show her any judicial or other warrant. The petition also alleged that she was being detained in Minnesota, although efforts to determine her exact location had been unsuccessful. The respondents did not dispute the petition’s facts.
Claims and arguments
Maria challenged her detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal law allowing a court to review unlawful detention. She argued that the government had wrongly classified her as a person seeking admission who was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), rather than as a person already in the country who was subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). She argued that the classification and denial of a bond hearing violated due process under the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Maria also raised challenges under the Accardi doctrine and the Fourth Amendment based on her alleged warrantless arrest. She requested declarations that her arrest and detention were unlawful, release from custody, restrictions on any future re-detention, and other relief.
The respondents argued that the petition failed on the merits for reasons described in a prior related proceeding. The opinion states that the respondents did not argue that Maria was subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) or another detention statute.
Court’s analysis
The court held that § 1225(b)(2) applies to applicants seeking admission, while § 1226(a) applies to noncitizens already in the country. Because Maria had lived in the United States for more than a year, the court found that her detention fell under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2). The court also stated that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions cited by the respondents did not prevent it from deciding the narrow question whether Maria was subject to discretionary or mandatory detention.
Section 1226(a) provides that, on a warrant issued by the Attorney General, a noncitizen may be arrested and detained. The court concluded that a warrant is necessary for discretionary detention under § 1226(a). The respondents had not produced a warrant and had not offered a specific argument that release was an improper remedy. The court therefore concluded that release was available and appropriate because the detention lacked a lawful statutory basis.
The court did not address Maria’s remaining grounds because resolving the statutory-classification issue in her favor made that unnecessary.
Disposition
The court granted Maria’s verified petition. It ordered that Maria was not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and was instead subject, if at all, to discretionary detention under § 1226.
The respondents were ordered to release Maria as soon as practicable and no later than 48 hours after entry of the order if she remained detained in Minnesota. If she had been moved outside Minnesota, the respondents were ordered to return her to Minnesota and release her as soon as practicable and no later than 72 hours after entry of the order. The court directed that judgment be entered.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.