Mejia v. Richard Muro and City of Minneapolis
- Paul Magnuson
- 0:24-cv-01170
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 3
In Tello Mejia v. Muro, Judge Magnuson denied Fernando Tello Mejia's attempt to appeal a magistrate judge's denial of appointed counsel to the appeals court, instead reviewing it himself and upholding the denial.
People representing themselves in civil lawsuits who seek court-appointed lawyers, and litigants who wish to appeal a magistrate judge's denial of appointed counsel — this opinion clarifies that such appeals must go to the district court judge first, not directly to the circuit court of appeals.
What happened
In Fernando Tello Mejia v. Richard Muro and City of Minneapolis (Case No. 24-1170), plaintiff Fernando Tello Mejia filed a motion seeking to appeal a magistrate judge's denial of his request for a court-appointed lawyer, apparently directing that appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case involves a civil lawsuit against Richard Muro and the City of Minneapolis. Mejia, who is representing himself without a lawyer, had previously been denied court-appointed counsel three separate times by Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko.
The court explained that the Eighth Circuit lacks the power to hear an appeal of a magistrate judge's decision denying appointment of counsel at this stage of the case, because denying appointed counsel is considered a non-final, non-dispositive ruling — meaning it doesn't end the case and must first be reviewed by the district judge, not the appeals court. Because Mejia is representing himself, Judge Paul A. Magnuson charitably re-interpreted his filing as an appeal to the district court itself, rather than dismissing it outright.
Judge Magnuson upheld Magistrate Judge Micko's ruling, finding it was neither clearly wrong nor contrary to law. The court reaffirmed that there is no legal right to a free lawyer in a civil case, and that Judge Micko had properly weighed the relevant factors — such as the complexity of the facts and legal issues, and Mejia's ability to present his own case — before concluding none justified appointment of counsel. The court also noted that Mejia had previously been connected to volunteer legal help through the Federal Bar Association's Pro Se Project. Mejia's motion was denied, and his separate application to proceed without paying court fees on appeal was denied without prejudice as premature, meaning he may refile it at the appropriate time.
The detailed version
- Mejia v. Richard Muro and City of Minneapolis · No. 0:24-cv-01170
- Paul Magnuson
- Feb. 17, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Fernando Tello Mejia is representing himself (proceeding pro se, meaning without an attorney) in a civil lawsuit against Richard Muro and the City of Minneapolis. Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko denied Mejia's motions for appointment of counsel — a request for the court to assign him a free lawyer — on three separate occasions. (Docket Nos. 56, 75, 78.)
Mejia's Motions
Mejia filed two motions before the district court: (1) a "Motion to Pass Bar Under Controlling Interlocutory Appeals" (Docket No. 82), which the court interpreted as an attempt to appeal the most recent denial of appointed counsel to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals; and (2) an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal (Docket No. 83), a request to be allowed to pursue an appeal without paying the associated court fees due to financial hardship.
Jurisdiction Issue and Reinterpretation of the Motion
The court first addressed whether the Eighth Circuit had the power (jurisdiction) to hear Mejia's appeal at this point. Under established Eighth Circuit precedent — specifically LeGear v. Thalacker, 46 F.3d 36, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) — the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel is a "nondispositive" matter, meaning it does not end or dispose of the case. Such rulings must first be reviewed by the district judge assigned to the case, not by the circuit court of appeals. The court cited Larson v. Minnesota Dep't of Human Services for the rule that appeal of such decisions goes to the district judge.
Because Mejia is unrepresented, Judge Magnuson construed his filing liberally — giving him the benefit of the doubt — and treated his attempted appeal to the Eighth Circuit as an appeal to the district court itself.
Standard of Review
When a district court reviews a magistrate judge's ruling on a nondispositive (non-case-ending) matter, the standard is highly deferential. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the district court will only overturn the magistrate judge's decision if it is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" — a high bar.
Analysis of the Appointment of Counsel Decision
Judge Magnuson found that Magistrate Judge Micko's decision met neither prong of that standard. The court emphasized several key points:
- No constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. Unlike criminal defendants, civil litigants have no legal right to a court-appointed attorney. - Proper application of the relevant factors. The court confirmed that Judge Micko evaluated the factors that govern whether to appoint counsel for a person who cannot afford one (an "indigent litigant"), as set out in Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1991). Those factors include: the factual complexity of the case, the litigant's ability to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting testimony, the litigant's ability to present his own claim, and the complexity of the legal issues involved. Judge Micko found that none of these factors favored appointment of counsel here. - Referral to volunteer legal help. Judge Micko had previously referred Mejia to the Federal Bar Association's Pro Se Project, through which volunteer counsel assisted him through and after a settlement conference. The court noted this prior assistance as relevant context. - Inability to find private counsel is not sufficient. Mejia's failure to find a lawyer willing to represent him in the rest of the case does not, by itself, change the legal analysis or entitle him to a court-appointed attorney.
Ruling
Judge Magnuson upheld Magistrate Judge Micko's conclusion that Mejia is not entitled to appointment of counsel and denied Mejia's motion (Docket No. 82). The court also denied Mejia's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal (Docket No. 83) without prejudice and as premature, meaning Mejia is not barred from refiling it at the appropriate time if an actual appeal to the Eighth Circuit later becomes proper.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.