Dusan C. v. Bondi

Background

Dusan C. sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the federal law allowing a person to challenge custody that violates federal law or the Constitution. He had been ordered deported to Poland in 1999 and was detained from October 8, 1999, until January 19, 2000. He was then released under an Order of Supervision after the former Immigration and Naturalization Service said it had been unable to remove him.

The parties disputed Dusan C.’s citizenship. He asserted that he had been a citizen of Yugoslavia and was stateless after Yugoslavia ceased to exist. The respondents asserted that he was a citizen and national of Poland. The court expressly made no finding on citizenship because that issue did not determine the petition.

Dusan C. alleged, and the respondents did not dispute, that he complied with the conditions of supervised release. On January 23, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers went to his home and arrested him when he returned. The opinion states that the officers did not have a judicial warrant to enter the home. After the arrest, Dusan C. did not receive a notice explaining why his release had been revoked, a custody determination, or other written justification for his re-detention.

Legal Framework

The petition challenged the revocation of supervised release and the lawfulness of the new detention, not the underlying removal order. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider those detention-related questions.

The court focused on 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Under subsection (i)(2), immigration officials may revoke supervised release and return a person to custody when, because of changed circumstances, they determine that removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The regulation identifies factors relevant to that determination, including compliance with the removal order, government efforts to remove the person, assistance with those efforts, expected results, and the State Department’s views.

Subsection (i)(3) requires officials, after revocation, to notify the person of the reasons, conduct an initial informal interview promptly, allow the person to respond and submit information, and review contested facts before deciding whether continued custody is warranted.

The court followed decisions from the District of Minnesota concluding that the government bears the burden of showing changed circumstances that justify re-detention under § 241.13(i)(2). In other words, because the government sought to change Dusan C.’s existing supervised-release status by taking him back into custody, it had to provide evidence supporting that change.

Court’s Analysis

The court concluded that the respondents did not meet their burden. The government had tried to remove Dusan C. to Poland in 1999 but had been unable to do so. In response to the court’s request for information about what had changed 26 years later, the respondents did not identify changed circumstances. They stated only that the Polish Embassy had been contacted about a travel document and the possibility of removal and that a response was pending.

The government had not obtained a travel document and provided no information showing that one was likely to be issued in the foreseeable future. The court therefore found that the respondents had not established a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

The court also concluded that the respondents failed to comply with § 241.13(i)(3). They did not contest Dusan C.’s allegation that he had received neither the required notice nor the required interview. Although the respondents acknowledged the regulation, they argued that the remedy should be allowing the agency to redo the process rather than releasing him. The court rejected that proposed remedy because the government had failed both to show changed circumstances and to provide the required notice and interview.

The court did not reach Dusan C.’s alternative arguments under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Fifth Amendment, or the Administrative Procedure Act. It also did not decide whether his prior and current detention should be combined for purposes of the six-month detention analysis discussed in Zadvydas v. Davis, because the regulatory violations independently supported relief.

Recommended Disposition

Judge Wright recommended that the verified habeas petition be granted. The recommendation would require the respondents to release Dusan C. immediately, and no later than 48 hours after the filing of the recommendation. If he were detained outside Minnesota, the respondents would first have to transport him to Minnesota for release. The recommendation also addressed coordination with counsel during release because of severe weather, return of his personal effects, and limits on release conditions.

The recommendation would allow only the conditions in Dusan C.’s existing January 19, 2000 Order of Supervision. It would also enjoin the respondents from re-detaining him under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 unless Poland issues a travel document, he violates a supervision condition, or another lawful basis for detention arises.

The recommendation permitted Dusan C. to seek attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act by a separate motion within 30 days after final judgment. The opinion states that the Report and Recommendation is not a final district-court order or judgment and is not directly appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Objections were due February 15, 2026, and responses were due February 17, 2026.