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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Nov. 26, 2025

Robinson v. Dianne T. Renwick

Judge
Jesse Furman
Docket
1:25-cv-08512
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
7
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissPro Se
In one sentence

In Robinson v. Renwick, Judge Furman dismissed Robinson’s complaint because judicial immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred her claims.

Who this affects

Gina Robinson’s lawsuit was dismissed, ending her claims for damages and injunctive relief against the named judicial defendants. The court did not impose a filing injunction, but warned Robinson that future frivolous lawsuits could lead to sanctions or one.

What happened

In Gina Robinson v. Dianne T. Renwick et al., Gina Robinson, representing herself, sued several New York state appellate judges and Judge Gregory H. Woods. She claimed that the judges violated her constitutional rights by dismissing or otherwise ruling against her in related cases and sought money damages and an order overturning those decisions.

The court ruled that judicial immunity barred Robinson’s claims for damages because the challenged decisions were judicial acts. It also ruled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented the federal court from reviewing Robinson’s challenges to state-court judgments, including her request to overturn those judgments.

Judge Furman dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. He declined to block Robinson from filing future cases at that time but warned that additional frivolous lawsuits could lead to sanctions or a filing injunction; he also denied her ability to appeal without paying fees.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Robinson v. Dianne T. Renwick · No. 1:25-cv-08512
Judge
Jesse Furman
Date
Nov. 26, 2025

Background

Gina Robinson, proceeding without a lawyer, sued several New York state appellate judges and Judge Gregory H. Woods of the Southern District of New York. Her complaint arose from state-court litigation involving a contract dispute. The New York Supreme Court had partially granted and partially denied Robinson’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied her request for review. The opinion notes that a cross-appeal by the defendants in the state contract case remained pending before the Appellate Division.

Robinson alleged that Judge Woods and the New York appellate judges violated her constitutional rights by improperly dismissing her cases. She sought money damages and injunctive relief. Her requested injunctive relief was an order overturning decisions issued by Judge Woods and the New York appellate courts.

Damages Claims

The court held that judicial immunity barred Robinson’s damages claims. Judicial immunity generally protects judges from suits for money damages based on their judicial acts. The court found that the dismissals Robinson challenged were acts arising from or related to cases before the judges and therefore were judicial acts. The court rejected Robinson’s argument that alleged malicious, corrupt, criminal, or fraudulent conduct eliminated judicial immunity. It also rejected her argument that nominal damages could avoid the immunity bar, explaining that nominal damages are still money damages.

The court therefore dismissed the damages claims for failure to state a claim under the rule governing insufficiently pleaded claims.

Injunctive Relief and Jurisdiction

The court held that it lacked authority to overturn the challenged state-court decisions. It applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents a federal district court from functioning as an appeals court for state-court judgments. The court explained that the doctrine applies to challenges alleging that state-court decisions were unconstitutional.

The court rejected Robinson’s argument that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because a cross-appeal in the underlying state case remained pending. It concluded that the particular issue Robinson sought to relitigate—whether the state courts properly denied her appeal from the partial denial of summary judgment—had been resolved. The court also rejected her argument that constitutional-rights allegations prevented application of the doctrine.

The court further concluded that treating the complaint as a request for Supreme Court review or as another type of post-trial petition would not help Robinson because this district court could not provide those remedies and lacked jurisdiction to hear that type of case.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It declined to grant Robinson leave to amend because the defects in her proposed claims were substantive and amendment would be futile. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Robinson permission to appeal without paying filing fees.

The court declined to impose a filing injunction based solely on this lawsuit because Robinson had not previously been warned that her conduct could lead to one. It warned, however, that additional frivolous lawsuits could result in sanctions or an injunction requiring her to obtain permission before filing future lawsuits. The Clerk was directed to close the case, and outstanding motions were terminated as moot.

The authoritative version

Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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