Reese v. Warden
- Laura Provinzino
- 0:24-cv-04341
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 8
In Reese v. Warden, FCI Sandstone, Judge Provinzino denied Gordon David Reese's petition challenging his ineligibility to earn First Step Act time credits.
Federal prisoners who are serving sentences that include a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possessing or using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence) and who seek to earn First Step Act time credits to reduce their sentences.
What happened
In Reese v. Warden, FCI Sandstone (Case No. 24-cv-4341), federal prisoner Gordon David Reese filed a petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons' determination that he is ineligible to earn time credits under the First Step Act (a federal law allowing prisoners to shorten their sentences by completing rehabilitation programs). The Bureau of Prisons found that because Reese was convicted of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and because all of his multiple sentences are treated as one combined sentence under federal law, he is ineligible to earn any such time credits on his entire sentence. Reese argued that the relevant statutes are ambiguous and should be read in his favor, and also raised a constitutional due process challenge.
The case was first reviewed by a magistrate judge (a judicial officer who assists the district court), who issued a Report and Recommendation in November 2025 concluding that Reese's petition should be denied. Reese objected, arguing that a legal principle called the 'rule of lenity' — which says that ambiguous criminal statutes must be interpreted in favor of defendants — required a different reading of the statutes. He also argued that the Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which limited courts' deference to federal agencies, should change the result. Additionally, he contended that the Bureau of Prisons' determination violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process.
Judge Laura M. Provinzino overruled all of Reese's objections and adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation in full. The court found no ambiguity in the relevant statutes, so the rule of lenity did not apply. The court also found that Loper Bright did not help Reese because courts had independently — not merely by deferring to the agency — reached the same conclusion that Eighth Circuit precedent confirmed. On the due process claim, the court held that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the opportunity to earn First Step Act time credits. Reese's petition was denied and the case was dismissed without prejudice.
The detailed version
- Reese v. Warden · No. 0:24-cv-04341
- Laura M. Provinzino
- Mar. 2, 2026
Background
Gordon David Reese, representing himself without an attorney (pro se), was convicted in 2006 of five federal offenses: conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)), being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, and assault resulting in bodily injury. He was originally sentenced to 363 months total. After a resentencing on one count, his sentence was adjusted. At the time of filing, his projected release date was September 20, 2031.
The First Step Act (FSA) allows federal prisoners to earn time credits (FTCs) by completing recidivism reduction programs, which can result in earlier transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release. However, the FSA expressly bars prisoners from earning FTCs if they are serving a sentence for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) relating to firearm use during a drug trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii). A separate statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), requires that multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently be treated as a single, aggregate term for administrative purposes.
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) determined that because Reese's § 924(c) conviction was aggregated with his other sentences into one combined sentence, he is ineligible to earn FTCs on his entire aggregated term. Reese filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (a legal challenge to the lawfulness of his confinement or the conditions of his imprisonment) in December 2024, contesting this determination.
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
United States Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on November 10, 2025, concluding that the BOP's determination was correct and recommending denial of the petition. Reese timely objected. The district court reviewed the objected-to portions of the R&R de novo (fresh, without deferring to the magistrate judge's conclusions) and reviewed the remainder for clear error.
Analysis
Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction requiring that genuine ambiguities in criminal statutes be resolved in favor of the defendant. Courts apply it only when, after using all other tools of statutory interpretation, a 'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty' remains.
Reese argued that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584(c) and 3632(d)(4)(D) are ambiguous as to whether a prisoner serving time for multiple convictions — not all of which trigger ineligibility — is barred from FTCs for his entire sentence or only for the portion attributable to the ineligible convictions. The court rejected this argument. It found that § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii) clearly states that a prisoner 'is ineligible to receive time credits' if serving a sentence for a § 924(c) conviction, and that § 3584(c) clearly requires that multiple terms be treated as a single aggregate term. Because there was no ambiguity, the rule of lenity had no role to play.
The court also addressed Reese's argument based on Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), in which the Supreme Court overruled the Chevron doctrine (which had required courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes). The court acknowledged that under Loper Bright, courts must independently determine whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority. However, it found the statutes unambiguous, making the Loper Bright framework inapplicable. The court further noted that Loper Bright does not render prior decisions that happened to apply the Chevron framework automatically wrong, and that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Clinkenbeard v. Murdock, No. 24-3127, 2025 WL 926451 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) — decided after Loper Bright and presenting nearly identical facts — affirmed denial of a habeas petition on the same grounds.
Fifth Amendment Due Process
The R&R concluded that the BOP's determination did not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the opportunity to earn FTCs. Reese objected, arguing that the absence of a protected liberty interest does not categorically bar a Fifth Amendment due process challenge. The court disagreed, citing Eighth Circuit authority stating that constitutional due process is only implicated when a deprivation of life, liberty, or property is at stake. Because Reese did not claim deprivation of life or property, and because multiple decisions within the District of Minnesota have consistently rejected the argument that a federal prisoner has a protected liberty interest in earning FTCs, the court overruled this objection as well.
Disposition
Judge Provinzino overruled all of Reese's objections, adopted the magistrate judge's R&R in full, denied Reese's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the case without prejudice.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.