Reese v. Warden
- Laura Provinzino
- 0:24-cv-04341
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 8
In Reese v. Warden, FCI Sandstone, Judge Provinzino denied federal prisoner Gordon David Reese's petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons' decision that his firearm conviction made him ineligible to earn First Step Act sentence-reduction credits on his entire combined prison term.
Federal prisoners serving sentences that include a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime) who seek to earn First Step Act sentence-reduction credits. This ruling confirms that such prisoners are ineligible for those credits across their entire aggregated sentence, consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent.
What happened
In Reese v. Warden, FCI Sandstone, Gordon David Reese, a federal prisoner convicted in 2006 of drug, firearm, and assault offenses, challenged the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) determination that he could not earn First Step Act (FSA) time credits — credits that allow eligible prisoners to reduce their sentences by completing rehabilitation programs. The BOP found that because Reese's conviction for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) was part of his overall sentence, and because federal law requires multiple prison terms to be treated as one combined term, he was ineligible to earn any FSA credits at all — not just on the firearm portion of his sentence.
Reese raised two main arguments. First, he argued that the statutes were ambiguous and that under a legal rule called the 'rule of lenity' — which requires ambiguous criminal laws to be read in a defendant's favor — they should be interpreted to allow him to earn credits at least on the non-firearm parts of his sentence. Second, he argued that the BOP's determination violated his constitutional right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. He also argued that a recent Supreme Court decision, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which limited courts' deference to government agency interpretations of law, required the court to side with him.
Judge Provinzino overruled all of Reese's objections and adopted the Magistrate Judge's earlier recommendation in full. The court found the relevant statutes clear on their face — no ambiguity existed to trigger the rule of lenity, and multiple federal courts including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had reached the same conclusion on nearly identical facts. The court also rejected the due process argument, finding that prisoners do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the opportunity to earn FSA credits. The petition was denied and the case dismissed without prejudice, meaning Reese could potentially refile under appropriate circumstances.
The detailed version
- Reese v. Warden, FCI Sandstone, No. 24-cv-4341 (LMP/DLM)
- United States District Court, District of Minnesota
- Laura M. Provinzino, United States District Judge
- March 2, 2026
Background
Gordon David Reese, proceeding without an attorney (pro se), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — a legal filing asking a court to order that a prisoner's detention or sentence terms are unlawful — challenging the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) determination that he is ineligible to earn First Step Act (FSA) time credits (FTCs).
In 2006, Reese was convicted of five counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846); (2) possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)); (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)); (4) being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1)); and (5) assault resulting in bodily injury (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4)). He was originally sentenced to 363 months total (303 months concurrent on Counts 1, 2, and 4; 6 months concurrent on Count 5; and 60 months consecutive on Count 3), later resentenced to 120 months on Count 4. His projected release date is September 20, 2031.
Under the FSA, federal prisoners who complete recidivism reduction programs may earn FTCs toward early transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release. However, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii) expressly bars prisoners serving sentences for convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) relating to firearm possession during a drug trafficking crime from earning FTCs. Separately, 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c) requires that multiple prison terms — whether consecutive or concurrent — be treated as a single aggregated term for administrative purposes. The BOP relied on both statutes to find Reese ineligible for FTCs across his entire aggregated sentence.
Procedural History
Reese filed his petition on December 2, 2024. United States Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on November 10, 2025, recommending denial. Reese timely objected; the Government responded. Judge Provinzino reviewed the contested portions of the R&R de novo (from scratch) and the remainder for clear error, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3).
Issues and Holdings
1. Rule of Lenity: Reese argued that §§ 3584(c) and 3632(d)(4)(D) are ambiguous as to whether a prisoner with mixed convictions (some FTC-eligible, some not) loses FTC eligibility for the entire aggregated sentence or only the ineligible portion. He argued that under the rule of lenity — the canon that ambiguous criminal statutes must be construed in the defendant's favor — the statutes should be read to allow him to earn FTCs at least on the drug portions of his sentence.
The court rejected this argument. It found both statutes unambiguous: § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii) clearly bars FTCs for anyone serving a sentence for a § 924(c) conviction, and § 3584(c) clearly mandates that multiple terms be treated as one aggregate term. The court cited the Eighth Circuit's decision in Clinkenbeard v. Murdock, No. 24-3127, 2025 WL 926451 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025), which affirmed denial of a habeas petition on nearly identical facts, as well as Sok v. Eischen and the Second Circuit's decision in Giovinco v. Pullen (noting unanimity among circuits). Because there was no statutory ambiguity, the rule of lenity had no application.
2. Loper Bright Argument: Reese argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) — which overruled the Chevron doctrine requiring courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes — compelled a different result. The court rejected this, finding again that the statutes are not ambiguous, so there is nothing to re-examine. The court also noted that Loper Bright explicitly preserved prior decisions made under the Chevron framework, and that Clinkenbeard was decided after Loper Bright and still upheld the BOP's approach.
3. Fifth Amendment Due Process: Reese argued that the BOP's determination violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that the R&R improperly disposed of the claim solely on the basis that there is no protected liberty interest in earning FTCs. The court held that the constitutional guarantee of due process is only triggered when a deprivation of life, liberty, or property is at stake. Because Reese did not claim deprivation of life or property, the question was whether there is a protected liberty interest in earning FTCs. The court agreed with consistent decisions in the District of Minnesota that no such protected liberty interest exists, citing Vang v. Rardin, Davis v. Warden FCI Sandstone, and Reynolds v. Eischen.
Disposition
Reese's objections were overruled in their entirety. The R&R was adopted in full. His habeas petition was denied and the case was dismissed without prejudice (allowing the possibility of refiling under appropriate circumstances). Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.