Rushing v. The McGaw Medical Center of Northwestern University

Background

Plaintiff Marcus Rushing filed a complaint on May 1, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against more than thirty defendants, including medical centers, hospitals, health companies, banks, law firms, individual attorneys and individuals, and several Illinois and Ohio state agencies and commissions. As the basis for the court's authority to hear the case, Rushing invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1332 — the federal diversity-of-citizenship statute — which gives federal district courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy exceeds a statutory threshold.

Jurisdictional Defects

The court identified at least three independent reasons why diversity jurisdiction was absent:

1. Non-Diverse Parties Complete diversity of citizenship — meaning no plaintiff shares a state of citizenship with any defendant — is required under § 1332. Rushing's own complaint alleged that both he and defendant U.S. Bank National Association are citizens of Minnesota. That single overlap destroys complete diversity and eliminates the statutory basis for jurisdiction.

2. Inadequate Pleading of Citizenship for Unincorporated Entities For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a limited liability company (LLC) or partnership is determined by the citizenship of each of its members or partners, not by the entity's principal place of business. Rushing named multiple LLCs and partnerships without identifying the citizenship of their members or partners, making it impossible for the court to confirm complete diversity even setting aside the Minnesota overlap.

3. State Agency Defendants The Supreme Court established long ago, and federal courts of appeals have reaffirmed, that a state or a state agency is not a "citizen" of any state for diversity purposes and therefore cannot be a party to a diversity action. See Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. State of Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894); Dep't of Fair Emp. & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2011). Because Rushing named several state agencies — including Illinois and Ohio agencies — as defendants, diversity jurisdiction was unavailable on this ground alone, independent of any other defect.

Failure to Cure

The court noted that Rushing had received notice of jurisdictional problems months earlier, when a motion to dismiss was filed on July 2, 2025. Despite having ample time, Rushing did not file a motion to amend his complaint with a proposed amended pleading that would adequately establish jurisdiction, as required by Local Rule 15.1 of the District of Minnesota. His original complaint therefore remained the operative — and jurisdictionally defective — pleading.

Potential Federal Claims

Rushing submitted documents suggesting he wished to pursue federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (a civil rights statute allowing suits against state actors) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). However, because he did not file a proper motion to amend, those proposed claims were not before the court. The court noted in a footnote that even if Rushing had properly sought to amend:

- His RICO claims lacked sufficient factual detail to satisfy the heightened pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which demands that fraud-based allegations be stated with particularity. - His § 1983 claims failed because the only defendant against whom he sought § 1983 relief — McGaw Medical Center of Northwestern University — is not a state actor. Section 1983 liability attaches only to state actors. See Doe v. North Homes, Inc., 11 F.4th 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2021).

Disposition

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), which requires dismissal whenever a court determines it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, Judge Tunheim dismissed Rushing's complaint without prejudice — meaning Rushing is not permanently barred from reasserting his claims in a proper forum or in a properly pleaded complaint. All pending motions (identified by docket numbers in the order) were denied as moot.

Good-Faith Certification and Appeal Warning

The court certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from the dismissal would not be taken in good faith, and that any application by Rushing to proceed without paying appeal fees ("in forma pauperis") on appeal would therefore be denied.

Filing-Restriction Warning

The court repeated a warning issued in another recent case brought by Rushing in the same district: continued filing of lawsuits against the same defendants about essentially the same subject matter risks the imposition of restrictions on Rushing's ability to initiate new litigation in the District of Minnesota without being represented by counsel or obtaining advance authorization from a judicial officer.