Johnson v. North Memorial Health Care
Jason Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and the proposed Minnesota Rule 23 Class v. North Memorial Health Care
- Patrick Schiltz
- 0:23-cv-01780
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 14
In Johnson v. North Memorial Health Care, Judge Nelson granted and denied parts of both parties' summary judgment motions on whether EMT on-call hours are compensable work time under federal and state wage laws.
Current and former EMTs and paramedics who worked on-call shifts for North Memorial Health Care in Minnesota, as well as other employers in the ambulance and emergency services industries who pay reduced wages for on-call time and exclude it from overtime calculations.
What happened
In Jason Johnson v. North Memorial Health Care (Case No. 23-cv-1780), plaintiff Jason Johnson, a former emergency medical technician (EMT), and roughly 120 others sued North Memorial Health Care for allegedly failing to pay proper overtime and minimum wages under federal and Minnesota law. The dispute centers on whether the time EMTs spent 'on call'—available to respond to emergencies but not physically at work—counts as compensable working time. North Memorial paid EMTs $4.00 per hour for on-call time and excluded those hours from overtime calculations.
Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. Johnson asked the court to rule, as a matter of law, that North Memorial cannot use a 'good faith' defense to avoid extra damages under federal wage law, and that North Memorial's conduct was 'willful,' which would extend the time period covered by the lawsuit from two years to three. North Memorial asked the court to rule in its favor on willfulness and, more broadly, on whether the on-call hours even qualify as working time requiring full pay.
Judge Susan Richard Nelson granted both motions in part and denied both in part. The court ruled in Johnson's favor on the good-faith defense, finding that North Memorial's vague references to legal counsel and internal audits—without any specifics—were insufficient to meet the legal standard. The court ruled in North Memorial's favor on willfulness, finding that the evidence at most showed negligence, not that North Memorial knowingly or recklessly disregarded its obligations. The central question—whether on-call time is compensable working time—remains unresolved and will proceed to trial, because sharply conflicting evidence makes it a question for a jury to decide.
The detailed version
- Johnson v. North Memorial Health Care · No. 0:23-cv-01780
- Patrick Schiltz
- Mar. 9, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Jason Johnson worked for North Memorial Health Care as an emergency medical technician (EMT) from April 2002 to May 2023. Along with approximately 120 opt-in plaintiffs, Johnson brings claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., a federal law requiring minimum wage and overtime pay. On behalf of a certified class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Johnson also brings claims under the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act (MFLSA), Minn. Stat. § 177.21 et seq., and the Minnesota Payment of Wages Act, Minn. Stat. § 181.101. The class was certified on June 20, 2025, covering EMTs and paramedics who worked for North Memorial in Minnesota between June 13, 2020, and April 24, 2022.
North Memorial is a nonprofit corporation providing ambulance services in Minnesota and western Wisconsin. EMTs worked both 'primary' shifts (paid at the regular hourly rate) and 'on-call' (or 'off-premise') shifts (paid at $4.00 per hour). On-call hours were excluded from North Memorial's overtime calculations. When on-call EMTs responded to actual calls, those hours were treated as primary hours, with a guaranteed minimum of two hours' pay per completed call and one hour if a call was canceled before the EMT was en route.
North Memorial's general on-call requirements included: (1) being in the ambulance and en route within eight minutes of being called; (2) refraining from alcohol or mind-altering substances; and (3) being appropriately dressed. The extent to which these policies were actually enforced is disputed.
The Motions
Johnson filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 152). North Memorial filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 157). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Issue 1: Liability — Whether On-Call Time Is Compensable Working Time
The FLSA does not define a standard for when on-call time counts as working time. Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), courts look at all the circumstances, including whether the employer's on-call conditions interfere with the employee's ability to pursue personal activities.
The evidence is sharply conflicting. Johnson presented evidence that the eight-minute response requirement effectively forced many EMTs to stay at the station, limited where they could live, and made routine daily activities (errands, exercise, childcare, dining out, outdoor recreation) difficult or impossible. On average, EMTs spent slightly under one-third of on-call time actually responding to calls.
North Memorial countered with evidence that the eight-minute policy was not strictly monitored, that EMTs could swap shifts, and that EMTs in fact engaged in a wide variety of personal activities during on-call time. North Memorial also emphasized that many bases were in small towns where most amenities were within easy reach.
The court found that factual disputes preclude summary judgment on this issue. It also reviewed and distinguished multiple cases cited by both sides—including Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Commission, Renfro v. City of Emporia, Brekke v. City of Blackduck, and Sletten v. First Care Medical Services—concluding that none controls the outcome here because each case involves a distinct mix of factors. The court noted that the Supreme Court itself has recognized that no legal formula can resolve all on-call cases. Both parties' motions are therefore denied on the liability issue, and it will go to a jury.
Issue 2: Liquidated Damages and the Good-Faith Defense
Under the FLSA, an employee who prevails may recover unpaid wages plus an equal amount as liquidated damages (a form of automatic double damages). 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). However, under 29 U.S.C. § 260, an employer may avoid or reduce liquidated damages if it demonstrates both (1) subjective good faith—that it actually believed its conduct was lawful—and (2) objective reasonableness. The burden is a difficult one, and the Eighth Circuit has described it as a high bar.
The court found North Memorial's evidence of good faith insufficient. North Memorial offered only generic assertions that it relied on legal counsel, caselaw, seminars, treatises, and regulatory communications, without identifying who relied on what, when, or what specific guidance was received or analyzed. North Memorial's payroll witness acknowledged that yearly audits were conducted to ensure correct payment but could not describe their content, documentation, or results, and could only say the company 'would have' relied on various sources. The court contrasted this with Hultgren v. County of Lancaster, 913 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990), where the employer provided detailed, specific evidence of steps taken to comply with the FLSA after a relevant Supreme Court decision, including specific legal guidance obtained and actually relied upon.
The court granted Johnson's motion for summary judgment on this issue: North Memorial's good-faith defense to liquidated damages fails as a matter of law.
Issue 3: Willfulness and the Statute of Limitations
The standard FLSA limitations period is two years; if the employer's violation was 'willful,' it extends to three years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). To prove willfulness, plaintiffs must show the employer acted knowingly or with reckless disregard of whether its conduct violated the law—mere negligence is not enough. The burden of proof is on the plaintiffs.
Johnson argued that North Memorial's failure to investigate its FLSA obligations and its subsequent change in pay practices after an EMT complained to the Department of Labor demonstrated willfulness. The court disagreed. It found that this evidence, at most, shows negligence. Unlike cases such as Jarrett (where supervisors explicitly told employees they would not receive overtime) or Simpson (where discriminatory policies were explicit and a corporate officer made discriminatory comments), there was no positive evidence that North Memorial knew or recklessly disregarded its legal obligations. The court also noted that North Memorial has a meritorious legal argument that on-call time was not covered by the FLSA.
The court granted North Memorial's motion for summary judgment on willfulness. The applicable statute of limitations is two years under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
Disposition
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 152): Granted in part and denied in part. Granted as to North Memorial's good-faith defense to liquidated damages (that defense fails as a matter of law); denied in all other respects.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 157): Granted in part and denied in part. Granted as to willfulness (two-year statute of limitations applies); denied in all other respects.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.