Melissa E. v. Bisignano

Case: Melissa E. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, No. 24-cv-4438 (DLM), United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. Decided March 9, 2026, by Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko.

Background and Procedural History Plaintiff Melissa E. applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on April 15, 2021, alleging disability beginning April 12, 2021. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her claim initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing on October 4, 2023, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision on November 16, 2023. Melissa E. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Medical and Vocational Expert Testimony At the ALJ hearing, medical expert Dr. Ken Berger testified that Melissa E. suffered from numerous severe physical impairments including degenerative disc disease with moderate spinal stenosis, nerve root impingement, asthma, COPD, diabetes, hepatitis C, migraines, prior neck surgery, and hip bursitis. Dr. Berger opined she could walk for up to two hours at a time, no more than four hours total per eight-hour workday; stand for up to three hours at a time, no more than six hours per workday; and that the combined standing and walking limit was no more than six hours per workday. Vocational expert Eric Pruitt testified that a hypothetical worker with Melissa E.'s limitations — including no more than six hours standing and four hours walking — could perform three light-work jobs identified in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT): mail clerk (DOT No. 209.687-026), collator operator (DOT No. 208.685-010), and routing clerk (DOT No. 222.687-022). When asked by Plaintiff's counsel whether those jobs would remain available if the person could only stand or walk a combined total of four hours per workday, Pruitt answered yes.

ALJ's RFC Determination The ALJ found Melissa E. retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) — the most she can do despite her limitations — to perform light work with numerous restrictions, including standing for up to six hours per workday (no more than three continuous hours) and walking for up to four hours per workday (no more than two continuous hours). Critically, the RFC did not include an explicit cap on the combined total of standing and walking per day. The ALJ credited the three representative DOT jobs identified by Pruitt, noted they were all light-work positions, but did not address Pruitt's additional testimony that the jobs would remain available even if the plaintiff could only stand or walk a combined total of four hours per day.

Issues on Review Melissa E. raised two main arguments: (1) the ALJ improperly discounted her subjective complaints of pain; and (2) the RFC was unsupported by substantial evidence because it lacked a combined standing-and-walking cap, effectively allowing for a full workday of alternating standing and walking with no aggregate limit.

Issue 1 — Subjective Pain Complaints: No Error Found The court applied the Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), framework, which requires ALJs to consider daily activities, pain duration and intensity, aggravating factors, medication effects, and functional restrictions. The court found the ALJ adequately addressed these factors. The ALJ cited medical records showing some medication benefit (gabapentin, topical lidocaine); documented Plaintiff's pattern of declining physical therapy despite multiple provider recommendations over several years; and noted Plaintiff's daily activities (caring for pets, cooking, cleaning, laundromat use). The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ cherry-picked evidence, finding the ALJ's citations were well-supported by the record. The court declined to reverse for the ALJ's failure to highlight a single physical therapy visit shortly before the decision, characterizing that demand as impermissible nitpicking. Applying deferential review, the court upheld the ALJ's credibility determination.

Issue 2 — RFC's Lack of Combined Standing/Walking Cap: Error Found; Not Harmless The court agreed with Melissa E. that the RFC, as written, did not clearly reflect the six-hour combined standing-and-walking cap that Dr. Berger had opined. The RFC set separate limits on standing and walking but contained no aggregate limit, which could permit alternating standing and walking throughout the entire eight-hour workday. The Commissioner raised three defenses: (a) the ALJ was not required to adopt Dr. Berger's restrictions verbatim — the court agreed with this principle but found the divergence here was unsupported by any record evidence; (b) the light-work designation under SSR 83-10 implicitly imposed a six-hour combined cap — the court rejected this because the ALJ defined light work by reference to 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), which contains no such cap; and (c) any error was harmless because Pruitt testified the jobs remained available with only four combined hours of standing and walking — the court rejected this because that testimony conflicted with the DOT's classification of those jobs as light work requiring 'a good deal of walking or standing,' and the ALJ never identified or resolved that conflict as required under Stanton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 899 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 2018). Because the conflict was unresolved, Pruitt's testimony could not constitute substantial evidence supporting the denial.

Disposition Magistrate Judge Micko granted each side's motion for judgment on the administrative record in part and denied it in part, and remanded the case to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court did not award benefits; it returned the matter to the SSA to correct the RFC and resolve the conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the DOT.