Melissa E. v. Bisignano

Background

Plaintiff Melissa E. applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on April 15, 2021, alleging disability beginning April 12, 2021. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her claim initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on October 4, 2023, at which Melissa E. appeared with counsel and testified. The ALJ also received testimony from Dr. Ken Berger, a medical expert, and Eric Pruitt, a vocational expert.

Dr. Berger identified numerous severe physical impairments including degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with moderate spinal stenosis, nerve root impingement, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, hepatitis C, migraines, a history of neck discectomy and fusion, and trochanteric bursitis of the hips. Dr. Berger opined that Plaintiff could walk up to four hours per workday (no more than two hours at a time) and stand up to six hours per workday (no more than three hours at a time), but that the combined total of standing and walking could not exceed six hours per workday.

The ALJ posed hypotheticals to vocational expert Pruitt, including standing limits of six hours per day and walking limits of four hours per day. Pruitt identified three representative jobs: mail clerk (DOT No. 209.687-026), collator operator (DOT No. 208.685-010), and routing clerk (DOT No. 222.687-022). When Plaintiff's counsel asked whether these jobs remained available if the hypothetical person could only stand or walk for a combined total of four hours per day, Pruitt answered yes.

On November 16, 2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. The ALJ recognized the physical and mental impairments identified by Dr. Berger, plus additional impairments including chronic pain syndrome, bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, GERD, obesity, hypertension, fatty liver, and hyperlipidemia. The ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) — the most a claimant can still do despite limitations — to perform light work with extensive restrictions, including standing up to six hours per day (no more than three continuous hours) and walking up to four hours per day (no more than two continuous hours). The ALJ did not include an express aggregate cap on the combined total of standing and walking. The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled, relying on vocational expert Pruitt's testimony about the three representative jobs.

Issues on Review

Melissa E. raised two arguments before the district court:

1. The ALJ improperly discounted her subjective complaints about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, particularly regarding standing and walking. 2. The RFC, as written, did not reflect a combined standing-and-walking time limit, effectively suggesting she could stand and walk throughout an entire workday — a conclusion unsupported by any record evidence.

Issue 1: Subjective Complaints of Pain

The court reviewed the ALJ's evaluation of Melissa E.'s subjective symptom testimony under the framework established in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), and SSR 16-3p. The Polaski factors require consideration of daily activities; duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; medication dosage, effectiveness, and side effects; and functional restrictions. An ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor but must acknowledge and consider them before discounting subjective complaints.

Melissa E. argued the ALJ failed to adequately address her activities of daily living in relation to standing and walking, and that the ALJ misrepresented her conservative treatment history by ignoring reasons she might not have pursued more aggressive care.

The court found no error. The ALJ cited medical records showing Plaintiff reported some benefit from medications, documented her consistent pattern of declining physical therapy despite multiple providers' recommendations over several years, and acknowledged one physical therapy visit on September 28, 2023. The ALJ also noted a September 1, 2023 appointment at which a short-term oxycodone prescription was made contingent on Plaintiff actively participating in physical therapy — suggesting the ALJ was aware she might soon be doing so. The court declined to reverse for failure to mention a single physical therapy appointment, describing such an approach as the kind of "nitpicking" the Eighth Circuit has instructed reviewing courts to avoid.

On activities of daily living, the court found the ALJ did address them — noting Plaintiff cares for pets, cooks, cleans, and uses the laundromat — and that inconsistency between Plaintiff's self-assessment and her providers' observations provided sufficient grounds for discounting her testimony. The court deferred to the ALJ's credibility determination.

Issue 2: RFC and the Combined Standing-and-Walking Limitation

The court found reversible error in the RFC. Dr. Berger expressly testified that Plaintiff could only tolerate a combined total of six hours of standing and walking per workday. The RFC, however, listed separate caps (six hours for standing, four hours for walking) without any aggregate limit — creating the implication that Plaintiff could stand and walk throughout the full workday by alternating between the two activities. The Commissioner pointed to no record evidence supporting the notion that Plaintiff could tolerate a full workday of combined standing and walking.

Commissioner's Three Arguments Rejected

First, the Commissioner argued the ALJ was not required to adopt Dr. Berger's restrictions verbatim. The court agreed with that general principle but found the problem was not mere divergence — it was unsupported divergence with no evidentiary basis in the record.

Second, the Commissioner argued that because the RFC limited Plaintiff to "light work," it implicitly incorporated SSR 83-10's cap of approximately six hours of standing or walking, consistent with that exertional level. The court rejected this because the ALJ's RFC defined "light work" by reference to 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), which contains no such time limitation, not by reference to SSR 83-10.

Third, the Commissioner argued the error was harmless because vocational expert Pruitt testified the three representative jobs could be performed by someone who could only stand or walk a combined total of four hours per day. The court rejected this argument. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) descriptions of the three representative jobs do not reflect a half-day standing-and-walking limitation. Under Eighth Circuit precedent — Stanton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 899 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 2018) — before an ALJ can rely on vocational expert testimony that conflicts with a DOT listing, the ALJ must identify and resolve the conflict. The ALJ here did not resolve this conflict, and without resolution it is unclear whether the identified jobs would remain available to Plaintiff under a properly limited RFC. The court noted it did not fault the ALJ for failing to identify the conflict, as that portion of Pruitt's testimony did not form the basis of the ALJ's decision, but the unresolved conflict nonetheless required remand.

Disposition

Judge Micko granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's request for judgment on the administrative record, granted in part and denied in part Defendant's request for judgment on the administrative record, and remanded the case to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with the order.