Steelmantown Church v. Carlton County
Steelmantown Church; Edward Bixby; Loving Earth Memorial Gardens, LLC; and Matthew Connell v. Carlton County, Minnesota; Sarah Plante Buhs, in her official capacity as Carlton County Commissioner; Marv Bodie, in his official capacity as Carlton County Commissioner; Thomas R. Proulx, in his official capacity as Carlton County Commissioner; Susan Zmyslony, in her official capacity as Carlton County Commissioner; Dan Reed, in his official capacity as Carlton County Commissioner; Kristine Basilici, in her official capacity as Carlton County Recorder of the Carlton County Recorder’s Office; and Chris Berg, in his official capacity as Carlton County Zoning and […]
- Laura Provinzino
- 0:25-cv-02323
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 39
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
Judge Provinzino dismissed all claims in Steelmantown Church v. Carlton County, finding the church lacked legal status as a religious corporation under Minnesota law and could not use the private cemetery platting process it sought.
Religious organizations and nonprofits seeking to establish private cemeteries in Minnesota under Chapter 307, particularly those incorporated as nonprofit corporations rather than as 'religious corporations' under Minnesota Statutes Chapter 315. Also relevant to individuals and entities attempting to operate green burial sites in Carlton County, Minnesota, and to any party considering whether to bring First Amendment or RLUIPA land-use claims without first securing the specific legal status required by the underlying state statute.
What happened
In Steelmantown Church v. Carlton County, Minnesota, Steelmantown Church — a New Jersey nonprofit corporation registered in Minnesota as a foreign nonprofit — sought to establish a private green burial cemetery on land it owns in Carlton County. When the County Recorder refused to record Steelmantown's plat map under Minnesota's private cemetery statute (Chapter 307, which allows 'any private person and any religious corporation' to establish a cemetery on their own land), Steelmantown and co-plaintiffs Edward Bixby, Loving Earth Memorial Gardens, LLC, and Matthew Connell sued, claiming violations of the First Amendment's religion clauses, the Minnesota Constitution's Freedom of Conscience Clause, the 'Church Autonomy Doctrine,' and a federal law called the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
The court first found that Bixby, Loving Earth, and Connell lacked legal standing — meaning they had no sufficient legal basis to sue — because only Steelmantown owned the property, and the cemetery statute grants rights only to landowners. The court then rejected the defendants' argument that Steelmantown's claims were premature, finding the County Recorder's refusal to record the documents represented a sufficiently final decision. On the merits, the court's central finding was that Steelmantown is not a 'religious corporation' under Minnesota law because that term refers specifically to entities incorporated under Minnesota Statutes Chapter 315, and Steelmantown is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation — not a religious corporation — in both New Jersey and Minnesota.
Judge Laura M. Provinzino granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims. The claims of Bixby, Loving Earth, and Connell were dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. Steelmantown's First Amendment, Minnesota Constitution, Church Autonomy Doctrine, and RLUIPA claims were all dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, because Steelmantown — as a nonprofit rather than a religious corporation under Minnesota law — falls outside the scope of the statute it sought to invoke, and its allegations of religious discrimination or substantial burden on religious practice were conclusory and unsupported by specific facts.
The detailed version
- Steelmantown Church v. Carlton County · No. 0:25-cv-02323
- Laura M. Provinzino
- Mar. 11, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Steelmantown Church ('Steelmantown') is a New Jersey 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation registered in Minnesota as a foreign nonprofit corporation under Minnesota Statutes Chapter 303. It is not incorporated under Minnesota Statutes Chapter 315, which governs 'religious corporations' as a distinct legal entity type under Minnesota law. In 2023, Steelmantown purchased approximately twenty acres in Carlton County, Minnesota, intending to establish a private green burial cemetery to be managed by co-plaintiff Loving Earth Memorial Gardens, LLC ('Loving Earth'). Edward Bixby is Steelmantown's president; Matthew Connell is Loving Earth's president and manager.
Steelmantown sought to record a plat map and survey under Minnesota Statutes Chapter 307 ('Chapter 307'), which allows '[a]ny private person and any religious corporation' to establish a cemetery on their own land. The Carlton County Recorder declined to record the documents, stating that Chapter 307 did not apply and that Steelmantown instead needed to proceed under Chapter 306, which governs public cemeteries and applies to most private cemeteries established after March 1, 1906.
Around the same time, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a two-year moratorium (July 1, 2023 – July 1, 2025) on new green burial sites, directing the Minnesota Department of Health (DOH) to study environmental and public health impacts. After the DOH published its findings, the Minnesota Legislature incorporated recommendations into both Chapter 306 and Chapter 307. One week after plaintiffs filed suit, Carlton County enacted its own one-year moratorium (Interim Ordinance 41) pausing new green burial cemeteries while the county analyzed the DOH's recommendations.
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting four causes of action against Carlton County and various county officials in their official capacities: (1) violations of the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses; (2) violations of the Minnesota Constitution's Freedom of Conscience Clause; (3) violation of the 'Church Autonomy Doctrine'; and (4) violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment affirming their rights and a permanent injunction requiring the County Recorder to record the plat map under Chapter 307. Plaintiffs abandoned a Fifth Amendment/takings claim at the hearing.
Justiciability
Standing
The court dismissed the claims of Bixby, Loving Earth, and Connell for lack of Article III standing — the constitutional requirement that a party show a concrete injury traceable to the defendant that can be redressed by a court ruling. The court noted that only Steelmantown owns the property, and Chapter 307 grants rights only to landowners. The other plaintiffs were attempting to assert Steelmantown's legal rights rather than their own, which is generally impermissible under Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The 'third-party standing' exception (requiring a close relationship with, and hindrance to, the rights-holder) did not apply because Steelmantown itself is a party to the case and is not hindered from litigating its own claims. The court also rejected a damages-based standing argument raised at the hearing, finding that the complaint sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, plus attorneys' fees, neither of which created standing for the non-owner plaintiffs.
Ripeness
The court found Steelmantown's claims ripe for adjudication. The County Recorder's definitive refusal to record under Chapter 307 constituted a final, definitive position. The claims presented primarily legal questions not requiring further factual development. Steelmantown's alleged constitutional and statutory injuries satisfied the hardship element at least minimally. The court rejected defendants' argument that Interim Ordinance 41 rendered the claims unripe, explaining that the ordinance raised distinct questions about green burials specifically, while the core question — whether Steelmantown has a right to have its documents recorded under Chapter 307 at all — was already fit for decision.
Merits Analysis
Applicability of Chapter 307 and the Nesgoda Decision
A threshold legal question was whether Minnesota Statutes § 306.01 — which states that private cemeteries established after March 1, 1906, 'shall be organized and governed by' Chapter 306 — supersedes § 307.01's platting procedure. During the litigation, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued Nesgoda v. County of Le Sueur, No. A25-0112, 2025 WL 2902039 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2025) (nonprecedential), holding that § 306.01 governs the organization and governance of existing private cemeteries but does not bar establishing new private cemeteries under § 307.01. The court adopted this reading, noting it was the best available evidence of Minnesota law in the absence of a controlling Minnesota Supreme Court decision (the court noted Nesgoda is currently under review by the Minnesota Supreme Court).
The court agreed with Steelmantown that § 307.01 remains a viable path for 'any private person and any religious corporation' to establish a private cemetery. However, the court determined that Steelmantown falls into neither category.
Steelmantown Is Not a 'Religious Corporation' Under Minnesota Law
The court's central holding is that the term 'religious corporation' in § 307.01 refers specifically to entities incorporated under Chapter 315 of the Minnesota Statutes — not a descriptive label available to any corporation with religious purposes. Steelmantown acknowledges it was not organized under Chapter 315 and is instead registered as a foreign nonprofit under Chapter 303. The court applied fundamental corporate law principles that a corporation is a creature of statute with only the rights and powers conferred by its enabling legislation. Steelmantown cited no authority for the proposition that a nonprofit corporation may self-identify as a religious corporation under a different statutory framework. The court further noted that both Minnesota and Steelmantown's home state of New Jersey treat religious corporations and nonprofit corporations as distinct entity types, and Steelmantown is not a religious corporation in either state.
First Amendment Claims (Counts II & III)
Establishment Clause
The court applied the post-Lemon v. Kurtzman framework requiring plaintiffs to show that the challenged practice aligns with a historically disfavored establishmentarian practice. Steelmantown made no such showing. Section 307.01 does not prefer any religion or denomination; it references 'any religious corporation' without regard to religious beliefs, and Chapter 315's incorporation requirements are content-neutral. The court also found no factual allegations showing that the County Recorder acted out of religious hostility or that similarly situated non-religious entities were treated more favorably. The court observed that granting Steelmantown's requested relief — treating it as a religious corporation while it remains a nonprofit — would itself come closer to an Establishment Clause violation by granting religion-based preferential treatment.
Free Exercise Clause
Under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Section 307.01 and Chapter 315 are neutral and generally applicable — they do not target religious practice. The court found no substantial burden on religious exercise: Steelmantown did not allege that maintaining its nonprofit status is central to its religious beliefs, that reincorporating as a religious corporation would violate its beliefs, or that the cost of doing so was prohibitive (the court noted Chapter 315 imposes minimal fees and requirements). The court distinguished Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), which was decided under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a higher statutory standard, not the Free Exercise Clause, and which involved a mandate directly conflicting with sincerely held beliefs — facts not alleged here.
Minnesota Constitution Claims (Counts II & III)
The Freedom of Conscience Clause of the Minnesota Constitution provides broader protection than the First Amendment. To state a claim, a plaintiff must show that government action 'burdens the exercise of religious beliefs' in a way that is 'real and not remote,' and for a generally applicable law, must show that compliance requires 'a change in religious conduct or philosophy.' The court found Steelmantown failed this standard: it did not allege that incorporating under Chapter 315 would require any change in its religious beliefs or practices. Changing corporate form is not a change in religious conduct. The denominational preference argument failed for the same reasons as the Establishment Clause claim.
Church Autonomy Doctrine (Count IV)
The church autonomy doctrine (also called the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine) provides that courts should avoid 'extensive inquiry' into matters of religious law and polity. The court noted that this doctrine functions as an affirmative defense — a legal shield against claims brought by others — not as an independent cause of action a church can assert offensively. No authority supports a direct cause of action under the doctrine, and the case does not require any inquiry into religious law. The claim was dismissed.
RLUIPA Claims (Count V)
Substantial Burden
RLUIPA prohibits government from imposing land-use regulations that substantially burden religious exercise unless the burden is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. The court applied the definition that a substantial burden must put meaningful pressure on an institution to change its religious exercise — a higher bar than mere inconvenience. The court found the only obstacle to Steelmantown's plans was its own choice of corporate form. No pressure was placed on Steelmantown to change any religious practice; it could establish a religious corporation under Chapter 315 with minimal effort. The court invoked the principle from Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014), that RLUIPA does not protect parties who seek through 'subterfuge' to avoid laws they prefer to ignore.
Equal Terms
RLUIPA's equal-terms provision prohibits treating a religious institution 'on less than equal terms' with a comparable nonreligious institution. The court found Steelmantown pleaded no facts showing any secular or other religious institution was treated more favorably when seeking to establish a private cemetery under § 307.01. References to green burial cemeteries in other Minnesota municipalities were insufficient because Steelmantown did not allege those were private cemeteries established under § 307.01. The claim rested on conclusory allegations of discrimination insufficient under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Disposition
Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. The claims of Bixby, Loving Earth, and Connell were dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. All of Steelmantown's claims were dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Read the full 39-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.