Welsh v. Perrier

Background

Plaintiff Katie Sue Welsh, proceeding without a lawyer (pro se), filed a Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 11, 2025, along with an application to proceed without paying the filing fee (in forma pauperis, or IFP). The complaint is 48 pages long and names 13 individual and entity defendants, plus 10 unnamed "John Doe" defendants described as evidence custodians, court personnel, and unknown conspirators.

Welsh alleges a conspiracy arising from an April 2025 traffic stop conducted by Shakopee Police Officer Seth Perrier. She contends that various defendants — including police officers, assistant county attorneys, Minnesota district court judges, and her own public defender — conspired to fabricate evidence, unlawfully arrest and detain her, maliciously prosecute her, deny her a speedy trial and effective counsel, and cover up wrongdoing. She further alleges that in July 2025, defendants attempted to deceive her into pleading guilty by misrepresenting a felony plea agreement. The complaint notes that the underlying state criminal case was dismissed in August 2025 without a conviction.

The Complaint's Claims

The complaint alleges 16 causes of action organized into 14 counts:

- Counts I–X: Constitutional violations under § 1983, including false arrest (I), false imprisonment (II), malicious prosecution (III), fabrication of evidence (IV), Brady violations (V, relating to suppression of exculpatory evidence), denial of speedy trial (VI), ineffective assistance of counsel (VII), conspiracy to deprive civil rights (VIII), denial of access to courts (IX), and spoliation of evidence (X). - Count XI: Alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (federal criminal statute concerning deprivation of rights under color of law). - Count XII: Alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). - Count XIII: Monell municipal liability claims against the City of Shakopee and Scott County, alleging unconstitutional policies or customs. - Count XIV: Three Minnesota state law claims — false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

Welsh seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.

Standards of Review

Because Welsh applied for IFP status, the court reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires dismissal of any IFP action that fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or that seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief. The court accepted Welsh's factual allegations as true and construed her pro se complaint liberally, while still requiring that the allegations raise a plausible (not merely speculative) right to relief under the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

Judicial Immunity (Judges Vraa, King, Webber, and Lennon)

Welsh named four Minnesota district court judges — Paula Duggan Vraa, Colleen G. King, Charles Webber, and Caroline H. Lennon — alleging they refused to rule on motions, denied substitute counsel, continued proceedings past speedy trial deadlines, presided over plea discussions, and set bail. The court held that absolute judicial immunity bars all § 1983 claims against the judges, because all of the alleged conduct was judicial in nature and within the judges' jurisdiction. This immunity applies even to allegations of malice, corruption, or conspiracy with prosecutors or a public defender. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).

Section 1983 itself bars injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts taken in their judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable — neither of which Welsh alleged. The court also found that Welsh's requested declaratory relief was retrospective (addressing past conduct) rather than prospective, and therefore could not be granted.

For Welsh's Minnesota state law claims against the judges, the court applied Minnesota's judicial immunity standard, which it found virtually identical to the federal standard. See Myers ex rel. Myers v. Price, 463 N.W.2d 773 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1.

All claims against the four judges were dismissed with prejudice.

Prosecutorial Immunity (Groh and McDonald)

Welsh named Michael J. Groh and Alexander G. McDonald, both assistant county attorneys for Scott County, alleging they pursued charges without probable cause, withheld exculpatory evidence, infringed on her speedy trial right, conspired against her, and engaged in deceptive or coercive plea conduct.

The court held that absolute prosecutorial immunity shields prosecutors from civil damages liability under § 1983 for acts "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," including initiating charges, approving charging documents, litigating prosecutions, negotiating pleas, and deciding to dismiss charges. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). This immunity applies even to allegations of malice or dishonesty.

The court also dismissed Welsh's requests for injunctive and declaratory relief against Groh and McDonald. As to injunctive relief, Welsh lacked Article III standing because the dismissed prosecution created no imminent risk of future prosecution — any future injury was speculative. As to declaratory relief, the Declaratory Judgment Act requires an "actual controversy" grounded in present legal relations; declarations about past conduct in a dismissed prosecution do not meet this requirement.

Welsh's Minnesota state tort claims against Groh and McDonald were also dismissed based on Minnesota's absolute prosecutorial immunity, which protects prosecutors from civil liability for prosecutorial acts even when improper motive or lack of probable cause is alleged. See Stresemann v. Jesson, 868 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 2015); Brown v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 314 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 1981).

All claims against Groh and McDonald were dismissed with prejudice, and both were dismissed from the action.

Claims Against Public Defender Harris

Welsh brought § 1983 claims against Andrew Lawrence Harris, her public defender, alleging he gave bad advice, refused to pursue certain arguments, mishandled discovery, and participated in plea negotiations in ways that harmed her. The court held that a public defender performing standard defense functions does not act "under color of state law" — a threshold requirement for § 1983 liability — because the defender's professional obligations run to the client, not the state. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).

Although Welsh alleged Harris conspired with prosecutors and judges (which could in theory create state-actor liability), the court found the conspiracy allegations were conclusory and unsupported by specific factual content showing an actual agreement to violate Welsh's rights.

The court also dismissed Welsh's IIED claim against Harris because the complaint did not allege facts showing "extreme and outrageous" conduct or "severe" distress attributable to Harris, as required under Minnesota law. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).

All claims against Harris were dismissed with prejudice, and Harris was dismissed from the action. (Note: the court's order states these dismissals are "with prejudice" as part of Order ¶ 1; the conclusion section also refers to some dismissals being "without prejudice," but the ordering paragraph for Harris specifies "with prejudice.")

Scott County Sheriff's Office and Shakopee Police Department

The court dismissed the Scott County Sheriff's Office and the Shakopee Police Department as defendants because, under both federal and Minnesota law, these entities are arms or subdivisions of the county and city, respectively, and are not separate legal persons capable of being sued. See Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992); Minn. Stat. § 373.01, subd. 1(a)(1); Maras v. City of Brainerd, 502 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). Because the county and city themselves are already named, the sub-unit claims were also redundant.

Both entities were dismissed with prejudice per Order ¶ 1.

Municipal Liability (Count XIII — Monell Claims)

Welsh's Monell claims against the City of Shakopee and Scott County alleged unconstitutional policies, customs, and failures to train. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), municipalities can be liable under § 1983 only for their own official policies, widespread customs, or deliberate indifference in training — not for the acts of employees under a respondeat superior (employer-is-responsible-for-employee) theory.

The court found that Count XIII relied almost entirely on boilerplate assertions, with no concrete factual allegations identifying a specific policy, a widespread pattern of similar misconduct, or a policymaker's decision. Welsh suggested that a "pattern" would be "discoverable through litigation," which the court held is insufficient under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard.

The court also dismissed official-capacity § 1983 claims against Perrier and Radde (which legally amount to claims against the City) for the same reasons.

Count XIII and all official-capacity § 1983 claims against Perrier and Radde were dismissed without prejudice. (The court noted that the City remains a defendant for potential vicarious liability under Minnesota state law for Perrier's and Radde's conduct, which does permit respondeat superior-type liability under Minnesota law.)

Denial of Access to Courts (Count IX)

Welsh alleged that unidentified court reporters, court administration, and John Doe defendants violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment right of access to courts by refusing to provide her with transcripts from her state criminal case unless she paid for them. The court held that a denial-of-access claim requires the plaintiff to allege "actual injury" — specifically, that a nonfrivolous underlying legal claim was hindered. The court found no such hindrance because Welsh had successfully accessed the courts by filing this very action.

Count IX was dismissed without prejudice.

Claims That Survive

After the above dismissals, the following claims remain and will proceed:

- Defendants: Seth Perrier and Fred Radde (each in their individual capacities), and the City of Shakopee (for potential vicarious liability under Minnesota state law). - Counts: I (false arrest), II (false imprisonment), III (malicious prosecution), IV (fabrication of evidence), VIII (conspiracy to deprive civil rights), X (spoliation of evidence), XII (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim), and XIV (Minnesota state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and IIED).

IFP Application and Service

Welsh's application to proceed without paying the filing fee was granted. The court directed Welsh to submit Marshal Service Forms (Form USM-285) for Perrier, Radde, and the City of Shakopee within 30 days, or the remainder of the case will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. The U.S. Marshals Service was directed to effect service on the City of Shakopee, and the Clerk of Court was directed to seek waiver of service from Perrier and Radde in their individual capacities.