George v. Bisignano
- Becky Thorson
- 0:19-cv-00145
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 7
In George V. v. Bisignano, Magistrate Judge Elkins granted in part a Social Security attorney's fee request, awarding $22,200 instead of the $34,212.97 sought.
Attorneys who represent Social Security disability claimants on a contingency-fee basis and seek court approval of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b); Social Security claimants whose withheld past-due benefits are used to pay attorney's fees.
What happened
In George V. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security (Case No. 19-cv-145), the plaintiff previously won a court ruling sending his Social Security disability case back for reconsideration, and on remand he was awarded past-due benefits. Social Security withheld 25% of those past-due benefits — $38,498.50 — to cover potential attorney's fees. The plaintiff's attorney then asked the court to approve a fee of $34,212.97 under the federal law governing attorney's fees in Social Security cases (42 U.S.C. § 406(b)).
The court reviewed the fee request independently, as required by law. The attorney had spent 14.80 hours on the case before the court, and a paralegal had worked an additional 10.75 hours. The court declined to count paralegal hours toward the fee calculation under § 406(b), finding no precedent in this district for doing so. Based on attorney hours alone, the requested fee translated to an effective hourly rate of approximately $2,238 — far above the highest rates previously approved in this district, which have ranged up to about $1,750 per hour.
Magistrate Judge Elkins found that the requested fee would be disproportionate to the time the attorney actually spent on the case, even though the representation was successful and the attorney was experienced. The court reduced the hourly rate to $1,500 — described as still the highest rate of this type approved in the district — and awarded a total of $22,200 (14.8 hours multiplied by $1,500). The motion was granted in part and denied in part. Because the earlier fee award under a separate law (the Equal Access to Justice Act) had already been applied to the plaintiff's own debt rather than paid to the attorney, the court did not require the attorney to refund that amount to the plaintiff.
The detailed version
- George v. Bisignano · No. 0:19-cv-00145
- Becky Thorson
- Mar. 16, 2026
Background
The plaintiff, George V., filed suit challenging a denial of Social Security disability benefits. Previously, Magistrate Judge Thorson granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, denied the government's motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for further proceedings. On December 16, 2020, Magistrate Judge Thorson awarded $4,285.53 in attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), a federal law allowing fee awards against the government in certain civil cases. That EAJA award was applied to delinquent debt owed by the plaintiff rather than paid to counsel.
On remand, the SSA awarded the plaintiff past-due disability insurance benefits (DIB). The SSA withheld 25% of those past-due benefits — $38,498.50 — to hold for potential attorney's fee payment, as is standard practice.
Plaintiff's counsel filed multiple motions for attorney's fees. The court considered only the third and operative motion (Dkt. 46), filed January 9, 2026, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which governs attorney's fees for work performed before the federal court in successful Social Security cases. Counsel sought $34,212.97, calculated as the amount withheld by SSA ($38,498.50) minus the prior EAJA award ($4,285.53). The Commissioner of Social Security did not oppose the motion but asked the court to conduct an independent reasonableness review.
Legal Standard
Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), a court may award a "reasonable fee" to a successful claimant's attorney for work before the court, capped at 25% of the claimant's past-due benefits. Courts do not simply rubber-stamp contingency fee agreements; they must independently assess whether the fee is reasonable. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). A reduction may be appropriate where: (1) representation was substandard; (2) counsel caused delay that inflated the benefit fund; or (3) the benefits are large relative to the time counsel spent on the case.
Analysis
Threshold: Successful Representation
The court found that counsel's representation was successful because it resulted in a favorable judgment for the claimant — a remand that led to an award of past-due benefits. This satisfies the threshold requirement of § 406(b)(1)(A).
Calculating the Fee Cap
The plaintiff's fee agreement provided for 25% of past-due benefits, consistent with the statutory maximum. The government verified that past-due benefits totaled $153,944.00, making 25% equal to $38,486.00. The court noted a $12.50 discrepancy between that figure and the $38,498.50 withheld by SSA but did not resolve the source of the discrepancy. The court used $38,486.00 as the cap and calculated the net fee ceiling (after subtracting the prior EAJA award of $4,285.53) as $34,200.47.
Exclusion of Paralegal Hours
Counsel's supporting exhibit showed 14.80 attorney hours and 10.75 paralegal hours. The court found no precedent in the District of Minnesota for including paralegal time in a § 406(b) fee calculation, and counsel provided no legal argument supporting it. Accordingly, the court excluded the 10.75 paralegal hours from the analysis, consistent with a recent district court decision, Gerry W. v. Dudek, No. 23-cv-02010 (ECW), 2025 WL 1125478 (D. Minn. Apr. 16, 2025).
Effective Hourly Rate and Reasonableness
Excluding the $1,075 attributable to paralegal time (10.75 hours at $100/hour, the rate used for the prior EAJA motion), the remaining fee of $33,125.47 divided by 14.80 attorney hours yields an effective hourly rate of approximately $2,238.20. The court found this rate far exceeds the highest rates previously approved in this district, which have ranged from approximately $900 to $1,747 per hour, with the latter having been found excessive.
The court acknowledged that counsel's representation was not substandard and did not cause delay, and that counsel is experienced. Nonetheless, the court found that awarding $2,238.20 per hour would result in benefits being large in comparison to the time expended — a recognized basis under Gisbrecht for a downward adjustment.
The court also noted that counsel has not yet sought a separate fee award for administrative work before the agency under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), and that the fee agreement did not cap total fees — factors the court considered in its reasonableness analysis.
Fee Award
The court set the hourly rate at $1,500.00 — described as still the highest approved rate of this type in the district — and awarded total attorney's fees of $22,200.00 (14.8 hours × $1,500.00).
The court declined to require counsel to refund the prior EAJA award to the plaintiff because that award had already been applied to the plaintiff's debt, effectively benefiting the plaintiff.
Disposition
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Dkt. 46) was granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's counsel is awarded $22,200.00 in attorney's fees.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.