George v. Bisignano
- Becky Thorson
- 0:19-cv-00145
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 7
In George V. v. Bisignano, Judge Elkins granted in part and denied in part a Social Security attorney fee request, awarding $22,200 instead of the $34,212.97 sought.
Attorneys who represent Social Security claimants on a contingency fee basis and seek court-approved fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), particularly those whose fee requests translate to high effective hourly rates or who seek to include paralegal time in their calculations.
What happened
In George V. v. Bisignano (Case No. 19-cv-145), a Social Security disability benefits case in the District of Minnesota, the plaintiff's attorney filed a motion seeking $34,212.97 in attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), a federal law allowing courts to award fees to attorneys who successfully represent Social Security claimants. The plaintiff had previously won a remand of his case, was ultimately awarded past-due benefits on remand, and Social Security withheld 25% of those benefits ($38,498.50) for potential attorney fee payment. The attorney's fee request reflected the amount withheld minus a prior fee award under a separate federal fee statute.
The court found that counsel's representation was successful and that the 25%-of-past-due-benefits contingency fee agreement was consistent with the statutory maximum. However, the court identified a problem: the attorney worked only 14.80 hours on the federal court case, meaning the full requested fee would translate to an effective hourly rate of approximately $2,238.20 — far exceeding the highest rates previously approved in this district. The court also excluded 10.75 hours of paralegal time from the calculation, finding no legal support in the attorney's motion for including paralegal hours under this fee statute and no prior district precedent allowing it.
Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins granted the motion in part and denied it in part, reducing the hourly rate to $1,500 — described as still the highest rate of this type in the district — and awarded a total of $22,200.00 ($1,500 multiplied by 14.8 attorney hours). The court also noted that because the prior fee award under the Equal Access to Justice Act had already been applied to the plaintiff's delinquent debt rather than paid to the attorney, the attorney was not ordered to refund that earlier amount to the plaintiff.
The detailed version
- George v. Bisignano · No. 0:19-cv-00145
- Becky Thorson
- Mar. 16, 2026
Background
This is a Social Security disability benefits case. Previously, Magistrate Judge Thorson granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. On remand, the plaintiff was awarded past-due benefits. Social Security withheld 25% of those past-due benefits — $38,498.50 — for potential payment of attorney fees.
Magistrate Judge Thorson had also previously awarded the plaintiff $4,285.53 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), a separate federal statute that allows prevailing parties to recover fees from the government in certain circumstances. That EAJA award was applied to delinquent debt owed by the plaintiff rather than paid to the attorney.
Plaintiff's counsel filed multiple motions for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The court considered only the third and final motion (Dkt. 46), filed January 9, 2026, which sought $34,212.97 — calculated as the $38,498.50 withheld by Social Security minus the $4,285.53 EAJA award. The Commissioner of Social Security did not oppose the fee request but asked the court to make an independent reasonableness determination.
Legal Framework
Section 406(b) of Title 42 allows a court to award a "reasonable fee" to an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security claimant before the court, capped at 25% of the claimant's past-due benefits. The Supreme Court's decision in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002), requires courts to independently review contingency fee arrangements to ensure they yield reasonable results. A court may reduce a fee award if the legal representation was substandard, counsel caused delay that inflated the fund, or if the benefits awarded were large relative to the time counsel spent on the case.
Fee Calculation Issues
The court identified several complications with the fee request.
Past-due benefits amount
Plaintiff's counsel did not provide the total past-due benefits amount or show the 25% calculation in the third motion. The Commissioner verified that past-due benefits totaled $153,944.00, making 25% equal to $38,486.00 — $12.50 less than the $38,498.50 Social Security actually withheld. The court used $38,486.00 as the 25% figure, yielding a corrected maximum fee request of $34,200.47 ($38,486.00 minus $4,285.53).
Paralegal time
Counsel's supporting exhibit showed 14.80 attorney hours and 10.75 paralegal hours. The motion provided no argument or legal authority for including paralegal time in a § 406(b) fee calculation. The court found no prior District of Minnesota decision allowing paralegal time in § 406(b) calculations and excluded those hours. Using a $100/hour paralegal rate drawn from a prior EAJA filing, the court subtracted $1,075 (10.75 hours × $100) from the adjusted fee amount.
Effective hourly rate
After excluding paralegal time, the court calculated an effective attorney hourly rate of approximately $2,238.20 ([$34,200.47 − $1,075] ÷ 14.80 hours). The court noted that this far exceeds the highest rates previously approved in this district, which have ranged from approximately $900 to $1,747.06 per hour — with $1,747.06 itself having been found too high in a 2025 decision.
Ruling
The court found that counsel's representation was successful and not substandard, and that no improper delay was attributable to counsel. Nonetheless, the court concluded that an effective rate of $2,238.20 per hour would be disproportionate given the time spent, warranting a downward adjustment under Gisbrecht.
The court reduced the effective hourly rate to $1,500.00, characterizing it as still the highest rate of this type in the district, and awarded a total of $22,200.00 (14.8 attorney hours × $1,500/hour).
The motion was granted in part and denied in part.
EAJA Offset Note
When both EAJA fees and § 406(b) fees are awarded, the attorney ordinarily must refund the smaller amount to the client to prevent a double recovery. Here, because the entire EAJA award had already been applied to the plaintiff's delinquent debt, the court did not order counsel to refund the EAJA amount, finding that it had effectively already gone to the plaintiff's benefit.
Additional Note on Future Fees
The court observed that counsel had not yet sought fees for administrative work performed before the Social Security Administration under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a), a separate provision, and that the fee agreement did not cap fees under either § 406(a) or § 406(b).
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.