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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled Mar. 16, 2026

Rich Elbert v. Rollins

Full caption

Rich Elbert, Jeff A. Kosek, Reichmann Land & Cattle LLP, Ludowese A.E. Inc., and Michael Stamer v. Brooke Rollins, Patricia Swanson, and Director of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:25-cv-03668
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
4
Civil Procedure
In one sentence

In Elbert v. Rollins, Magistrate Judge Docherty granted the federal defendants' motion to set aside a clerk's default entry and extended their deadline to respond to the complaint.

Who this affects

Federal government defendants who missed answer deadlines and had a default entered against them, and plaintiffs in federal court cases where government defendants fail to respond on time. Also relevant to litigants and attorneys dealing with clerk's entry of default under Rule 55(c) and motions for extension of time under Rule 6(b)(1)(B).

What happened

In Elbert v. Rollins (Case No. 25-cv-3668), five plaintiffs sued three federal government defendants — Brooke Rollins, Patricia Swanson, and the Director of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation — in the District of Minnesota. The defendants were served in November 2025 but missed two successive deadlines to answer the complaint, leading the Clerk of Court to enter a default against them in February 2026. The defendants then moved to have the default set aside, explaining that there had been initial uncertainty about whether service had been completed, that an attempt to agree on a time extension with plaintiffs' counsel had fallen through, and that the U.S. Attorney's Office was dealing with a staffing shortage and heavy immigration-related caseload.

The defendants asked the court to vacate the default and give them until March 18, 2026 to respond to the complaint. Plaintiffs filed a response stating they took no position on the motion — meaning they neither supported nor opposed it. The legal standard for setting aside a clerk's default requires the moving party to show "good cause," which courts evaluate by looking at whether the defaulting party acted culpably, whether it has a potentially valid defense, and whether the other side would be harmed if the default is lifted. A separate rule also required the court to find "excusable neglect" because the original deadline had already passed.

Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty granted the motion in full. The court found the defendants' conduct was not blameworthy given the initial uncertainty over service and the competing workload demands, that the question of a meritorious defense was neutral at this early stage, and that the plaintiffs had not claimed any harm from the delay. Applying those same factors to the excusable-neglect standard, the court also extended the deadline to respond to the complaint to March 18, 2026, and ordered the clerk's entry of default set aside.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Rich Elbert v. Rollins · No. 0:25-cv-03668
Judge
Katherine Menendez
Date
Mar. 16, 2026

Background

Five plaintiffs — Rich Elbert, Jeff A. Kosek, Reichmann Land & Cattle LLP, Ludowese A.E. Inc., and Michael Stamer — filed suit against three federal defendants: Brooke Rollins, Patricia Swanson, and the Director of the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. The opinion does not describe the underlying merits of the claims.

Summonses were returned as executed on December 9, 2025, reflecting service on all three defendants on November 19,

  1. The original deadline to answer was January 20,
  2. When no answer was filed, the court directed plaintiffs to notify defendants of their obligation and the risk of default. Plaintiffs did so. A new deadline of February 20, 2026 was set. Defendants again did not answer or submit a stipulation for an extension. Plaintiffs applied for default, and the Clerk of Court entered default against defendants on February 24,
  3. The court sent a letter alerting defendants to the default on March 6, 2026.

The Motion

Defendants filed a motion to set aside or vacate the entry of default and for additional time to respond on March 11, 2026. They offered three explanations for the failure to respond:

  1. Uncertainty about service: The U.S. Attorney's Office had no record of receiving a paper copy of the complaint, creating initial uncertainty about whether service had occurred. Defendants conceded that plaintiffs later provided evidence that service had in fact been completed, and defendants did not contest the validity of service.
  2. Failed stipulation: Defendants acknowledged that a stipulation for an extension of time to answer had been discussed with plaintiffs' counsel but was never finalized.
  3. Staffing and workload: Defendants' counsel was occupied with immigration-related detention cases and noted a staffing shortage in the U.S. Attorney's Office.

Defendants requested an extension of time to March 18, 2026 to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. Plaintiffs responded on March 16, 2026, stating they took no position on the motion.

Legal Standards

Setting Aside Entry of Default — Rule 55(c)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), a court may set aside a clerk's entry of default (which is distinct from a default judgment) for "good cause." The Eighth Circuit instructs courts to consider: (1) whether the defaulting party's conduct was blameworthy or culpable; (2) whether the defaulting party has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the non-defaulting party would be prejudiced if the default were excused. Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1998).

Extension of Time — Rule 6(b)(1)(B)

Where a deadline has already passed, a party seeking an extension must show both "good cause" and "excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Excusable neglect is a flexible standard that may encompass late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, carelessness, or circumstances beyond a party's control. Chorosevic v. MetLife Choices, 600 F.3d 934, 946 (8th Cir. 2010). Courts consider: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the other party; (2) the length of the delay; (3) the reasons for the delay; and (4) whether the moving party acted in good faith. Sugarbaker v. SSM Health Care, 187 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1999).

Court's Analysis and Ruling

Magistrate Judge Docherty applied the Rule 55(c) good-cause factors and found:

- Culpability: Defendants' conduct was not blameworthy given the initial uncertainty about service, defendants' effort (even if unsuccessful) to arrange a stipulation, and the competing demands of immigration-related litigation. - Meritorious defense: At this early stage, it was not known whether defendants had a meritorious defense, so this factor was neutral. - Prejudice: Plaintiffs did not claim they would be prejudiced, so this factor weighed in defendants' favor.

The court found good cause and granted the motion to set aside the default. Applying the overlapping Rule 6(b)(1)(B) factors, the court also found both good cause and excusable neglect to extend the response deadline. The proposed extension to March 18, 2026 was approximately two months from the original January 20 deadline and one month from the February 20 extended deadline — a length the court found acceptable in light of all circumstances.

Order

The court granted Defendants' Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Entry of Default and for Additional Time to Respond to Complaint (Dkt. No. 20), with the following specific directives:

1. The Clerk's Entry of Default (Dkt. No. 17) is set aside. 2. The deadline for defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint is extended to March 18, 2026.

The opinion does not address the underlying merits of any claim.

The authoritative version

Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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