Wright v. Swift County

Background

Pro se plaintiff Treasure Wright contacted Swift County, Minnesota multiple times between May and July 2025 to purchase tax-forfeited real property — property the government has taken ownership of due to unpaid taxes and makes available for public purchase. She alleged that Swift County and its then-Treasurer/Auditor, Katie Foley, failed to respond to some of her inquiries, responded too slowly to others, gave her inaccurate information, and ultimately prevented her from bidding on or purchasing tax-forfeited property.

Ms. Wright filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute that allows individuals to sue state and local governments and officials for violating constitutional rights. She brought four claims: (1) violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process; (2) violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection; (3) First Amendment retaliation; and (4) general government misconduct. She sued Swift County directly and sued Katie Foley only in her official capacity as Treasurer/Auditor — not in Foley's personal capacity.

Ms. Wright sought $3 million in compensatory damages, a declaration that Defendants violated her constitutional rights, injunctions requiring the County to restore its tax-forfeited land webpage, offer her a fair and documented opportunity to purchase tax-forfeited land, and provide legal easement access to any parcel she purchases, and attorney's fees if she retained counsel.

The Monell Requirement

Defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when no reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party's favor based on the evidence in the record.

The court granted the motion primarily on the basis of the Monell doctrine, derived from Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, a plaintiff suing a municipal entity (such as a county) under § 1983 must show that the constitutional injury was caused by an official governmental policy or custom. A municipality cannot be held liable simply because one of its employees acted wrongfully. This requirement also applies to suits against government officials sued only in their official capacity — because such a suit is treated as a suit against the government entity itself.

Ms. Wright's complaint contained no factual allegations identifying any policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violations. Defendants explained that their delayed or absent responses to Ms. Wright's inquiries resulted from administrative difficulties caused by combining the County's auditor and treasurer offices — not from any official policy. These challenges caused delays in responding to emails, limited website access to tax-forfeited property information, and resulted in some sold properties being listed as still available. Ms. Wright did not address these explanations or point to any evidence of a policy-driven decision in her response to the motion.

Failure to Establish Constitutional Violations

Beyond the Monell problem, the court found that Ms. Wright had not shown how the Defendants' conduct could amount to a constitutional violation on any of her theories:

Procedural Due Process Ms. Wright did not identify what protected liberty or property interest she was deprived of, or what constitutionally required procedure she was denied, as required under the Eighth Circuit's framework in Jenner v. Nikolas, 828 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2016).

Equal Protection Ms. Wright did not identify the basis for her equal-protection claim (e.g., race, sex, or another classification), nor did she identify any similarly situated person who was treated more favorably by Defendants. The Eighth Circuit requires identification of a comparator as the first step of an equal-protection analysis. See Adam & Eve Jonesboro, LLC v. Perrin, 933 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2019).

First Amendment Retaliation Ms. Wright did not identify what First Amendment-protected activity she engaged in, whether Defendants took adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that activity, or whether any adverse action was motivated by her protected activity — all elements required for a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983. See Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392 (8th Cir. 2016).

General Government Misconduct Ms. Wright identified no legal authority supporting a stand-alone "government misconduct" claim under § 1983.

Ms. Wright's Rule 56(d) Argument

Ms. Wright argued that Defendants' summary judgment motion was premature because no discovery had yet occurred, invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). That rule allows a court to defer a summary judgment ruling if the non-moving party shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specific reasons, it cannot present facts essential to oppose the motion.

The court rejected this argument. Ms. Wright filed a declaration, but her requests for discovery were described in the broadest possible terms — for example, seeking "internal emails, memoranda, policies, directives, and records" without connecting any specific request to a specific claim or explaining what particular facts she expected to find. The court held that general assertions about needing discovery do not satisfy Rule 56(d)'s requirement that a party show the facts sought actually exist and are necessary to oppose the motion. See Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2015).

Disposition

Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Ms. Wright's complaint without prejudice. Judgment was entered accordingly.