Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill

Background

Plaintiff Eniola Famuyide filed this lawsuit on April 20, 2023, alleging that Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. and Chipotle Services, LLC (collectively, Defendants) hired a registered sex offender, Lionell Bailey, who sexually harassed and sexually assaulted her at the Rochester, Minnesota Chipotle restaurant (referred to as the "Ear of Corn Chipotle Restaurant") where she worked. Bailey pleaded guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the third degree in connection with his conduct toward Famuyide on November 23, 2021.

Fact discovery was extended by court order to July 29, 2025. On May 30, 2025, Famuyide noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition — a procedural mechanism under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring a corporation to designate and prepare one or more representatives to give legally binding testimony on specified topics — for June 20, 2025, identifying 23 topics. Defendants objected to all but three topics and said they could not prepare a witness by that date. After extensive correspondence and a meet-and-confer call, Famuyide served an amended deposition notice on June 27, 2025, revising many topics and setting a new date of August 12, 2025, in Newport Beach, California, to accommodate Defendants.

On July 7, 2025, Defendants sent a letter withdrawing their objections to five additional topics (Topics 5, 6, 8, 14, and 15), meaning they had agreed by that date to produce a witness on eight of the 22 remaining topics. On July 30, 2025, the court held an informal discovery conference regarding outstanding disputes and advised the parties to proceed with the deposition and, if disputes remained, to leave the deposition open and allow Famuyide to file a motion to compel afterward.

The August 12, 2025 Deposition and Motion for Protective Order

At 9:01 p.m. on August 11, 2025 — the night before the deposition — Chipotle Services, LLC filed a motion for a protective order seeking to block testimony on Topics 3–8, 10–19, and 21–24. Plaintiff's counsel did not receive the motion until the following morning and had no time to review it before the deposition began.

At the start of the deposition, Defendants' counsel announced the corporate witness, Tammy Simpson, would only testify on Topics 1, 5, 9, 14, and 20 — effectively withdrawing the previously agreed-upon agreement to cover Topics 6, 8, and 15. When Famuyide's counsel pointed out the July 7, 2025 letter, Defendants' counsel responded that she did not know what document counsel was referring to.

Simpson testified she had started preparing for the deposition on August 8, 2025, and had spent only three or four hours preparing. On Topic 14 (reasons for Famuyide's termination), Simpson testified she was "assuming" and said she would need to log into the company database to answer basic questions — conduct the court characterized as clearly unprepared. Simpson's testimony also contradicted Defendants' own court filings (specifically, Defendants' Answer admitted Famuyide had requested a leave of absence, but Simpson said there was no record of such a request). At the close of the deposition, Famuyide's counsel stated the deposition was "not in any way, shape, or form concluded."

At the September 30, 2025 hearing, Defendants' lead counsel Matthew Treco acknowledged that he had drafted the motion for protective order and that he had "forgotten" that Defendants had previously agreed to produce a witness on Topics 5, 6, 8, 14, and 15.

Motions Before the Court

Two motions were at issue: 1. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order (filed August 11, 2025), seeking to bar corporate witness testimony on Topics 3–8, 10–19, and 21–24. 2. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and for Sanctions (filed August 27, 2025), seeking an order compelling a second deposition, monetary sanctions (fees and costs), and evidentiary sanctions for Defendants' failures.

Legal Standards Applied

The court applied several Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

- Rule 30(b)(6): Requires a corporation to designate and prepare witnesses to give complete and binding testimony on noticed topics that are described with "reasonable particularity." - Rule 26(b)(1): Defines the scope of discovery as any nonprivileged matter relevant to a claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. - Rule 26(c): Governs protective orders; requires the moving party to certify a good-faith meet-and-confer before filing. - Rule 37(a)(5)(A): Requires the court to award reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, to the party that prevails on a motion to compel, unless the opposing party's conduct was substantially justified. - Rule 37(d): Authorizes sanctions for failure to appear at a deposition; however, failure to appear is excused if a motion for a protective order is pending. - Rule 30(d)(2): Permits sanctions against a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of a deponent. - Local Rule 7.1(a): Requires a meet-and-confer before filing a motion. - Local Rule 1.3: Authorizes the court to impose appropriate sanctions for rule violations.

Analysis and Holdings

Evidentiary Sanctions — Denied

The court declined to impose evidentiary sanctions. Although Defendants filed their motion for protective order in a manner the court characterized as inconsistent with Rule 1's goal of "just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution, the motion was technically on file before the deposition began. Under Rule 37(d)(2), a pending motion for a protective order excuses a failure to appear. The court distinguished the cited case ProDox, LLC v. Professional Document Services, Inc., where the protective order had been denied before the deposition was to begin and the party failed to appear entirely.

Motion for Protective Order — Denied in Full

The court denied the motion for protective order on every topic. Several grounds applied across multiple topics:

Failure to meet and confer as to Topics 5, 6, 8, 14, and 15: Because Defendants had already withdrawn their objections to these topics in the July 7, 2025 letter and then reversed course without informing Famuyide or meeting and conferring again before filing the motion, the court found Defendants failed their good-faith meet-and-confer obligation under Rule 26(c) and Local Rule 7.1(a). Defendants' explanation — internal miscommunication and forgetfulness — did not excuse this failure.

Arguments based on outdated topic language: For multiple topics (including 16, 17, 18, 19, and 23), Defendants' brief quoted the original version of the topic rather than the operative amended version. The court found this a sufficient independent basis to overrule objections, and noted it was "unclear to the Court whether Defendants are intentionally reading a now-nonexistent 'termination' requirement into the amended topic, are intentionally ignoring the amendment, or drafted their briefs without any care for their accuracy."

Rejection of general objections: - The court rejected a blanket rule that topics using the phrase "all facts" are insufficiently particular under Rule 30(b)(6), finding no such rule in the cited cases and addressing each topic individually. - The court rejected the argument that use of the word "including" renders a topic insufficiently particular. - The court rejected the argument that topics were improperly duplicative of other discovery, declining to adopt any rule that prior written discovery forecloses a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on the same subject. The purpose of a corporate deposition is to obtain legally binding testimony that other discovery does not provide. - The court rejected the argument that 22 topics were excessive for a "single-plaintiff employment action," finding the number proportional to the needs of the case.

Topic-specific rulings (all denied as to protective order, all granted as to compel): - Topic 4 (Bailey's hiring): Reasonably particular; Defendants' argument that the topic was vague despite listing specific subcategories was "strained." - Topic 5 (reason for no criminal background check): Denied protective order; compelled further examination on the rationale for background check policies within the scope of Topic 1. - Topic 6 (management structure of the Rochester location): Reasonably particular; Defendants' argument based on prior individual witness testimony rejected because that testimony did not bind the corporation. - Topic 8 (sexual harassment and workplace violence training for Rochester managers): Reasonably particular; Defendants' duplicativeness argument rejected because the cited interrogatories covered different subject matter. - Topics 11 and 12 (initial and subsequent investigations into Bailey's assault of Famuyide): Reasonably particular and not duplicative of prior discovery. - Topic 13 (Chipotle's knowledge of Bailey's harassment of other female employees before November 23, 2021): Reasonably particular; not duplicative. - Topic 14 (reasons for Famuyide's termination): Witness was inadequately prepared; testimony contradicted Defendants' own Answer; the court rejected Defendants' hair-splitting distinction between "termination" and "separation." - Topic 15 (circumstances surrounding departure of five named employees): Defendants' protective order arguments were based on original topic language that Famuyide had already amended to remove the assumption of termination; the court found this approach "confounding." - Topics 16, 17, 18 (Bailey's misconduct; workplace violence at Rochester location; sexual assaults at Chipotle retail locations nationwide 2011–2021): All denied; protective order arguments again relied on outdated topic language. - Topic 19 (knowledge of Rochester managers January 2020–December 2021, including knowledge of manager Isaac Straitiff's alcoholism): Reasonably particular and relevant to negligent retention and supervision claims. - Topics 21 and 22 (steps Chipotle took to preserve evidence): "Discovery about discovery" is permissible where discovery compliance has been reasonably called into question. The court found adequate factual basis given testimony that restaurant employees communicated via text messages and GroupMe, none of which Defendants produced. - Topic 23 (EEOC consent decrees related to sexual harassment or assault, 2015–present): The court found Defendants made incorrect statements to the court and to Famuyide by claiming the Ear of Corn restaurant "is not and has never been covered by any EEOC consent decree." The court found the Jerome Consent Decree (EEOC v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-02128 (M.D. Fla.)) explicitly imposed nationwide obligations on Chipotle Services, LLC — including maintenance of anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies nationwide — effective before Bailey's assault of Famuyide. The court was "inclined" to find Defendants' objections waived as a sanction, and independently overruled all other objections to this topic. - Topic 24 (total number of employee sexual harassment complaints at retail locations, January 2017–December 2021): A single numerical figure; information likely obtainable from Defendants' existing database; proportional to the needs of the case.

Motion to Compel — Granted Except as to Evidentiary Sanctions

The court granted the motion to compel as to all disputed topics and ordered a second Rule 30(b)(6) deposition on Topics 4–6, 8, 11–19, and 21–24.

Sanctions Awarded

1. Attorneys' fees and costs for the Motion to Compel: Under Rule 37(a)(5)(A), the court awarded Famuyide her reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in bringing the Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. The court expressly found Defendants' objections were not substantially justified, noting that most were based on outdated topic language or a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. This award is against both Defendants and their lead counsel, Martenson, Hasbrouck & Simon LLP.

2. Travel costs for the August 12, 2025 deposition: As a sanction for Defendants' failure to meet and confer as to Topics 5, 6, 8, 14, and 15 before filing the motion for protective order, the court awarded Famuyide her attorneys' fees and costs for counsel's travel to California for the August 12, 2025 deposition, including hourly rate for travel time, hotel, flights, and other reasonable expenses. This award is also against Defendants and Martenson, Hasbrouck & Simon LLP, and is grounded in Local Rule 1.3, Rule 30(d)(2), and the court's inherent authority.

3. Deposition logistics and costs: The second deposition must take place in Minneapolis at Plaintiff's counsel's offices (or another location of Plaintiff's choosing), within 30 days of the order. Plaintiff is entitled to at least 7 hours on the record. Defendants must pay all deposition costs, including court reporter and video recording. Failure to produce a sufficiently prepared witness will result in additional, more severe sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2).

4. Mandatory participation of local counsel: As further sanction, the court ordered that Defendants' local counsel, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, must participate in all aspects of the case going forward — including reviewing all correspondence and court filings before submission, signing all filings, participating in all meet-and-confers, and appearing in person at all depositions and court proceedings.

Fee Determination Procedure

For both monetary sanctions awards, Famuyide must serve a statement of reasonable expenses on Defendants within 14 days of the order. If Defendants disagree, they must file objections within 7 days. Famuyide may respond within 7 days. The court will decide the amounts on the papers unless it determines a hearing is necessary.

Professionalism Notes

The court commented on several instances of unprofessional conduct by Defendants' counsel, including an email from Betsy Bulat containing statements the court found to be "unprofessional, personal attacks" on opposing counsel. The court cited the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct requirement of "a professional, courteous, and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system," which apply in this district.