A.D.G. v. Bondi

Background

On January 21, 2026, Petitioner Jerson A.D.G. was arrested and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). That same day, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus — a legal mechanism to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention — in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. On January 27, 2026, the court granted the petition and ordered Petitioner's immediate release from custody.

Petitioner's counsel represented him on a pro bono (no-charge) basis. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount of $4,125.70. Petitioner's net worth was stated to be under $2,000,000, satisfying the EAJA eligibility threshold.

Legal Framework: The Equal Access to Justice Act

The EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), requires a court to award fees and expenses to a prevailing party in a civil action against the United States unless the court finds that the government's position was 'substantially justified' or that special circumstances make an award unjust. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D), the 'position of the United States' encompasses both the underlying agency action (here, the arrest and detention) and the litigation position taken in court.

To be 'substantially justified,' the government's position need not be correct, but must be 'justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.' Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). If the prevailing party meets their initial burden of showing eligibility and alleging the government's position was not substantially justified, the burden shifts to the government to prove substantial justification. Huett v. Bowen, 873 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1989).

Undisputed Issues

Respondents — Attorney General Pamela Bondi, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, ICE Acting Director Todd M. Lyons, and ICE St. Paul Field Office Acting Director David Easterwood, all sued in their official capacities — did not dispute that Jerson A.D.G. was the prevailing party, nor did they challenge the amount of fees requested. The sole dispute before the court was whether the government's position was substantially justified.

The Disputed Issue: Substantial Justification

The government sought to justify Petitioner's detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1159, which governs the adjustment of status of refugees. The court noted, citing its earlier order granting the habeas petition (Doc. No. 7 at 4-6), that in doing so the government acted in direct opposition to its own guidance and disregarded clear caselaw.

Respondents argued that the legal question was unsettled in the Eighth Circuit, pointing to U.H.A. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-417, 2026 WL 558824 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2026), as support. Judge Frank acknowledged that unsettled law can sometimes justify a denial of fees under the EAJA, citing Bah v. Cangemi, 548 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 2008). However, Judge Frank expressly disagreed that the legal framework regarding detention of refugees under § 1159 is unsettled.

Judge Frank cited U.H.A. itself against the government's argument: in that case, Judge Tunheim found that the government's position 'flatly contradicts the plain meaning of § 1159(a) and contravenes forty-five years of agency practice.' 2026 WL 558824, at *1. The court concluded that the law is settled and the government violated it.

Because the detention and litigation position were treated together under the EAJA's definition of 'position of the United States,' the court found that neither the underlying arrest and detention nor the litigation strategy was substantially justified.

Ruling

Judge Frank granted Petitioner's motion for attorneys' fees and awarded $4,125.70 to Petitioner's counsel for work on the case.