Strickland v. Rueger
Kellye Strickland v. Nicole Rueger, in her individual and official capacities also known as Nikki; Elizabeth Clysdale, Referee, in her individual capacity; Corina Loya, Deputy, in her official capacity only; Ramsey County, a local government entity; Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd., a Minnesota professional corporation; Jenese Larmouth, Referee, in her individual capacity; Rebecca Rossow, Referee, in her individual and official capacities; Victoria Elsmore, Referee, in her individual capacity; Kyle Manderfeld, in his individual capacity only; and John and Jane Does 5-10, in their individual capacities.
- Donovan Frank
- 0:25-cv-02056
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 2
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
In Strickland v. Rueger, Judge Frank denied plaintiff Kellye Strickland's motion asking the court to reconsider its earlier dismissal ruling.
Litigants who have had claims dismissed with prejudice and are considering whether to file a motion for reconsideration in the District of Minnesota, particularly those who may be affected by local rules requiring court permission before such a motion is filed.
What happened
In Strickland v. Rueger (Civil No. 25-2056), Kellye Strickland sued multiple defendants — including county referees, a deputy, Ramsey County, and a law firm — and the court had previously dismissed most of her claims with prejudice (meaning she cannot refile them). She then filed a motion asking the court to reconsider that dismissal, convert it to a dismissal without prejudice (which would allow refiling), and grant her permission to file a revised complaint. She also asked the court to pause the federal case while a related state court appeal was pending.
The court identified two problems with Strickland's motion. First, under local court rules, a party must get the court's permission before filing a reconsideration motion, and Strickland did not do that. Second, even setting aside that procedural problem, the legal standard for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) requires showing either a clear legal or factual error in the earlier ruling or newly discovered evidence — and Strickland's arguments did not meet that standard. The original dismissal with prejudice had been based on the defendants' immunity from suit and on the court's conclusion that her claims could not be successfully rewritten no matter how many times she tried.
Judge Donovan W. Frank denied both requests — the motion to reconsider and the alternative request for a stay — finding no basis to disturb the prior judgment or to pause the proceedings.
The detailed version
- Strickland v. Rueger · No. 0:25-cv-02056
- Donovan Frank
- Mar. 20, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Kellye Strickland brought suit against a group of defendants including Nicole Rueger (in individual and official capacities), several court referees (Elizabeth Clysdale, Jenese Larmouth, Rebecca Rossow, and Victoria Elsmore), a county deputy (Corina Loya), Ramsey County, the law firm Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd., Kyle Manderfeld, and unidentified John and Jane Does. In a prior order (Doc. No. 103), the court dismissed Counts I and IV through XIII with prejudice, meaning those claims were terminated and cannot be refiled. The dismissal rested primarily on defendants' entitlement to immunity, as well as persistent pleading failures and the court's finding that the claims could not conceivably be successfully repleaded.
The Motion at Issue
Strickland filed a motion (Doc. No. 107) invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which permits a court to alter or amend a judgment to correct manifest (i.e., obvious and clear) errors of law or fact, or to consider newly discovered evidence. She sought two forms of relief:
1. Modification of the judgment — converting the with-prejudice dismissal to a without-prejudice dismissal and granting leave to file a second amended complaint. 2. Alternative stay — pausing the federal proceedings pending resolution of a state appellate proceeding.
In support, Strickland argued she could cure procedural defects in her complaint, specifically the misidentification of governmental actors and the characterization of challenged conduct as discretionary.
Court's Analysis
Procedural Bar Under Local Rules
The District of Minnesota's Local Rule 7.1(j) requires a party to obtain the court's permission before filing a motion to reconsider. Strickland did not file the required letter requesting permission, making her motion procedurally improper at the outset.
Failure to Meet Rule 59(e) Standard
Even setting aside the local-rule violation, the court concluded that Strickland failed to satisfy Rule 59(e)'s requirements. The Eighth Circuit has stated that Rule 59(e)'s limited purpose is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Ryan v. Ryan, 889 F.3d 499, 507 (8th Cir. 2018). Strickland's arguments about curing pleading defects did not identify a manifest error in the court's prior analysis. The court had dismissed the claims with prejudice primarily because defendants were entitled to immunity and because the claims could not conceivably be repleaded with success — neither of which Strickland's motion challenged with the showing required by Rule 59(e).
Stay Request
The court also found no basis for staying the federal proceedings pending state appellate action, and denied that alternative request as well.
Disposition
The court denied the motion in its entirety — both the reconsideration request and the alternative stay request.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.