Norris v. 501 HUDSON PIZZA CORP.
- Vernon Broderick
- 1:21-cv-08539
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 6
In Namel Norris v. 501 Hudson Pizza Corp., Judge Broderick dismissed the action for failure to prosecute after repeated missed deadlines.
Namel Norris’s action was terminated for failure to prosecute; 501 Hudson Pizza Corp. and 501 Hudson Co. LLC had not appeared or responded.
What happened
Namel Norris v. 501 Hudson Pizza Corp. began in October 2021, and the defendants did not appear or respond to the complaint. Norris served documents and later obtained amended summonses, but did not seek a default judgment.
The court repeatedly ordered Norris to seek a default judgment or show that he intended to continue the case. It extended the deadline once, but Norris missed the extended deadline and another later deadline, despite warnings that the case could be dismissed.
Judge Broderick found that all five factors governing dismissal for failure to prosecute favored dismissal, including the lengthy delay, repeated warnings, likely prejudice from further delay, and the court’s efforts to use less severe measures. The court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
The detailed version
- Norris v. 501 HUDSON PIZZA CORP. · No. 1:21-cv-08539
- Vernon Broderick
- Dec. 2, 2025
Background
Namel Norris filed this action on October 17, 2021. The opinion states that affidavits of service were filed in December 2021, but Plaintiff’s counsel later expressed uncertainty about whether the defendants had received service through the Department of State. After the court issued amended summonses, Norris filed affidavits stating that 501 Hudson Co. LLC was served on September 10, 2025, and 501 Hudson Pizza Corp. was served on September 13, 2025.
501 Hudson Pizza Corp. and 501 Hudson Co. LLC did not appear or respond to the complaint. The court directed Norris to seek a default judgment under the court’s procedures by April 15, 2025, and warned that failure to do so could result in dismissal for failure to prosecute. The court granted Norris an extension until June 2, 2025, but he did not seek a default judgment by that date.
On August 4, 2025, the court again ordered Norris to seek a default judgment by August 18, 2025, or otherwise demonstrate an intent to prosecute the case. Norris did not comply. After the later service of the amended summonses, his counsel requested an additional 45-day extension for the defendants to respond, citing a calendaring error. The court granted that request on September 17, 2025, but Norris still did not seek a default judgment or take other action to prosecute the case.
Court’s analysis
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits dismissal for failure to prosecute. The court considered five factors: the length of the plaintiff’s failure to comply, whether the plaintiff was warned about dismissal, likely prejudice to the defendants from further delay, the balance between docket management and the plaintiff’s opportunity to be heard, and whether a lesser sanction would be appropriate. Before dismissing, the court also had to find willfulness, bad faith, or reasonably serious fault.
The court found that all five factors favored dismissal. Norris had not taken action for approximately three and a half years after serving the defendants and had failed to comply with multiple court orders and deadlines. The court had expressly warned that noncompliance could lead to dismissal. Although the defendants had not appeared, the court found that prejudice from unreasonable delay could be presumed. The court also found that it had given Norris repeated opportunities to proceed and had considered less severe measures, including extensions and warnings.
The court concluded that Norris had persistently failed to comply with its orders and had not shown an intent to prosecute the action. It found that this amounted to at least reasonably serious fault, even if not willfulness.
Ruling
Judge Vernon S. Broderick ordered that the action be dismissed for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the action. In its discussion, the court stated that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate, while also noting that limitations issues might make the dismissal practically equivalent to a dismissal with prejudice. The operative order itself stated that the action was dismissed for failure to prosecute without separately repeating a prejudice designation.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.