Acosta v. The New York Times Company d/b/a The New York Times and Pamela Dryfoos

Background

Ara Acosta alleged that she worked for The New York Times as an Administrative Director for The Athletic and that Pamela Dryfoos was her direct supervisor. Acosta alleged that Dryfoos required her to keep working after she tested positive for COVID-19, criticized her requests for time off and her performance, and that the company ended her employment while she was on approved short-term-disability and Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave. She also alleged that Dryfoos later sought a replacement and that evidence of those efforts disappeared after Acosta complained through counsel.

The operative amended complaint asserted disability discrimination and retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), FMLA interference and retaliation, and retaliation under the New York Labor Law. Defendants moved to dismiss only the NYCHRL disability-discrimination claim and the FMLA-interference claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

NYCHRL Disability-Discrimination Claim

The court held that Acosta did not adequately allege that her COVID-19 infection qualified as a disability under the NYCHRL. The complaint alleged that she had a fever and sore throat lasting five days. Although the NYCHRL broadly defines disability, the court explained that the law still requires an illness or injury to meet a threshold of seriousness or permanence. The court contrasted Acosta’s allegations with cases involving serious respiratory problems, breathing difficulties, or other lasting effects.

The court rejected Acosta’s argument that the NYCHRL’s broad definition means any COVID-19 infection qualifies as a disability. It explained that earlier decisions did not categorically exclude COVID-19, but also did not hold that every COVID-19 infection satisfies the statute. The court therefore dismissed the NYCHRL disability-discrimination claim for failure to state a claim.

FMLA-Interference Claim

The court separately dismissed Acosta’s FMLA-interference claim. An interference claim concerns an employer’s denying or discouraging an employee from exercising FMLA rights. Acosta alleged that her leave related to her grandmother’s care, bereavement, and mental-health distress was approved from August 26 through November 18, 2024. The court found that she did not allege that Defendants denied or discouraged that leave. Instead, the complaint alleged that a human-resources representative provided leave forms and encouraged her to take leave.

The court also rejected Acosta’s reliance on performance concerns discussed before she first asserted a need for FMLA leave. According to the opinion, Acosta did not begin asserting her FMLA rights until at least August 8, 2024, after the July 19 performance meeting. The court further found that her allegations about failing to designate the leave as FMLA-protected were conclusory and that she did not allege prejudice from any missing FMLA notices. Because she received the leave she requested without obstruction, the court concluded that she had not stated an interference claim.

Disposition

Judge John P. Cronan granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Acosta’s NYCHRL disability-discrimination and FMLA-interference claims. The order did not rule on Acosta’s NYCHRL retaliation, FMLA retaliation, or New York Labor Law retaliation claims. The opinion does not state whether the dismissed claims may be refiled.