R.R. v. Bondi

Background

Juan Carlos R.R., a Cuban citizen, entered the United States with his wife and two children on August 1, 2024, and appeared at a scheduled appointment with U.S. Customs and Border Protection in San Ysidro, California. Customs and Border Protection charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), granted him parole permission to remain in the United States until July 31, 2026, and gave him a work permit with the same expiration date. His asylum and withholding applications remained pending.

Juan Carlos lived in St. Paul with his family and worked as a DoorDash delivery driver. The opinion states that he had not been convicted of a crime and had not received written notice revoking his parole. On December 21, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested him after an encounter involving his vehicle. Juan Carlos said the officers were masked and armed, that he did not know they were immigration officers, and that they fired multiple shots into his car. A Department of Homeland Security report stated that he hit two parked cars while trying to flee and struck an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer with his vehicle.

The federal government later indicted Juan Carlos on two felony counts of assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon and one felony count of assaulting a federal officer. In the criminal case, a magistrate judge released him on conditions on January 8, 2026. Immigration officers immediately detained him again and returned him to the Sherburne County Jail. The opinion states that the government did not produce an administrative warrant for that second arrest. Juan Carlos filed this petition challenging his continued detention and requesting immediate release or, alternatively, a bond hearing.

Statutory detention provisions

The government argued that Juan Carlos was subject to mandatory detention under three statutes: 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(c), and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), as amended by the Laken Riley Act.

The court rejected Sections 1225(b) and 1231(c) as detention grounds. It stated that the government had not developed either argument. The court also concluded that Section 1225(b)(2) did not apply because Customs and Border Protection had paroled Juan Carlos and expressly authorized him to remain in the United States until July 31, 2026. Section 1231(c) was also inapplicable because Juan Carlos was not arrested at a port of entry, was not subject to removal under the provisions identified in that statute, and had no removal order from an immigration judge.

The court agreed with the government that Section 1226(c)(1)(E) applied to Juan Carlos under the Laken Riley Act. That provision covers certain noncitizens charged with specified offenses, including assault of a law-enforcement officer, when they also fall within listed inadmissibility categories. The court found that Juan Carlos met the first requirement because he had been charged as inadmissible under Section 1182(a)(7) for allegedly lacking valid entry documents. It found that he met the second requirement because his indictment alleged physical contact and bodily injury with a dangerous weapon, conduct the court determined constituted assault under the statute.

Constitutional due-process analysis

Juan Carlos argued that mandatory detention without a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment because it was based only on criminal charges and not a conviction. The court agreed under the circumstances presented. It applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, considering Juan Carlos’s interest in physical freedom, the risk of an erroneous detention, the value of additional procedures, and the government’s interests.

The court found that Juan Carlos’s liberty interest weighed strongly in his favor because he had been paroled and permitted to work, had established a life in Minnesota, and supported his family. The court also found a significant risk of erroneous detention because he had not been convicted and because several recent federal-officer-assault cases in the District of Minnesota had ended in dismissals, charge reductions, or other developments that the court viewed as casting doubt on the reliability of some allegations and evidence.

The court concluded that the government’s interests in protecting the community and preventing flight did not strongly favor detention without a hearing because the criminal court had already determined that release conditions could address those risks. The court distinguished Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit decisions upholding detention involving people convicted of predicate crimes or held pending removal proceedings. It concluded that those decisions did not resolve detention based solely on unproven criminal charges under the Laken Riley Act.

Recommendation and disposition

The Report and Recommendation recommends that Juan Carlos’s petition be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It recommends ordering the respondents to provide him with a bond hearing no later than five days after a district judge adopts the recommendation. If the hearing results in continued custody, the decision must state the reasons for continued detention.

The recommendation does not call for immediate release. If the bond hearing results in release, the respondents would be required to release Juan Carlos inside Minnesota, at a safe time and place communicated in advance to counsel, with his personal effects in the respondents’ possession. The remainder of the petition would be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The opinion states that the Report and Recommendation is not a district court order or judgment and is not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit; objections were due February 25, 2026, and Juan Carlos’s response was due February 26, 2026.