Ge Y. v. Noem

Background

Petitioner Ge Y. is a native of Laos and a member of the Hmong ethnic minority who first entered the United States in 1989 as a refugee at age nineteen and subsequently obtained lawful permanent resident status retroactive to 1989. Following criminal convictions in 2002 and 2007, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and on October 16, 2012, an immigration judge ordered him removed to Laos. Both Ge Y. and the Department of Homeland Security waived appeal of that order, making it administratively final on October 16, 2012.

After completing his prison terms, Ge Y. was taken into ICE custody. Because Laos was not at that time accepting repatriated individuals — and specifically was not accepting Hmong deportees — ICE could not carry out the removal. ICE released Ge Y. on January 14, 2013, pursuant to an Order of Supervision. For approximately thirteen years thereafter, Ge Y. remained compliant with all conditions of that supervised release.

On December 23, 2025, ICE officers arrested Ge Y. outside his Minneapolis residence as part of an enforcement operation called 'Operation Metro Surge.' At the time of arrest, ICE possessed no warrant, and no documentation stating the basis for the arrest was provided to Ge Y. before or during the arrest. After Ge Y. had been arrested and transported to a facility in St. Paul, ICE signed a 'Notice of Revocation of Release' approximately four minutes before providing it to Ge Y. That notice stated (1) that Ge Y. had not been compliant with his release conditions, and (2) that 'due to changes in circumstances, ICE will pursue new efforts to remove' him to Laos. The notice provided no specifics regarding either the alleged noncompliance or the alleged changed circumstances.

On January 4, 2026, the government requested travel documents from Laos. Laos issued those documents on January 30, 2026. Ge Y. filed this habeas corpus petition — a request for a court order directing the government to release someone it is holding unlawfully — on March 2, 2026, seeking immediate release.

Legal Framework

Federal courts have authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to grant habeas corpus relief to individuals detained in violation of the Constitution, federal law, or a treaty. This jurisdiction extends to immigration detention. Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not) that his detention is unlawful.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, ICE must detain a person subject to a final removal order during the 90-day 'removal period.' After that period expires without removal being accomplished, specific regulations govern whether and how ICE may detain, release, or re-detain the individual. Two regulations are relevant: 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Section 241.13 applies when ICE previously determined there was 'no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future'; § 241.4 applies otherwise.

Under § 241.13(i), ICE may revoke an individual's supervised release on only two grounds: (1) violation of supervised release conditions, or (2) changed circumstances indicating a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. In either case, the regulation requires ICE to notify the individual of the specific reasons for revocation and to promptly conduct an informal interview giving the individual an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. Courts have held that these regulatory procedures embody constitutionally required due process protections (the Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without fair process), because individuals released under § 241.13 retain a protected liberty interest in continued freedom.

Analysis

Which Regulation Applies

The court found that § 241.13 governs Ge Y.'s re-detention. ICE's own regulations provide that before releasing a detainee, immigration officials must conclude, among other things, that travel documents are unavailable or that removal is otherwise not practicable. Because Laos was not accepting Hmong deportees when Ge Y. was released in January 2013, ICE necessarily concluded at that time that there was no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. This means § 241.13, not § 241.4, controls. The court noted that even if § 241.4 applied, the government would still have failed to comply with its requirements, so the outcome would be the same under either regulation.

Failures to Comply with § 241.13(i)

The court identified multiple independent violations, each of which it found sufficient on its own to warrant habeas relief:

First — No pre-arrest revocation. There is no evidence in the record that any authorized immigration official actually revoked Ge Y.'s supervised release before arresting him. The government did not allege that the arrest was made pursuant to a prior revocation. Arresting and detaining Ge Y. without any prior authorized revocation constitutes a patent violation of his due process rights.

Second — No prior notice. Section 241.13(i)(3) requires that an individual be notified of the reasons for revocation before re-detention, so that person can respond. The Notice of Revocation of Release was signed and delivered only after Ge Y. had already been arrested and transported to St. Paul. The government did not even allege that notice was given before or during the arrest. The court held, consistent with multiple other decisions in this district, that post-arrest notice does not satisfy the regulatory requirement.

Third — Notice was substantively inadequate. Even if the notice had been timely, the court found it too vague to satisfy § 241.13(i)'s substantive requirements. The assertion that Ge Y. 'has not been compliant' with his release conditions gave no specifics. The reference to 'changed circumstances' and 'new efforts to remove' likewise provided no detail about what those circumstances or efforts were. Without specific reasons, Ge Y. could not meaningfully prepare rebuttal evidence for an informal interview.

Fourth — No valid grounds for revocation. Setting aside notice issues, the government failed to demonstrate a proper basis for revocation as of the date of arrest. The government did not challenge Ge Y.'s assertion that he was compliant with all release conditions. Nor did it identify any changed circumstance specific to Ge Y. — as distinct from a general policy shift — that would support a finding of significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future at the time of the arrest.

Government's Argument About Travel Documents

Respondents argued that the later-obtained Laos travel documents satisfied § 241.13's requirements or cured any deficiencies. The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, Respondents submitted no documentary evidence of the travel documents into the record — the court found it could not rely on a bare assertion that such documents exist. Second, and more fundamentally, post-arrest acquisition of travel documents cannot retroactively cure the government's failure to comply with due process requirements at the time of re-detention. The court quoted another court's observation: 'that is simply not how it works.'

Respondents also argued that, if relief were warranted, the proper remedy would be to order ICE to redo the revocation process rather than to release Ge Y. The court rejected this as well, citing consistent authority within the District of Minnesota holding that the appropriate remedy for § 241.13 violations is immediate release, not a procedural 'do-over.'

Recommendation and Relief

Magistrate Judge Brisbois recommends that the habeas corpus petition be GRANTED and that the district court order:

Objection Period

This document is a Report and Recommendation issued by a magistrate judge, not a final order. Under ordinary local rules, parties would have 14 days to object and 14 additional days to respond — a total of 28 days. The court found that allowing the full period would materially prolong what it deemed an unlawful detention and would undermine the recommended relief. Exercising its inherent authority to manage litigation, the court shortened the objection period to 2 days, with 1 day to respond to any objection. The recommendation is not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals; a district judge must first rule on it.