Ge Y. v. Noem
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:26-cv-01700
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 16
Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate.
In Ge Y. v. Noem, Magistrate Judge Brisbois recommends granting a petition for release from immigration detention because ICE failed to follow required procedures before revoking Ge Y.'s supervised release.
Noncitizens — particularly those from countries that previously did not accept deportees (such as Laos) — who were released from ICE custody under supervised release orders and have since been re-arrested by ICE. This ruling is part of a pattern of decisions in the District of Minnesota holding that ICE must follow specific procedural requirements before revoking such individuals' supervised release.
What happened
In Ge Y. v. Noem (Case No. 26-cv-1700), a man named Ge Y. — a native of Laos and member of the Hmong ethnic minority who has lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident since 1989 — was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on December 23, 2025, outside his Minnesota home. He had been living under court-supervised release conditions for nearly thirteen years, during which he was fully compliant, after ICE previously concluded it could not remove him because Laos was not accepting deportees.
ICE arrested Ge Y. without a warrant and without giving him any prior notice of why his supervised release was being revoked. After the arrest, ICE issued a written notice claiming he had violated release conditions and that circumstances had changed — but the notice was vague, gave no specifics, and was delivered only after he had already been transported to a detention facility. Federal regulations require ICE to notify a person of the specific reasons for revoking supervised release before the arrest occurs, and to conduct an informal interview giving the person a chance to respond. ICE did none of this.
Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois recommends that Ge Y.'s petition for release from detention be granted. The recommendation calls for his immediate release in Minnesota under no greater conditions than those in his original 2013 supervision order, the return of all personal property and documents seized at the time of his arrest, and a bar on re-detaining him under the same legal theory rejected here absent materially changed circumstances. This is a recommendation, not a final order — the parties have two days to file objections and one day to respond to any objections, after which a district judge will decide whether to adopt it.
The detailed version
- Ge Y. v. Noem · No. 0:26-cv-01700
- Katherine Menendez
- Mar. 17, 2026
Nature of the Proceeding
This is a Report and Recommendation — an advisory ruling issued by a U.S. Magistrate Judge that must be reviewed and adopted (or rejected) by a U.S. District Judge before it takes legal effect. The ruling addresses Ge Y.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is a legal mechanism for challenging the lawfulness of one's detention. The magistrate judge recommends that the petition be granted and that Ge Y. be immediately released.
Background Facts
Ge Y. is a native of Laos and a member of the Hmong ethnic minority who entered the United States in 1989 as a refugee and later received lawful permanent resident status retroactive to 1989. Following criminal convictions in 2002 and 2007, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal (deportation) proceedings. On October 16, 2012, an immigration judge ordered Ge Y. removed to Laos. After his release from prison, ICE took him into custody but was unable to carry out the removal because Laos was not accepting repatriated individuals at that time. ICE released Ge Y. on January 14, 2013, under an Order of Supervision — a set of conditions he must follow while living in the community. For nearly thirteen years thereafter, Ge Y. remained in full compliance with those conditions.
On December 23, 2025, ICE officers arrested Ge Y. outside his Minnesota residence as part of an operation called Operation Metro Surge. At the time of the arrest, the officers did not have a warrant and did not provide Ge Y. with any documentation explaining the basis for his arrest. After the arrest — and after Ge Y. had already been transported to a facility in St. Paul — ICE issued a "Notice of Revocation of Release," delivered approximately four minutes after it was signed. That notice stated that Ge Y. had not been compliant with release conditions (without specifying how) and that "due to changes in circumstances, ICE will pursue new efforts to remove" him (without specifying what had changed). Respondents do not dispute that the notice was issued after the arrest, not before.
On January 4, 2026, the government requested travel documents from Laos. On January 30, 2026, Laos issued travel documents. Ge Y. filed this habeas petition on March 2, 2026, seeking immediate release.
Legal Framework
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, after a removal order becomes final, immigration officials may detain the individual during a 90-day "removal period." After that period expires, if ICE releases the individual under supervision, its ability to re-detain that person is governed by its own regulations: 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13.
Section 241.13 applies when ICE previously determined there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Section 241.13(i) permits revocation of supervised release on only two grounds: (1) violation of release conditions, or (2) changed circumstances that create a significant likelihood of removal. In either case, the regulation requires ICE to: (a) notify the individual of the specific reasons for revocation before the arrest, and (b) conduct an initial informal interview after the return to custody, at which the individual may present rebuttal evidence. The court characterized these procedures as constitutionally required due process protections.
Analysis
Which Regulation Applies
The court determined that § 241.13 — not § 241.4 — governs Ge Y.'s case. The court reasoned that before releasing Ge Y. on supervision in January 2013, ICE was required to have concluded that removal was not practicable, which necessarily means ICE had already determined there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. This is also supported by the undisputed fact that Laos was not accepting Hmong deportees at the time of his release.
Three Independent Due Process Violations
The court identified three separate, each independently sufficient violations of § 241.13(i):
1. No pre-arrest revocation by an authorized official. There is no evidence in the record that any authorized immigration official actually revoked Ge Y.'s supervised release before his arrest. The arrest appears to have been made with no formal revocation in place, which alone constitutes a patent violation of his due process rights.
2. Failure to provide prior notice. Even assuming the arrest constituted a lawful revocation, ICE did not notify Ge Y. of the reasons for revocation before — or even during — his arrest. The notice was delivered only after he was arrested and transported to another facility. The court held that post-arrest notice cannot satisfy § 241.13(i)(3)'s requirement of prior notification.
3. Substantively inadequate notice. Even if the notice had been timely, the court found it was too vague to satisfy the regulation. The notice failed to identify how Ge Y. allegedly violated his release conditions and failed to identify any specific "changed circumstances" that would support a finding of significant likelihood of removal. Vague, conclusory assertions cannot satisfy the requirement to inform the individual of the specific reasons for revocation so that the individual can present rebuttal evidence.
Respondents' Arguments Rejected
Respondents argued: (1) procedural challenges to § 241.13 are not properly raised in habeas proceedings — the court rejected this, noting that courts have repeatedly held otherwise; (2) the post-arrest acquisition of travel documents from Laos cured any deficiencies — the court rejected this on two grounds: Respondents did not submit the travel documents into evidence, and in any event, post-hoc justification for a detention that was unlawful at its inception does not cure the due process violation; and (3) if relief were warranted, the appropriate remedy would be a "redo" of the § 241.13 process rather than release — the court rejected this, citing consistent District of Minnesota authority that the remedy for non-compliance is release, not a second chance.
The court also noted in a footnote that even if § 241.4 governed (rather than § 241.13), Ge Y. would still be entitled to habeas relief because Respondents also failed to comply with § 241.4's requirements, including the requirement that a revoking official make an individualized determination considering specific statutory factors before revoking release.
Recommendation and Proposed Order
Magistrate Judge Brisbois recommends:
- The habeas petition be granted;
- Respondents immediately release Ge Y. in Minnesota under no conditions greater than those in his original January 14, 2013 Order of Supervision;
- Respondents return all personal effects, identification documents, and immigration documentation seized at the time of arrest;
- Respondents confirm Ge Y.'s release within 48 hours of any order adopting this recommendation; and
- Respondents be precluded from re-detaining Ge Y. under the same legal theory rejected here absent materially changed circumstances.
Objection Period
Although the standard local rule allows 14 days for objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the court invoked its inherent power to manage litigation and shortened the objection period to 2 days, with 1 day for any response. The court explained that the standard 28-day combined objection-and-response period would materially undermine the recommended relief by unnecessarily prolonging what it characterized as unlawful detention.
Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.