Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation
William Wade Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation; Bridgecrest Lending Auto Securitization Trust 2024-4; Computershare Trust Company, N.A.; and Bridgecrest Auto Funding, LLC
- Jeffrey Bryan
- 0:25-cv-01340
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 7
In Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corp., Judge Bryan dismissed with prejudice all eight claims by a self-represented borrower who tried to pay off a car loan with a bogus 'Demand Draft.'
Self-represented borrowers who attempt to discharge auto loans or other debts using bogus 'Demand Draft' or similar sovereign-citizen-style documents; anyone asserting that loan securitization relieves a borrower of repayment obligations; plaintiffs bringing defamation claims based on credit reporting without following the Fair Credit Reporting Act's procedural requirements.
What happened
In Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation (and related defendants), a Minnesota man named William Wade Acker bought a car through Carvana in late 2024, financed by Bridgecrest. Instead of making regular payments, Acker sent Bridgecrest a document he called a 'Demand Draft,' claiming it paid off his roughly $50,000 loan in full by drawing on a U.S. government account under a federal statute. Bridgecrest refused the document and told Acker he still owed the full loan balance. Acker then sued, raising eight claims including breach of contract, fraud, defamation, and others.
The court evaluated all eight claims after Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings — a procedural motion asking the court to rule in their favor based solely on what the complaint and related documents say, without a full trial. The court found that Acker's core theory — that the 'Demand Draft' was valid currency that wiped out his debt — has been repeatedly rejected by federal courts across the country as frivolous. His fraud-related claims failed because there is nothing unlawful about a lender bundling loans into securities, and Acker cited no law saying otherwise. His defamation claim was preempted by a federal consumer-reporting law (the Fair Credit Reporting Act), and he failed to plead the required elements of that law. His recoupment claim failed because recoupment is a defense, not a standalone claim a plaintiff can bring.
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Acker's complaint with prejudice, meaning Acker cannot refile the same claims in federal court. The court also granted Acker's request to file supplemental materials and considered them before ruling.
The detailed version
- Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation · No. 0:25-cv-01340
- Jeffrey M. Bryan
- Mar. 24, 2026
Background
In November 2024, plaintiff William Wade Acker entered into an agreement with Carvana LLC to purchase a vehicle financed through Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation (which noted it is actually named Bridgecrest Credit Company, LLC). In December 2024, Acker sent Defendants a letter enclosing a document titled "DEMAND DRAFT," purporting to pay off the full loan balance of $50,094.88 by drawing on "the account of the United States" pursuant to 50 U.S. Code § 4305(b)(2) and (b)(3). The document was not a check, cash, or any conventional form of currency.
Acker's letter claimed Defendants had received payment in full and that all related contracts were settled. He demanded written acknowledgment within 14 days. Defendants refused the Demand Draft, marked it "REFUSED," and informed Acker he remained legally bound by his retail installment contract and owed the full balance remaining.
In February 2025, Acker filed suit in Washington County (Minnesota) District Court, asserting eight civil claims: unjust enrichment, breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, recoupment, defamation, fraudulent concealment, failure to release lien, and invalid security interest. Defendants removed the case to federal court in April 2025 based on federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Rule 12(c))
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The standard for this motion mirrors the Rule 12(b)(6) standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim: the court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, but need not accept conclusory statements or bare legal recitations as true. Because Acker is self-represented (pro se), the court construed his complaint liberally, but noted that even pro se plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts and that courts are not obligated to entertain baseless filings, particularly those in the "sovereign citizen" style.
Acker also filed a Motion to Supplement Pleadings (Doc. No. 63), which the court granted and considered in ruling on Defendants' motion.
Analysis of Each Claim
Claims Dependent on the Demand Draft (Unjust Enrichment, Breach of Contract, Failure to Release Lien)
Acker's central theory — that the Demand Draft discharged his debt — was the foundation for these three claims. The court found the Demand Draft to be an "unintelligible document" with no legal validity as a negotiable instrument (a document, like a check, that can be transferred and represents an obligation to pay). The court cited prior decisions from this district and others finding that documents purporting to release debtors from obligations through "redemption and reservation of rights" theories are consistently rejected as frivolous. Because these three claims all depended on the Demand Draft being valid currency, they were dismissed.
Invalid Security Interest, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Fraudulent Concealment
Acker alleged Bridgecrest failed to disclose that the loan and retail installment contract would be securitized (bundled and sold to investors as a financial product), and that this failure invalidated the security interest in the vehicle. The court found no legal support for this theory. Securitization of debt is lawful and commonplace; courts have held that failing to disclose securitization is not per se illegal or unethical, and no authority holds that securitization relieves a borrower of the obligation to repay.
Defamation (Preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act)
The court held that Acker's defamation claim was preempted (displaced) by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Under the FCRA, a plaintiff suing a lender (as a "furnisher" of information to credit bureaus) under § 1681s-2(b) must allege three things: (1) that he notified a consumer reporting agency (such as Equifax or Experian) that it was reporting inaccurate information; (2) that the agency relayed his dispute to the lender; and (3) that the lender failed to conduct a reasonable investigation to correct the reporting. Acker neither alleged that the reported information was inaccurate, nor that he notified any consumer reporting agency of a dispute. The defamation claim therefore failed.
Recoupment
The court dismissed the recoupment claim because recoupment is a legal defense — a way to reduce what a plaintiff can recover — not an independent affirmative claim that a plaintiff may bring. Since Acker is the plaintiff, not a defendant seeking to reduce a judgment against him, recoupment was not available as a cause of action.
Disposition
Judge Bryan granted Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissed Acker's complaint with prejudice, meaning Acker may not refile these same claims in federal court. Acker's Motion to Supplement Pleadings was granted.
Reviewer note from the AI+
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.