Lauren Gryniewski v. Sleep Number Corporation

Background

Plaintiff Lauren Gryniewski is a commercial photographer specializing in architectural photography. Her business entity, Plaintiff Round Three Photography, LLC ("Round Three"), serves as the vehicle for her photography and videography work; she is its founder, owner, and sole member.

On July 8, 2022, Round Three and Defendant Sleep Number Corporation executed a Photography Services Agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement granted Sleep Number a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use photographs Gryniewski took of a Sleep Number store (the "Photograph"), but only "on the condition of full compliance with this Agreement," including payment and attribution requirements. The Agreement required Sleep Number to "conspicuously indicate Photographer as the source of the Photographs" for any and all uses, and expressly stated that "[f]ailure to properly credit or tag Photographer will constitute copyright infringement."

Plaintiffs allege that between September 1, 2022, and November 26, 2024, Sleep Number published the Photograph on its website, in nationally televised commercials, on its YouTube channel, and made it available for high-resolution download — all without providing the required attribution. Plaintiffs also allege that third parties copied and displayed the Photograph without proper license.

Procedural History

Gryniewski filed the initial Complaint on March 31, 2025, as the sole plaintiff. Sleep Number moved to dismiss, arguing that Round Three — not Gryniewski individually — owned the Photograph and therefore Gryniewski lacked standing. In response, on June 26, 2025, Gryniewski and Round Three executed two retroactive ("nunc pro tunc") assignments: the first purportedly assigning copyright ownership from Gryniewski to Round Three as of July 7, 2022; the second assigning those rights back to Gryniewski as of August 16, 2022. Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint joining both Gryniewski and Round Three as plaintiffs and asserting three counts: (1) copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501; (2) contributory copyright infringement; and (3) violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 1202, for removal of copyright management information. Sleep Number's original motion to dismiss was denied as moot given the amended complaint. Sleep Number then filed a new motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).

Rule 12(b)(1): Standing and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Sleep Number argued that because Round Three — not Gryniewski — owned the Photograph at the time of filing, Gryniewski lacked standing to bring the initial suit, and that standing must exist at the outset of litigation and cannot be retroactively created.

The court rejected this argument on two independent grounds. First, the court was not persuaded that Gryniewski lacked standing even initially, given her role as sole owner of Round Three and her identification throughout the Agreement as the photographer. Second, and alternatively, the court held that even if she lacked standing initially, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Dubuque Stone Products Co. v. Fred L. Gray Co., 356 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1966), supports the validity of post-filing assignments to cure standing defects where the defendant suffers no prejudice — which Sleep Number did not demonstrate here. The court also noted the inefficiency of dismissing when both Gryniewski and Round Three are now joined as plaintiffs. The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) was denied.

Rule 12(b)(6): Copyright Infringement (Count 1)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege facts sufficient to make a claim "plausible on its face." The court considers the complaint's allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.

Failure to Provide Credit

Sleep Number argued that failure to credit an author does not, as a general matter, give rise to copyright infringement under U.S. law. The court acknowledged this general principle but distinguished it: Plaintiffs' claim rests not on a freestanding right to credit, but on the contractual structure of the Agreement itself.

The court applied the legal distinction between a covenant and a condition in licensing agreements. Under Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1998): if a licensee breaches a covenant (a contractual promise), the licensor has a breach-of-contract claim only; but if a licensee fails to satisfy a condition to the license, the license never effectively comes into existence and any use is without authority — giving rise to copyright infringement. The court found that the Agreement's grant of a license was expressly conditioned on "full compliance," including the attribution requirement. Plaintiffs' allegation that Sleep Number wholly failed to provide attribution plausibly voided the license, supporting a copyright infringement claim.

Unauthorized Uses

Separately, the court found that Plaintiffs' allegation that Sleep Number used the Photograph in television commercials — a use not expressly authorized by the Agreement — independently supports a plausible copyright infringement claim. Whether the Agreement implicitly authorized television use is a question the court declined to resolve at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

The motion to dismiss Count 1 was denied.

Rule 12(b)(6): Contributory Copyright Infringement (Count 2)

Contributory copyright infringement (also called secondary liability) can arise in three ways: (1) vicarious liability, when a party has a direct financial interest in infringement and the right and ability to supervise the direct infringer; (2) the "inducement rule," when a party distributes a device or takes affirmative steps with the intent to encourage infringement; or (3) contributory liability, when a party materially contributes to another's infringing activity with knowledge of that infringement.

The court found that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any of the three theories: - No facts were alleged showing Sleep Number had the right or ability to supervise third-party infringers (precluding vicarious liability). - The allegation that Sleep Number "knowingly induced" infringement was a conclusory legal conclusion unsupported by specific facts (precluding inducement liability). - No facts were alleged showing Sleep Number possessed actual knowledge of third-party infringing conduct (precluding contributory liability).

Count 2 was dismissed without prejudice, meaning plaintiffs may potentially replead this claim.

Rule 12(b)(6): DMCA Claim (Count 3)

Plaintiffs alleged that Sleep Number "intentionally removed the copyright management information" from the Photograph before displaying it, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b). Copyright management information under the DMCA includes identifying information about the author conveyed in connection with copies of a work.

The court found that Plaintiffs' DMCA claim rested solely on the allegation that Sleep Number failed to provide the attribution required by the Agreement — but that is not the same as removing or altering copyright management information already embedded in or accompanying the Photograph. Because Plaintiffs never alleged that Sleep Number actually removed or altered existing copyright management information, they failed to state a claim under § 1202.

Count 3 was dismissed with prejudice, meaning this claim cannot be refiled.

Disposition

Sleep Number's motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint was granted in part and denied in part: - The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was denied. - The motion to dismiss Count 1 (copyright infringement) under Rule 12(b)(6) was denied. - The motion to dismiss Count 2 (contributory infringement) under Rule 12(b)(6) was granted; Count 2 was dismissed without prejudice. - The motion to dismiss Count 3 (DMCA violation) under Rule 12(b)(6) was granted; Count 3 was dismissed with prejudice. - Sleep Number's original motion to dismiss (Docket No. 10) was denied as moot.