Gary L. v. Bisignano
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:24-cv-03955
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 12
In Gary L. v. Bisignano, Judge Bullard upheld the Social Security Administration's denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits, finding the ALJ's functional capacity assessment was legally sound and supported by substantial evidence.
Individuals who have been denied Social Security Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and are seeking federal court review of ALJ decisions, particularly those involving mental health limitations and the ALJ's use of RFC language that differs from the specific wording used by state agency medical consultants.
What happened
In Gary L. v. Bisignano (No. 24-cv-3955-EMB, D. Minn.), Gary L. sought federal court review of an administrative decision denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. The case had a prior history: an earlier federal court remand had directed the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to clarify certain limitations in Gary L.'s residual functional capacity (RFC) — the assessment of the most a person can do despite their impairments — and to reconsider a medical opinion from a psychiatric nurse practitioner. On remand, the ALJ again found Gary L. was not disabled and could perform jobs such as laundry worker, store laborer, and industrial cleaner.
Gary L.'s sole argument on review was that the ALJ made a legal error by rejecting language used by two state agency psychologists — specifically the term 'brief, superficial and infrequent interactions' — and substituting his own RFC wording. Gary L. argued that 'superficial' is a widely recognized qualitative limitation distinct from the quantitative term 'occasional,' and that the ALJ impermissibly conflated the two. He also argued that a Social Security Ruling called SSR 24-3p required the ALJ to let a vocational expert decide whether the term was vocationally meaningful. The Commissioner defended the ALJ's substituted language as a clearer and adequate expression of the same limitations.
Magistrate Judge Elsa M. Bullard ruled in favor of the Commissioner. She found that the ALJ's RFC language — limiting Gary L. to 'occasional interactions' with co-workers and supervisors where his primary job was taking and executing instructions — captured both the quantity and quality of permitted interactions and was not inconsistent with the psychologists' opinions. Judge Bullard also found SSR 24-3p inapplicable because it did not take effect until January 6, 2025, several months after the ALJ issued his August 2024 decision, and the ruling itself instructs courts to apply the rules in effect at the time of the ALJ's decision. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
The detailed version
- Gary L. v. Bisignano · No. 0:24-cv-03955
- Eric Tostrud
- Mar. 31, 2026
Background
Gary L. applied for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under the Social Security Act. His application was denied initially and on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing and issued an unfavorable decision.
Gary L. sought federal court review. In prior proceedings captioned as Lange v. Kijakazi, No. 23-cv-17 (D. Minn.), Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright recommended remand on two grounds: (1) the ALJ had claimed the state agency psychologists' limitations did not go far enough, yet did not include a restriction on the quality (e.g., superficial contact) of interactions with supervisors and co-workers in his RFC, and (2) the ALJ needed to reconsider the supportability and consistency of the medical opinion of psychiatric nurse practitioner Jenny Bliss. District Judge Katherine Menendez adopted the report and recommendation and remanded the case.
On remand, the Appeals Council sent the case back to the ALJ and directed him to consolidate Gary L.'s claim files, associate the evidence, and issue a new decision. The ALJ held a telephonic hearing on July 12, 2024, where Gary L. and vocational expert (VE) Glee Ann Kehr testified. The ALJ issued a new unfavorable decision on August 5, 2024.
The ALJ's Five-Step Analysis
The Social Security disability evaluation uses a sequential five-step process under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The only disputed portion here is the ALJ's determination of Gary L.'s residual functional capacity (RFC) — the maximum the claimant can do despite his impairments — which feeds into steps four and five.
At step two, the ALJ found severe impairments: bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and primary insomnia. At the RFC stage, the ALJ concluded Gary L. could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following nonexertional (mental/behavioral) limitations: - Simple, routine, and repetitive tasks not performed at a fast production rate (such as assembly-line work); - Occasional interactions with co-workers and supervisors, limited to taking instructions and performing consistent tasks; and - No work around crowds where the primary task involves direct communication with the public (e.g., customer service or cashiering).
Based on this RFC, the ALJ concluded Gary L. could not perform past relevant work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers nationally — laundry worker, store laborer, and industrial cleaner — and was therefore not disabled.
The Legal Challenge
Gary L.'s Argument
Gary L. raised one argument: the ALJ legally erred by rejecting the state agency psychologists' language that he could handle only "brief, infrequent and superficial contact" with the public, co-workers, and supervisors, and by substituting different RFC language. Gary L. argued:
1. The 'superficial' limitation was improperly discarded. The ALJ dismissed "superficial" as "not vocationally defined" and without "vocational meaning under Social Security regulations." Gary L. argued that "superficial" is a recognized qualitative limitation (relating to the nature of interactions), as distinct from "occasional," which is a quantitative limitation (relating to the frequency of interactions). He contended the ALJ impermissibly conflated these two concepts.
2. SSR 24-3p required a different process. Social Security Ruling 24-3p, Gary L. argued, placed the determination of vocational relevance with the vocational expert, not the ALJ.
The Court's Analysis
On the RFC language
Judge Bullard found no legal error. An ALJ is not required to use the specific wording suggested by medical experts, as long as the RFC appropriately accounts for the limitations identified. The court noted that the ALJ himself recognized the psychologists' language related to both the quantity and quality of interactions — he simply expressed those limitations in different terms.
The court found the ALJ's RFC adequately captured both dimensions: - Quantity: "occasional" interactions; - Quality: limited to "taking instructions from supervisors and performing tasks consistent with those instructions," with no requirement for further engagement — a formulation the court found consistent with superficial interaction.
The court also rejected Gary L.'s contention that the ALJ impermissibly conflated "superficial" (quality) and "occasional" (quantity). The opinion found nothing in the record supporting that the ALJ conflated these terms; rather, the ALJ recognized the distinction and translated both limitations into defined RFC language.
On SSR 24-3p
Judge Bullard held that SSR 24-3p does not apply here because it did not take effect until January 6, 2025 — several months after the ALJ issued his August 5, 2024 decision. The ruling expressly states that federal courts should review final decisions using the rules in effect at the time the decisions were issued. Accordingly, Gary L.'s arguments under SSR 24-3p were inapplicable.
On substantial evidence
The court found the RFC was also supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. This included mental status examination findings that typically showed Gary L. was well-groomed, had normal speech, appropriate affect, cooperative attitude, normal mood, good insight, and intact cognition — though sometimes noting depressed, anxious, or irritable mood, and occasionally a flat or blunted affect. The ALJ also noted that Gary L. ceased treatment in January 2022 for no clear reason, had not returned to a provider, and had chosen to stop taking medications despite improved symptoms. The ALJ found nurse practitioner Bliss's opinion unpersuasive because symptoms showed improvement over time.
Disposition
Judge Bullard denied Gary L.'s request for relief, granted the Commissioner's motion, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.