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U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
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Procedural orderFiled Apr. 1, 2026

Pittman v. Rardin

Judge
Susan Nelson
Docket
0:26-cv-01662
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
6
HabeasCriminalCivil ProcedurePro Se
In one sentence

In Pittman v. Rardin, Magistrate Judge Elkins recommends denying Earnest Lee Pittman Jr.'s petition challenging his federal prison earned-time credit calculations because he never alleged he actually participated in qualifying programs during the disputed period.

Who this affects

Federal prisoners who were remanded into custody at sentencing but did not immediately arrive at their designated Bureau of Prisons facility, and who seek earned-time credits under the First Step Act for the transit period. This ruling underscores that such prisoners must also allege actual participation in qualifying programming during that period, not merely that their sentence had legally commenced.

What happened

In Pittman v. Rardin (No. 26-cv-1662), federal prisoner Earnest Lee Pittman Jr. filed a petition for a court order challenging the way the federal Bureau of Prisons calculated his earned-time credits under the First Step Act. Pittman argued that because his sentence legally began on December 14, 2021 — when he was remanded into custody after sentencing — the Bureau of Prisons wrongly started counting his earned-time credits only from March 18, 2022, when he physically arrived at his designated facility, costing him roughly 30 to 45 days of credit.

The court acknowledged a genuine legal dispute about whether the Bureau of Prisons' regulation conflicts with federal law, and noted that many courts — including others in the same district — have agreed the regulation may be too narrow. However, Magistrate Judge Elkins found it unnecessary to resolve that question because Pittman's petition had a more basic flaw: the First Step Act grants earned-time credits only to prisoners who actually participate in qualifying programs or activities, and Pittman's petition never alleged that he participated in any such programs during the disputed 94-day transit period.

Magistrate Judge Elkins recommends that the District Court deny the petition and dismiss the case. The judge also recommends denying Pittman's application to proceed without paying filing fees as moot. Separately, the judge denied without prejudice Pittman's request to seal the entire court record, finding the request too broad and not sufficiently tailored to justify overriding the public's presumptive right to access court documents.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Pittman v. Rardin · No. 0:26-cv-01662
Judge
Susan Nelson
Date
Apr. 1, 2026

Background

Earnest Lee Pittman Jr. is a federal prisoner confined at FMC-Rochester. He was sentenced on December 14, 2021, and remanded into federal custody that day, but did not physically arrive at his designated facility — the Federal Correctional Institution in Forrest City, Arkansas — until March 18, 2022. In June 2025, while reviewing his institutional records, Pittman discovered that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had not begun counting his earned-time credits (ETCs) until his arrival date of March 18, 2022, skipping the approximately 94-day transit period. Pittman claims this cost him 30 to 45 days of ETCs.

Legal Framework: The Statutory vs. Regulatory Conflict

The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) created a system allowing eligible federal prisoners to earn time credits by completing evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(B)(ii), a prisoner cannot earn ETCs for programming completed during official detention prior to sentence commencement as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). That provision defines sentence commencement disjunctively: a sentence begins either (1) when the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to the designated facility, or (2) when the defendant voluntarily arrives at the designated facility.

The BOP's implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(a), ties ETC accrual solely to the date a prisoner arrives at the designated BOP facility, effectively ignoring the first statutory trigger (being received in custody awaiting transportation). The court noted that a substantial and growing body of district-court authority — including within the District of Minnesota — has found § 523.42(a) to be in conflict with the statutory text, citing Maestas v. Eischen, No. 24-cv-4337, 2025 WL 4037762 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025).

Dispositive Issue: The Participation Requirement

The court found it unnecessary to resolve the statutory-regulatory conflict because the petition fails on a threshold ground. ETC eligibility under the FSA is not automatic upon sentence commencement; it requires that a prisoner "successfully complete evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities." 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). The court cited Crayton v. Eischen, No. 25-cv-1102, 2025 WL 2421014 (D. Minn. June 12, 2025), for the proposition that prisoners are eligible for ETCs "if, and only if, they are participating" in qualifying programming or activities.

Pittman's petition alleged only that his sentence had commenced under § 3585(a) during the transit period, treating ETC eligibility as a matter of status alone. He did not allege that he actually participated in any specific evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities during the 94-day transit period. The court found this omission fatal to the petition.

Sealing Request

Pittman also requested that the entire court record — all filings and proceedings — be sealed. The court denied this request without prejudice. Applying the common-law presumption of public access to judicial records recognized in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), and the Eighth Circuit's case-specific balancing framework from IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220 (8th Cir. 2013), as well as Local Rule 5.6, the court found that Pittman's blanket sealing request was not narrowly tailored, did not identify specific passages for redaction, and did not provide a focused proposal. The court concluded that less restrictive measures (such as targeted redaction) were available and that the generalized showing could not justify sealing the entire record.

Rulings and Recommendations

Magistrate Judge Elkins issued both an Order and a Report and Recommendation (R&R). As a magistrate judge, Elkins can issue binding orders on non-dispositive matters but may only recommend — not finally decide — dispositive matters, which must be adopted (or rejected) by a district judge.

Order (binding)

Pittman's request to seal the case record is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Recommendations (subject to district judge review):

  1. The case caption be modified so that Jared Rardin, in his official capacity as warden of FMC-Rochester, is listed as the sole respondent.
  2. The petition for a court order under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a type of challenge to the legality of federal custody or its conditions) be DENIED.
  3. This action be DISMISSED.
  4. Pittman's application to proceed in district court without prepaying fees or costs be DENIED as moot.

Objection Procedure

Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), any party may file written objections to this R&R within 14 days of being served a copy. Responses to objections are due within 14 days after service of the objections. The R&R is not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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