Rivera v. Flesvig
Alveto Rivera v. Evelyn Flesvig, Charles S. Fai, Philip W. Olson, and Anabelle Ochoa, in their individual capacities and in their official capacities
- Jerry Blackwell
- 0:25-cv-04517
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 4
In Rivera v. Flesvig, Judge Blackwell dismissed pro se plaintiff Alveto Rivera's civil rights complaint without prejudice, finding it failed to state any viable federal claim.
Civilly committed individuals in state treatment programs who seek to challenge facility transfers or treatment decisions through federal civil rights claims; individuals considering § 1983 suits for monetary damages against state agency employees in their official capacities.
What happened
In Rivera v. Flesvig, Alveto Rivera, a person civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, sued four employees of Direct Care and Treatment — a state agency — in both their individual and official capacities. Rivera alleged that his transfer between program facilities, a reset in his treatment progress, and being misled about the purpose of a psychological test violated his constitutional rights.
A magistrate judge recommended dismissing the case without prejudice and rejecting Rivera's request to proceed without paying court fees. Rivera objected, but the court reviewed his objections and found they provided no legal or factual reason to reach a different result, even reading his filings generously as required for someone representing himself without a lawyer.
Judge Jerry W. Blackwell overruled Rivera's objections and accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation, dismissing Rivera's complaint without prejudice and denying his fee-waiver application as moot. The court held that: damages claims against the defendants in their official capacities were barred by state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; Rivera's procedural due-process claim failed because a transfer between secure facilities and a treatment reset do not deprive someone of a protected liberty interest; his substantive due-process claim failed because the alleged misconduct — misrepresenting the purpose of a test — does not meet the 'shock the conscience' standard; and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments simply do not apply to his situation. Because all federal claims were dismissed, the court declined to hear any state-law claims.
The detailed version
- Rivera v. Flesvig · No. 0:25-cv-04517
- Jerry W. Blackwell
- Apr. 8, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Alveto Rivera, proceeding without a lawyer (pro se) and civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), sued four individuals — Evelyn Flesvig, Charles S. Fai, Philip W. Olson, and Anabelle Ochoa — in both their individual and official capacities. All four are employees of Direct Care and Treatment (DCT), identified in the opinion as a state agency. Rivera's complaint centered on his transfer within MSOP from the Moose Lake facility to the St. Peter facility, an alleged reset in his treatment progress, and claims that defendants misled him about the purpose of a neuropsychological test and then used those results in the transfer decision. Rivera sought monetary relief and asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (a federal law allowing civil rights suits against state actors), as well as invoking the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Procedural History
United States Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) on December 19, 2025, recommending dismissal of Rivera's complaint without prejudice and denial of his application to proceed without paying filing fees (in forma pauperis) as moot. Rivera filed objections on January 5, 2026. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district judge reviews de novo (fresh, without deference) those portions of an R&R to which a party specifically objects.
Analysis
Eleventh Amendment Immunity — Official-Capacity Claims
Because the defendants are employees of DCT, a state agency, claims against them in their official capacities are effectively claims against the State of Minnesota. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against a state in federal court unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has overridden it. The court held that Minnesota has not waived its immunity for § 1983 damages actions, and § 1983 itself does not abrogate that immunity, citing Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Accordingly, the official-capacity damages claims were barred.
Procedural Due Process — No Protected Liberty Interest
A procedural due process claim (the right to fair procedures before the government takes away a protected interest) requires, as a threshold matter, that a plaintiff identify a protected liberty or property interest. The court held Rivera failed to do so. Rivera's theory was that his transfer between MSOP facilities and the resulting reset in treatment progression implicated a liberty interest. The court rejected this, noting that generally no liberty interest attaches to a specific place of confinement absent a drastic departure from the ordinary conditions of a secure facility. The complaint alleged only an intra-program transfer and a treatment reset — not materially different conditions of confinement, additional physical restraints, or comparable hardship. Without a cognizable liberty interest, no procedural due process claim could proceed.
Substantive Due Process — 'Shock the Conscience' Standard
Substantive due process (a constitutional protection against government conduct so arbitrary or egregious it violates fundamental fairness, regardless of procedures used) is reserved for conduct that 'shocks the conscience,' per County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). Rivera alleged defendants misled him about the purpose of a neuropsychological test and used the results to support the transfer decision. Accepting those allegations as true, the court found the conduct described — at most misrepresentation or poor professional judgment in a treatment setting — did not approach the level of brutal, arbitrary, or oppressive conduct required to satisfy the constitutional threshold.
Fifth and Sixth Amendment Claims
The court rejected Rivera's reliance on the Fifth Amendment because that amendment's due process clause applies to federal actors, not state officials; any due process claim against these defendants arises, if at all, under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim because that amendment applies only to criminal prosecutions, and Rivera's claims concern civil commitment and treatment — not a criminal proceeding.
Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State-Law Claims
Because all federal claims were dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (the power to hear related state-law claims alongside federal ones) over any state-law claims, citing Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2016).
Disposition
Judge Blackwell overruled Rivera's objections, accepted the R&R (based on the court's own independent analysis rather than wholesale adoption of the magistrate's reasoning), dismissed Rivera's complaint without prejudice, and denied Rivera's application to proceed without paying fees as moot.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.