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D. Minn.Substantive rulingFiled Apr. 23, 2026

Daramola v. Minnesota

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:24-cv-00761
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
29
EmploymentSummary JudgmentCivil ProcedurePro Se
In one sentence

In Daramola v. Dungarvin, Judge Menendez denied more discovery, granted summary judgment to Dungarvin, and dismissed the race-discrimination case with prejudice.

Who this affects

Femi Joseph Daramola and Dungarvin Minnesota, LLC; the ruling ends Daramola’s Title VII race-discrimination action and bars refiling that action.

What happened

In Femi Joseph Daramola v. Dungarvin Minnesota, LLC, Dungarvin fired Daramola after a vulnerable adult under his supervision drank windshield washer fluid and suffered serious injuries. Daramola, who represented himself, claimed the company fired him because of his race.

The court rejected Daramola’s request for more discovery because he waited too long to seek it and did not show a good reason for missing the discovery deadline. The court also found that he presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Dungarvin’s stated reason—gross negligence and failure to follow safety procedures—was a cover for racial discrimination.

Judge Menendez denied Daramola’s request to change the scheduling order and conduct limited discovery, granted Dungarvin’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the action with prejudice.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Daramola v. Minnesota · No. 0:24-cv-00761
Judge
Katherine Menendez
Date
Apr. 23, 2026

Background

Femi Joseph Daramola worked for Dungarvin Minnesota, LLC, as a Mental Health Specialist II. He was terminated in February 2023 after an incident at Dungarvin’s Jordan home. A vulnerable adult whom Daramola was assigned to supervise went into a garage, obtained windshield washer fluid, and drank it. She was hospitalized for three days and required dialysis.

Dungarvin’s investigation concluded that Daramola had not followed the required overnight supervision procedures. The company determined that he failed to provide adequate supervision and terminated him for gross negligence and failure to fulfill his job responsibilities. Daramola disputed the company’s account, challenged the fairness of the investigation, and claimed that Dungarvin terminated him because he is Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Request for Additional Discovery

Daramola asked the court to postpone the summary-judgment ruling, modify the scheduling order, and allow additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). He argued that Dungarvin had objected to his written discovery requests and had not produced documents in its possession.

The court denied the request. It concluded that Daramola did not show a good reason why he could not obtain the information earlier and had not diligently pursued discovery. The fact-discovery deadline was November 17, 2025, but Daramola did not serve his document requests until October 30, 2025—too late for the requests to be completed by the deadline. The court also denied the request to modify the scheduling order.

Title VII Claim

The court applied the summary-judgment standard, under which judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court assumed, without deciding in detail, that Daramola had established the initial requirements for a race-discrimination claim. It found that Dungarvin had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination: Daramola allegedly failed to supervise the vulnerable adult as required, resulting in serious harm. Dungarvin’s policies allowed immediate termination for gross negligence that endangered the health or safety of residents.

The court then considered whether Daramola had shown pretext—that Dungarvin’s stated reason was not the real reason and that race discrimination actually motivated the termination. It found no direct evidence of racial bias. The voicemail from Dungarvin supervisor Caitlin Pope did not mention Daramola’s race or admit that he had done nothing wrong.

The court also rejected Daramola’s circumstantial evidence. He did not identify a similarly situated employee of another race who had engaged in comparable conduct and received more favorable treatment. The employees he named had different positions, responsibilities, or supervisors, and Daramola had no specific information about their alleged misconduct or discipline. His general belief that white employees had been treated more favorably was insufficient.

The court further found that Daramola presented no evidence that Dungarvin’s investigation was conducted differently because of his race, that the decision-makers did not honestly believe the stated reason for termination, or that the investigation was designed to produce a discriminatory result. The record showed that Dungarvin reviewed documents and video, interviewed witnesses, interviewed Daramola, and gave him an opportunity to review his statement. The court also noted that an independent investigation by the Minnesota Department of Human Services reached similar factual conclusions, although that later investigation was not the basis for Dungarvin’s termination decision.

Finally, the court found that the speed of the termination did not support an inference of discrimination. Dungarvin suspended Daramola four days after the incident, completed its investigation, and terminated him about three weeks after the incident. Daramola identified no evidence that Dungarvin departed from its policies or treated comparable employees differently.

Disposition

The court held that Daramola had not presented enough evidence to create a genuine dispute about whether Dungarvin’s stated reason was a cover for race discrimination. It denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify the Pretrial Scheduling Order and for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery, granted Dungarvin’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court directed that judgment be entered.

The authoritative version

Read the full 29-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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