Tom Anderson v. Township

Background

Windemere Township’s Board of Supervisors adopted a shoreland-management ordinance in 2025 that imposed new restrictions on property near lakes. The plaintiffs, who own land in Windemere Township, filed this lawsuit seeking to invalidate the 2025 Ordinance on constitutional, statutory, and common-law grounds. They alleged that the ordinance made many shoreland lots nonconforming and severely restricted property use.

The 2025 Ordinance affected the property plans of several plaintiffs. Tom Anderson said it made his plans to build a home impossible. Lynn Folsted said minimum-lot-size requirements prevented her from dividing property she had combined in 2015. Daniel Benzie said the ordinance prevented further subdivision and delayed plans to transfer property to his granddaughter.

The Board later repealed the 2025 Ordinance and adopted the 2026 Ordinance on April 7, 2026. The plaintiffs described the new ordinance as materially more restrictive. They moved for a preliminary injunction—a temporary court order intended to prevent harm before a final decision—seeking to block the 2026 Ordinance during the litigation.

Preliminary-Injunction Standard

The court explained that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm without preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities favors an injunction; and (4) that an injunction serves the public interest. The court described a preliminary injunction as an extraordinary remedy requiring a clear showing of entitlement.

Why the Court Denied the Motion

The court first found a mismatch between the plaintiffs’ complaint and their requested injunction. The complaint challenged the 2025 Ordinance, but the motion sought to enjoin the 2026 Ordinance. The court treated those as different ordinances adopted through different legislative processes. Because the operative complaint did not challenge the 2026 Ordinance, the court concluded that the merits of a challenge to that ordinance would not be addressed later in the case. The plaintiffs’ new assertions about the 2026 Ordinance might support additional claims, the court said, but could not support a preliminary injunction in the lawsuit as then presented.

The court also noted that the plaintiffs’ opening brief analyzed their likelihood of success on the 2025 Ordinance, not the 2026 Ordinance. Arguments directed at the 2026 Ordinance first raised in the reply brief came too late for the court to consider them as the basis for the motion. The court stated that the plaintiffs had not established a violation resulting from the 2026 Ordinance.

The court separately concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm. The construction and property-planning injuries described by Anderson, Folsted, and Benzie had already occurred and were largely attributed to the 2025 Ordinance. The plaintiffs did not explain how the 2026 Ordinance would injure them more severely. The court said past harm and speculative future harm do not qualify as irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction.

The court also rejected Anderson’s general assertion that construction costs might increase under the 2026 Ordinance. It found those allegations conclusory and stated that economic losses generally are not irreparable when they can be recovered. Finally, the court said alleged harms to the public, including public spending and instability in land-use regulations, could not alone establish irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.

Disposition

Judge Laura M. Provinzino ordered that the plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 31, was DENIED. The opinion did not decide the ultimate validity of the 2026 Ordinance, and the court did not rule on the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ claims had become moot.